Contesting land and identity: the case of women cultivators and Fulani cattle herders in Wum, northwest region of Cameroon by Angwafo, P.T.
                                
 
  
Contesting Land and Identity: the case of Women Cultivators and Fulani 
Cattle Herders in Wum, Northwest Region of Cameroon 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts (Research) in 
African Studies 
 
By Peter, Tse Angwafo 
                                                              
                                                             
                                                                 Supervisors: 
Prof. dr. Mirjam de Bruijn 
Dr Harry Wels 
 
University of Leiden, The Netherlands 
August, 2014 
 Contents 
Dedication vi 
Acknowledgement vii 
Acronyms ix 
Abstract xi 
CHAPTER ONE: FACING MENCHUM VALLEY AND DANCING THE PILOT 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 The Problem Statement 2 
1.3 Theoretical Approaches 5 
1.3.1 Towards a Definition of Conflict 5 
1.3.2 Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 6 
1.3.3 Scarcity or Abundance of Natural Resources? 8 
1.3.4 Conflicts Resulting from the Politics of Belonging and Identity 10 
CHAPTER TWO: THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF 
WUM CENTRAL SUB-DIVISION 13 
2.1 Introduction 13 
2.1.1 Situating the Site of the Research 13 
2.2 The Peopling of Wum Central Sub-division 16 
2.2.1 The Aghem Federation 17 
2.2.2 Aghem as ‘First Comers’ 18 
2.2.3 Aghem Social and Political Organisation 19 
2.3 The Chiefdom of Bu 19 
ii 
 
2.4 Matrilineal Succession as the Foundation of the Aghem and Bu Chiefdoms 21 
2.5 The Fulani Cattle Herdsmen 23 
2.6 Methodology of Data Collection 24 
CHAPTER THREE: CHANGING LAND TENURE AND SHIFTING PATTERNS OF 
LAND USE IN WUM CENTRAL 27 
3.1 Introduction 27 
3.2 Overview of Customary Land Tenure and the Traditional Agricultural Economy 28 
3.3 The Introduction of Colonial Land Laws and Policies 32 
3.3.1 Dividing the People, Sharing the Land: Colonial Land Expropriation Policy 33 
3.4 The Introduction of Cash Economy 37 
3.4.1 The Introduction of Rice Cultivation in Bu 38 
CHAPTER FOUR: ‘WE ARE STRANGERS IN OUR LAND AND OUR CHIEFS NOW 
BELONG TO THE FULANI ’: THE PARADOXES OF CHANGING PATRON/CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIPS IN LAND DEALS 43 
4.1 Introduction 43 
4.2 Understanding Patron-Client Relationships 45 
4.2.1 People as the Source of Authority of the Chief 47 
4.2.2 The Changing Context of Authority of Chiefs: From Wealth in People to Wealth in 
Land 50 
4.2.3 Being or Becoming a Patron or a Client 51 
4.3 Attribution of Land to Strangers and the Different forms of Social Exchanges 53 
4.4 The Nexus between Land and Patronage as Instruments of Political Mobilisation 56 
iii 
 
4.4.1 The September 30th 2013 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections 56 
4.4.2 Election Campaigns: The Politics of Gift-giving and Promises 58 
4.5 Mistrust and Disillusionment 62 
4.6 Why do Patron-Client Relationships Persist? 65 
CHAPTER FIVE: LAND GOVERNANCE, WOMEN, AND THE POLITICS OF 
DISPOSSESSION 67 
5.1 Introduction 67 
5.2 Towards the 1974 Land Ordinances 68 
5.2.1 The Basic Tenets the 1974 Land Ordinances 71 
5.3 Traditional Rulers facing the State 75 
5.4 Land Acquisition for ‘Public Purposes’ and the Politics of Dispossession 78 
5.5 The 1974 Law Ordinances: Women and Vulnerable Groups as Losers 84 
5.6 Closing the Gaps: Towards a new Land Reform? 85 
CHAPTER SIX: LAND, CATTLE AND WEALTH: THE SORE OF FULANI IN WUM 
CENTRAL SUB-DIVISION 89 
6.1 Introduction 89 
6.2 The Introduction of Extensive Cattle Herding Methods 93 
6.3 The Genesis of the ‘Unholy Alliance’ 99 
6.4 Farmer/Herder Relations 104 
6.5 MBOSCUDA and Citizenship Rights: The Fulani Response 106 
6.6 The 1990 Liberty Laws and Fulani right to Citizenship 109 
iv 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: ‘WHEN TWO ELEPHANTS FIGHT THE GRASS SUFFERS’: THE 
POLITICS OF LAND CONFLICTS AND CONTESTING IDENTITIES. 113 
7.1 Introduction 113 
7.2 Women Protests and Confrontations with Fulani Herders 114 
7.3 Why Women? 115 
7.4 Women’s Resistance to the Infringement of their Sphere 117 
7.5 Chiefs Facing the Women 119 
7.6 A Panorama of Conflicts over Crop damages 121 
7.7 Encroachments into Farmlands/grazing Fields 124 
7.8 Ritual and Burial Sites as Strategy for Land Claims 126 
7.9 The First Comer/Late Comer Thesis 128 
7.10 Why are these Conflicts Persistent? 130 
CHAPTER EIGHT: ‘LAND IS NOW MONEY’: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC ELITES IN LAND DEALS 135 
8.1 Introduction: 135 
8.2 Understanding the Phenomenon of Land Grabbing 135 
8.3 The Drivers Behind Land Grab 136 
8.4 The State and Domestic Elites as Vectors for Land Commercialisation 139 
8.5 Elites and the ‘Sons and Daughters of the Soil’ Syndrome 142 
8.6 Why Sell the Land? 143 
8.7 The ‘Silent Group’ and the Fulanisation of the Farmer-grazer Conflicts 144 
v 
 
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 151 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 
Glossary                                                                                                                                       182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Dedication 
To my Mother:  Manyie-Ntoh Esther M.Angwafo III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Acknowledgement 
This work could not have been accomplished without the support and encouragements from so 
many people. I owe a debt of gratitude to all those who assisted towards the realisation of this 
project in different ways. I want to particularly thank and appreciate Prof dr Mirjam, De Bruijn 
and Dr Harry Wels for accepting to work with me as Supervisor and Co-supervisor respectively. 
Their insightful comments and suggestions during the entire process of writing this thesis cannot 
be overemphasized. Also, I can not forget the collaboration that I enjoyed working with Professor 
dr Robert Ross and other members of staff. 
My special gratitude goes to the University of Leiden and the African Studies Centre who offered 
me the Leiden University Excellence Scholarship (LEXS) GOLD and Rabo Bank grant that 
enabled me to pursue this program. I also appreciate the financial assistance from the Volkswagen 
Small Grant of the University of Cologne –Germany which facilitated my movements for the six 
months of field work. 
I want to thank Prof Nyamnjoh Francis of the University of Cape Town- South Africa for the 
enormous efforts that he made for me to achieve this academic endeavour. There is no other way 
to say it but to thank you sincerely. 
Most of my gratitude goes to Mrs Chibikom Jacqueline for the invaluable comments and 
suggestions that she made on the manuscript which enhanced and improved the quality of the 
final project.Particular appreciation also goes to my classmates especially Michael Weldeghiorhis 
Tedla with whom we had several discussion sessions and exchanges on our work at every stage of 
the research. I also wish to extend my sincere gratitude to my mates, Julia Fouldriane, Andreas 
Admasie, Eefje Gilbert with whom I shared good moments and collaboration during the entire 
study period. It was a nice and friendly team that I will forever miss.  Special thanks also go to Dr 
Azeb Amha- the Coordinator of the African Studies program who in most cases served as a 
counselor and assisted me in several ways during my study period at Leiden. 
I acknowledge the collaboration and assistance that I received from Mr Forgwe Azarh Primus- the 
Archivist of the National Archives Buea (NAB) and Mrs Kpuyuf Nee Mary Benita Lamnyuy-the 
viii 
 
Librarian of the Buea Archive. I also want to register my profound gratitude to the Regional 
Delegate of Arts and Culture for the Northwest Region of Cameroon, Mrs Lukong Ernestine for 
allowing me use the services and resources of the Regional Archive in Bamenda (RAB). It is not 
possible to mention everybody here but I thank Fon Mbambi III of Aghem, the Regent of Bu and 
my informants.Your support meant so much during the ardous task of putting this work together. 
I am also indebted to Dr Nkwi of the Univeristy of Buea and Langaa Research and Publishing 
Group for providing me with comfortable accommodation in Mankon and Buea during my field 
work in Cameroon. Dr Kah Henry of Buea will be remembered for creating the necessary contacts 
for me in the field. Special thanks to my childhood friend, Augustine, K.Tanikwu who assisted 
me in so many ways to settle down in the Netherlands. 
It would be unjust if I do not recognise and appreciate the support that I got from Dr Beckley K. 
Nfor and wife Matilda Tani Nfor who provided shelter for me from September to November after 
my housing contract expired in August. I will not forget their two years old baby Angelica who 
fondly called me ‘Auko’ (Uncle) and became my companion and play mate at all times. Special 
thanks also to George Nfor and Juliette with whom I shared good moments and exchanged ideas 
not only about academics but about life in general. Finally, I wish to thank members of my family 
and especially my father-Fo Angwafo III S.A.N who have always stood by me at all times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Acronyms 
ACUDA  Aku Cultural and Development Association 
BMRS   Bu/Mbengkas Rice Co-operative Society 
CDC   Cameroon Development Corporation 
CPDM   Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement 
DO   District Officer 
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council 
ELECAM  Elections Cameroon 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
IUCN   International Union for Conservation of Nature 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
MBOSCUDA  Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association 
NAB   National Archives Buea 
NES   National Engagement Strategy 
NHRLC  National Human Rights and Liberties Commission 
NTFPs   Non Timber Forest Products 
NWO/WOTRO  Science for Global World Development Progammes 
PNDP   National Community Development Driven Plan 
RAB   Regional Archives Bamenda 
SDF   Social Democratic Front 
SODELCO  Société de Développement d’Élevage et du Commerce 
WADA  Wum Area Development Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Figure 1 Map of Cameroon within the Central African Sub region ............................................. 14 
Figure 2: Map showing (Aghem and Bu) Sites for Research ....................................................... 15 
Figure 3 Partial view of the Menchum Valley: one of the hotspots for conflicts between farmers 
and Fulani cattle herders. .............................................................................................................. 16 
Figure 4 View of Bu Rice fields ................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 5 Fon Mbambi of Aghem and Researcher in his palatial Reception hall. ......................... 48 
Figure 6 Royal paraphernalia of Fon Mbambi.Also seee poster showing his relationship'with Paul 
Biya' through patronage politics. .................................................................................................. 60 
Figure 7 Mallam Suleiman Guizo instructing his son Bashiru (herdsman) about to take the cattle 
afield for grazing ........................................................................................................................... 98 
Figure 8 The immobility of the mobile Fulani has brought them in serious confrontation with 
indigenous farmers as they compete over land and diminishing resources.Abdoulaye Guizo-a 
Fulani farmer in his pepper plantation at Bu Road Aghem. ....................................................... 103 
Figure 9 Despite Fulani occupation of this land for over a century, they are still regarded as 
strangers by the Aghem and Bu communities. ........................................................................... 104 
Figure 10  Partial view of Aghem Community Hall donated by Hon Wallang Richard EbuaError! 
Bookmark not defined. 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Abstract 
In Cameroon as elsewhere in Africa, the subject of ownership and access to land among different 
groups has been an issue of major concern. The arrival of the nomadic Fulani alongside with 
herds of cattle by the 1920s into Wum Central Subdivision did not only bring about profound 
changes in the political economy of the area but also introduced new ways of cohabiting, land use 
patterns and different perceptions about land and resources. This was partly so because the 
Aghem and Bu people who historically had exclusive ownership rights and access to land were 
compelled to compete and negotiate these rights and access on the same fertile lands that had 
abundant pastures for cattle with Fulani herders. With the presence of the Fulani, the issue of 
equal access and control of land and resources has constituted a contentious and perennial 
problem. Despite their long presence in the area, they are still considered as ‘strangers’ and/or 
‘intruders’. The objective of the research was to investigate why the conflicts between women 
cultivators and Fulani cattle herders are persistent. The outcome of this research reveals that the 
conflicts are more complicated than they appear and are embedded in gender relations and 
cultural practices where respect for tradition is optimal and exacerbated by a weak and out dated 
statutory land law. The law proscribes customary tenure system and does not guarantee women’s 
ownership land rights but helps in the alienation and dispossession of women from their ancestral 
land. In addition, it is also a lever for rich domestic elites who now acquire huge tracts of land at 
the detriment of the rural poor. Constrained by this, they turn their frustration towards the Fulani 
by invoking ethnic sentiments as the legitimate strategy for their land claims. With increasing 
population and competition over diminishing resources and the sedentarisation of the Fulani, this 
research advocates for a new and more inclusive land law where all stakeholders would have 
security over their land and property. 
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 Chapter One: Facing Menchum Valley and Dancing the Pilot 
1.1 Introduction 
The first time I visited Menchum division was in 2006 as a Research Assistant in a project1 
sponsored by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/WOTRO). For two 
years that I did field work in Menchum, I became fascinated by the beautiful landscape and the 
huge Fulani cattle herder population that I encountered and a vibrant farming population. At that 
time, I did not nurse any ambitions of doing research in Wum because I did not come across any 
conflicts or clashes while in the field. Perhaps the reason is that my research had little or nothing 
to do with land and conflicts. What attracted my attention to choose Wum for my research were 
the huge land acquisitions that domestic elites have made in the area. Surprised by this, I set out 
to research on the emerging phenomenon of land acquisition in Menchcum when I had this 
opportunity. My initial idea was to focus on ‘land grabbing’ and I was not familiar with the 
farmer/grazer conflicts that have come to constitute the focus of this research. The original 
research proposal was on ‘land commoditisation and patronage politics in Wum Central 
Subdivision’. During the process of collecting data in the field, the focus of the research changed 
and was adjusted towards land conflicts although land commoditisation cannot be excluded as one 
of causes of these conflicts. I was lured into this because in all interviews and focus group 
discussions that were organised during field work, farmer/grazer disputes were recurrent. 
Intrigued by this, I decided to examine this phenomenon in depth. When I arrived Wum for the 
field work, I went straight to the Divisional Officer (hence, DO) for Wum Central to introduce 
myself and also to let him know about my research interest. What stroke me at the DO’s office 
was the huge population made up of farmers and herders who came to complain or were called up 
because of crops that have been destroyed by cattle. One of the cases that I witnessed involved 
                                                 
1 Actually, my work was not restricted to Menchum but included other divisions of the northwest of Cameroon 
where I conducted and recorded interviews on the use of the mobile phone and how the phone serves a a tool that 
connects and disconnects or bypasses social hierarchies. More on this can be found in De Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and 
Angwafo (2010). 
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Idrissou a Fulani cattle herder and Youh Emerencia a farmer2 and it was from it that I drew the 
inspiration for this research.  
1.2 The Problem Statement 
The dispute between Emmerencia and Idrissou mentioned above appears to be a tip of the iceberg 
as the northwest region of Cameroon popularly known in colonial historiography as the Bamenda 
Grassfields (Nkwi 2011:  2) has been suffering from what Kah (2009: 185) refers to as ‘notorious 
land conflicts’ of different sorts which include interethnic, farmer/grazer and community scuffles 
(Sone 2012a: 84). Since the beginning of the first decade of the twentieth century, inter-ethnic 
conflicts have become a common currency (Nkwi 2011: 2).3 The arrival of the nomadic Fulani 
alongside with herds of cattle by the 1920s into Wum Central Subdivision did not only bring 
about profound changes in the political economy of the area but also introduced new ways of 
cohabiting, land use patterns and different perceptions about land and resources. Furthermore, the 
reintroduction of political liberalisation and economic reforms in the 1990s in Cameroon seem to 
have also exacerbated the issue as it evoked a new wave of ethnic sentiments and gained currency 
within the public arena in Cameroon (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2001; Nkwi 2011: 3; Ndjio 2009: 
84-5), where there has been the (re)interpretation of the notion of identity and belonging (Konings 
2001; Geschiere 2003). This has often resulted in the victimisation of people considered as 
‘strangers’ in several regions of the country,by so called ‘indigenes’ despite the fact that some 
have been living in these areas for more than half a century (Ndjio 2009: 84-5). 
Wum Central Sub-division is one of such volatile areas in Cameroon where there have been 
protracted land conflicts of a different dimension. The entire northwest region has the 
characteristic that favour the co-habitation of farmers and grazers and that is why there is a huge 
agricultural and livestock subsectors in the region (Ndenecho: 2010). For the past four decades 
there have been intermittent skirmishes and confrontations between cattle grazers and the Aghem 
                                                 
2 Emmerencia is an indigene born in Naikom and is a farmer who is involved in the cultivation of maize from which 
she raises money to take care of her children and for the up keep of the family. Idrissou on the other hand, is a 
Fulani whose parents migrated from Bafum, near Founbam. He was delivered in Aghem and he is a cattle herdsman 
with five children. He is also engaged in the cultivation of food. 
3 Some of the long standing disputes include: the Bali Nyonga boundary disputes with the Baforchu, Chomba and 
Bawock; Balikumbat-Bafanji, Oku have fought the Mbesa; the Bambui have clashed with the Bambili and Finge and 
Njong-Bamock conflicts just to name a few (Nkwi 2011: 2; Mbah 2008; Sone 2012a: 102). 
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and Bu people who are predominantly crop cultivators.4 Both the increase in the population of 
Fulani and in cattle numbers naturally had serious repercussions on the political economy of the 
region, which, until then, had been agricultural (Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 1). The conflict 
usually begins when cattle have strayed into farmlands and destroyed crops (Diduk 1992). Land 
disputes are therefore not new in ths area and have always been the basis for land claims and for 
ensuring the source of livelihood in most societies. Why then is the conflict in Wum different 
from other conflicts in the region? 
Contrary to Kah (2009: 190) who demonstrates that these conflicts in Wum are as a result of 
resource degradation and land scarcity, I rather follow Andersson (1999: 553) to argue that these 
changes and pressure notwithstanding, land conflicts are not always purely resource driven 
(Frerks et al 2014: 14) nor automatically attributable to physical or economic land shortage. 
Consequently, I maintain that the reasons why there are persistent land disputes in Wum are 
found elsewhere than the mere struggle over scarce resources or crop damages. It should be born 
in mind that; land, of course, is significant for rural survival, but land conflicts do not necessarily 
focus on the productive value of land for land has not only economic meaning, but combines 
multiple meanings. Similarly, Mwangi (2014: 3) notes that ‘conflicts that seem straight forward 
are in fact intricately multi-layered and have a complex historical nature, in which power and 
various notions of justice are at play’. Therefore, ‘land disputes cannot be reduced to 
economically motivated struggles, but have to be understood from a more encompassing, 
sociological perspective’(Andersson 1999: 554). 
The conflicts in Aghem and Bu are unique in that unlike in other areas where the problem is 
largely inter-ethnic boundary disputes (rivalries) between groups, in Wum Central, they are 
between women cultivators and Fulani grazers despite the fact that there is a huge population of 
other people who live and own cattle in Aghem. Furthermore, they are strikingly different 
because Fulani herders are also spread in other divisions and parts of the northwest region (Vabi 
n. d: 13) yet conflicts are not as rampant as in Aghem. Specifically, these conflicts overtly involve 
                                                 
4 Previous disputes between farmers and herders were recorded in 1937, 1943, 1951, 1961 1966 and in 1973, Aghem 
women organised a public protest boycotting all market activity in Wum and in two neighbouring villages. They 
demanded that Fulbe herders should keep their animals in three demarcated grazing zones or be expelled. They 
argued that herders continually disrespected farmers' efforts and endangered farmers' livelihood by appropriating 
more and more land.  
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women who constitute a majority of food cultivators and Fulani cattle herders with whom they 
compete over land and resources. Consequently, this research is focused on conflicts between 
women cultivators and Fulani cattle herders. Generally, the conflicts take on stronger gender 
coloration because rural women traditionally dominate farming and any measure that touches on 
land automatically affects their interest (Sone 2012a: 100) and they often respond with violent 
protests (Nkwi1985; Diduk 1992; Fochingong and Tanga, 2007). Another point worthy to note is 
the fact that several commissions and strategies adopted by local authorities and government 
officials in an effort to solve these perennial conflicts have not been successful. The research 
question which this study is seeking to answer is: Why are these conflicts persistent in Wum? 
This question has been supplemented by other sub research questions which go thus: 
i. What are the underlying causes of land disputes in Wum Central Sub-division? 
ii. Who are the key actors in those conflicts? 
iii. Why have the measures/strategies adopted by the state and local authorities to mitigate 
these disputes have persistently failed? 
The main objective of this research is therefore to fill the gap in the existing academic literature 
on farmer/herder conflicts with a particular focus on women and Fulani herders. In most of the 
existing literature on farmer/grazer conflicts in Wum, little attention has been paid on the role of 
women as the principal farm cultivators who have usufructs land rights and the customary tenure 
system in which these rights are embedded (See for instance Pelican 2008;Dze-Ngwa 2014). In 
most instances, the literatures simply gloss over and only mention women as protesters or 
agitators against crop destruction or infringement in the sphere of women (for example, Kah 
2009; Nkwi 1985; Diduk 1992). Also, a lot of scholars have written on the possible causes of land 
conflicts/disputes in this area without paying much attention on gender relations and the intrinsic 
customary and political undertones embedded in these conflicts.5  
                                                 
5 For instance, Kah (2009) has focused on the role of traditional rulers and government officials coupled with 
inefficient land management policies that have led to the dispossession of rural women; Davidheiser and Luna 2008 
have highlighted the changes in production systems and land tenure regimes that are influenced by western models 
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In addition, it is also to understand how these conflicts manifest and why the strategies adopted by 
the state in mitigating them have often failed. The last but not the least, the findings of this 
research, would be a contribution to academic endeavours that could be exploited by researchers 
and policy makers. I present some theoretical assumptions that can help us understand conflicts. 
1.3 Theoretical Approaches 
Conflicts are the hall mark of every society and the causes of conflicts are as complex as there are 
different interests. In this section, I shall try to identify the different causes of conflict. By 
touching on various causes of conflict and conflict types it will be shown that labelling a conflict, 
as for example political or resource based, is not always possible, due to the fact that the intention 
behind it might be unclear and unknown (Kirchner 2013: 27).  
1.3.1 Towards a Definition of Conflict 
A lot of scholars have written on conflict using different perspectives in different fields of study 
(Pelican 2008; Sone 2012b; Kah 2009). However, there is no absolute definition of conflict 
because of its complexity and different ways that conflict manifests. As some scholars hold, there 
is no society that is void of conflict of some sort. Sometimes conflict has a social relevance 
because it is through it that families, organizations, and states (re) define themselves, innovate and 
ideas emerge leading to social progress (Frerks et al 2014: 28). In this sense, conflict can also be a 
key driver of change (ibid). Yet conflict has led to profound negative consequences in most 
societies. It is therefore important to first of all attempt a definition of the concept ‘conflict’ in 
this study in order to situate the reader in context. The concept has been defined variously by 
many scholars but I follow that of Bavinck et al (2014: 2) and according to them, ‘conflict can be 
understood as “confrontations between groups or categories of people” regarding a resource 
activity and its management’. To them conflict may be positioned on a continuum ranging from 
mild tension to outright violence (ibid). It is important to note that a conflict is not necessarily 
violent or confrontational but confrontation or clash would be considered an extreme point in the 
continuum. This distinction has also been made by Kirchner (2013: 28) and she stresses that 
                                                                                                                                                               
of capitalist tendencies. Dafinger and Pelican(2008), emphasize on the Fulani( Mbororo) land claims rights of 
citizenship. 
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‘violence is a degree of conflict’. Conflict in the sense of confrontations is related to, but differ 
from conflict in the sense of conflicting interests (Bavinck et al 2014: 5). Conflicting interests 
may include what Kirchner (2013: 28) refers to as ‘social conflicts’ and constitute the struggle 
over values, ideas, tastes, fashion or claims of status, power and scarce resources. For instance, 
diminishing arable land for farmers where their agricultural activities cannot be met will mean 
that they have conflicting interests. Generally, when the situation has moved from the level of 
mild tension to that of confrontation, it signifies not only that the different parties are not willing 
to seek compromise or redress but that the mechanisms for conflict resolution have failed (Frerks 
et al 2014). What is important therefore is not the presence of conflict but how the conflict is 
resolved such that there can be peace among the different parties.  
Cooperation is often seen as the opposite of conflict. The more cooperation there is, the less 
conflict there will be, and vice versa (Jeffery and Vira 2001; Bavinck, Mostert and Pellegrini 
2014). Yet conflicting interests do not exclude cooperation (in our case among farmers) and 
cooperation does not exclude conflicting relations (especially when the root cause of the problem 
is not tackled). Usually, conflict emerges from grievances (latent causes) that one of the parties 
has been nursing for some time and grievances are more associated with groups suffering from 
relative deprivation, which in turn fuel conflicts (ibid). This is closely linked to the discourses of 
marginality (Kabiri 2001: 56) which highlights the notion of social exclusion of  certain groups or 
categories of people, for instance because of their minority status and other disadvantages within 
a larger social and/or political structure ( Logo and Bikie 1998). I shall now proceed to analyse 
the different theoretical perspectives that can help explain conflict.  
1.3.2 Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
The existence of conflicts dates back to early times in most organise societies when there was the 
struggle to acquire land through conquest (Umeh 1973: 2) or absorption of weaker or smaller 
lineages (Ndege 2012: 9). The underlined assumption here is that, even in pre-colonial period; 
stronger polities increased their territorial spheres through raids and subjugation. In support of 
this assertion, Tonah (2002: 44) notes that land did not constitute a problem since it was largely 
assumed that it was plentiful and anybody could have access to land. Not to say that conflicts did 
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not exist but to state that people had conflicts of interest. In some instances, as it was among the 
Dagombas and Konkombas of Northern Ghana, conflicts arose from the struggles over resources 
such as quarrels over a cow or  rights to fish in a river often referred to as the ‘fish war’ and the 
‘cow war’ (Pul 2003: 42). In Aghem, it was common to find stray goats and pigs in crop farms 
and women had the right to kill with impunity animals destroying crops. In some instances the 
goats were caught and the owner sued for compensation (Kaberry 1952: 89). In most areas, men 
had no right to kill goats or pigs feeding on farms, the correct procedure being to catch the animal 
and sue in court (ibid).Again, refusals to pay bride price or cases of adultery, murder amongst 
others were preoccupying. In such instances, the conflicts were resolved by the village or 
traditional councils using appropriate mechanisms which in most cases included the payment of 
fines (Chilver and Kaberry 1967). The advent of colonial rule brought new impetus in land deals 
and people’s perceptions about land began to change. The discussions below are focused on the 
colonial land policies which have contributed in no small way to land conflicts in Africa and in 
Cameroon. I use the literature from Tonah (2012), Fisiy (1995), Mbah (2009), and Sone (2012) to 
build up the argument. 
One of the leading approaches that have attracted a lot of academic attention towards 
understanding the causes of conflicts was the introduction of colonial land laws by European 
powers in Africa at the dawn of colonial rule. As Mbah (2009) has argued, the partitioning of 
Africa into economic and political spheres of influence by Europeans created what he refers to as 
‘disruptive colonial boundaries’. He insists that the arbitrary division of ethnic groups amongst 
themselves did not take into consideration the interests of the Africans and the demographic 
realities. Consequently, contestable boundaries emerged and were left unchanged and to date have 
proved to be a source of significant conflict. Nkwi (1998, 2011) picks up from there but focuses 
on the effects of the division of ethnic groups between the newly created African states that 
separated ethnic conglomerates. To him, colonial land policies arbitrarily demarcated land for the 
indigenes and also allowed Europeans to acquire huge tracts of land for the establishment of 
colonial plantations and for white settlers. This did not only split ethnic groups but communities 
also lost their land rights and were dispossessed from their ancestral lands. The introduction of 
cash economy by the Europeans had profound consequences not only on land use patterns and 
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labour but on the notions of land and resources.6 Tonah (2002) and Fisiy (1995) have focused on 
how these colonial land policies led to the dispossession and alienation of indigenous populations 
and also intensified the struggle for control and access over land. The alienation of ever increasing 
portions of land for white settlers implied that large numbers of people were resettled onto more 
marginal land and sometimes eviction was done through force (Werner 1993: 144). To them, this 
raised the interests of clans and lineages to compete for access to land and it constituted the basis 
for conflicts. These acquisitions went hand in gloves with the introduction of land laws and 
ordinances which actually helped in the categorisation of land between the natives and the 
Europeans.7  
Fisiy (1992) and Seller and Sellers (1999) attribute the emergence of conflicts on bias and other 
forms of discrimination that were enshrined in colonial land enactments and inherited by the post 
colony  and which have continued to exclude certain categories of people.8 Sone (2012b) has 
focused particularly on the bias and discrimination against women in the customary tenure system 
and the 1974 Land Ordinances governing inheritance which favours mainly patriarchal system 
and do not guarantee women’s access to land. Dafinger and Pelican (2008) on the other hand, 
shift the debate to a different direction and argue that the land law rather favours agriculturalist 
(including women) at the expense of herders who are often neglected because they are considered 
as strangers. I argue therefore that the land laws were bias in different respects against women and 
herders as their land rights have continued to be neglected and so could constitute one of the 
causes to the conflict.  
1.3.3 Scarcity or Abundance of Natural Resources? 
By looking at natural resource conflict I came across different views which show that scarcity 
and/or abundance can cause a conflict. The paradoxes of natural resource as a cause to conflict 
have become an issue for conflict scholars. Some articulate that conflicts are caused by 
                                                 
6 Also see Geschiere 1993;Konings 1996;Erkert and DeLancey 1988. 
7 For more on this see Fisiy 1996:226-230; Ndege 2012pp19-25. 
8 Due to the fact that the acquisition of a land title as provided in the 1974 Land Ordinances is very expensive, the 
poor who are usually women find it difficult to apply for title deeds. Consequently, only the rich-usually men can go 
for land registration. See Articles 11-15 of Land Ordinances of 6th July 1974 amended and supplemented by Decree 
No.2005/481 of 16th December 2005. 
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diminishing or scarcity of resources (Tonah 2002). To them, conflicts become evident when the 
resource base is threatened as a result of competition which in turn leads to over exploitation and 
degradation of resources. But increasingly, it has been argued by Frerks, Dietz, van der Zaag 
(2014: 15; De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005: 70) that scarcity of natural resources can be a cause to 
conflict just as abundance of resources can still result to conflict. Following this argument, most 
of the conflicts in the global South are attributed to what they refer to as the ‘abundance-of –
resources thesis’ sometimes also known as the ‘resource curse’ concept.9 This is closely linked to 
the ‘greed argument’ where different parties may try to gain control over valuable resources for 
financial gains (Manson 2013). A good example is the Congo Democratic Republic where 
military insurgence is highly linked to the mineral mines in the Kavu Province and it is the same 
scenario in the oil rich Niger Delta of Nigeria (Ejobowah 2000). The proceeds may be used to 
finance the conflict that they are involved in, and in this way the conflict may perpetuate itself 
(Frerks et al 2014: 16; Beek 2011). Linked to the debate on resource driven conflict is the 
argument that the over exploitation of resources eventually leads to environmental degradation 
which also leads to the alteration of the ecosystem and brings about mutations in climate regimes 
(De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005). Kabiri (2001: 45) demonstrates how the upswing in farming 
activities in the Amboseli ecosystem of Kajialo Kenya have caused environmental deterioration 
and denudation of woodlands leading to competition over few water wells by farmers and 
pastoralists. Climate variability and droughts are known to have caused the mobility of herders 
and farmers from their initial spaces in search of fertile lands and pastures (Niamir-Fuller 2001; 
De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005), over long distances and in most cases these movements have 
always resulted to conflicts with sedentary populations (Tonah 2002). But it has been observed by 
Frerks et al (2014) that environmental issues do not lead to conflict until they are politicised of 
some sort. This is particularly true in instances where the inhabitants in the area do not seem to 
enjoy the benefits accruing from the exploitation of such resources. As Ejobowah (2000) has 
argued, one of the causes of the conflicts in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is the fact that there is no 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which benefits the inhabitants of the area.10 This premise 
                                                 
9 Resource curse is a concept that evolved from an economic interpretation connecting negative economic growth 
with natural resource wealth .Also see van Beek (2011). 
10 Ken Sara wiwa is the Nigerian environmentalist who was executed in 1995 along side eight others who were 
campaigning for greater control over oil and gas resources on their land for economic development and  autonomy 
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has been contested by Geschiere (2004) who argues that even in situations where there is 
corporate social responsibility, conflicts can still occur. Drawing his example from the 1994 
forestry law in Cameroon which stipulates that 50% of logging taxes are supposed to remain with 
the local communities and municipalities, he contends that the allocation of such logging revenue 
in the community have instead triggered fierce struggles and intense fighting over belonging and 
exclusion. Put the other way round, usually people start debating on who ‘really’ belongs to the 
community and is qualified to benefit. Following Frerks et al (2014: 18), I argue that conflicts 
resulting from environmental issues are always embedded in political and socio-economic factors 
which are often exploited to arouse feelings of mutual distrust and hate. They may actually be the 
result of social deprivation, neglect, marginalisation and lack of proper environmental policies 
than of degradation and depletion (Manson 2013). Although it is reasonable to assume that a 
declining resource base is an important factor in land –use conflicts between herders and farmers, 
this fact does not reliably predict or explain these conflicts (Moritz 2006: 7). This is because there 
are areas in the Sahel with scarce resources and less intense farmer-herder conflicts and in Sub 
humid areas with a relative abundance of resources but many more conflicts (ibid). Moritz (2006: 
4) also adds his voice by acknowledging that the environment is simply the arena in which social, 
political, and economic conflicts between different actors are played out. As has cautioned, there 
is the need to be careful when describing direct causal links between environmental scarcities, be 
it imagined or real, and farmer-herder conflicts. 
1.3.4 Conflicts Resulting from the Politics of Belonging and Identity 
Conflicts also originate from what is generally referred to as ‘identity politics’ or ‘politics of 
belonging’ (Mostert and Pellegrini 2014: 6; Geschiere 2005a, Konings 2008). Increasingly, there 
is abundant evidence that indentity politics has become the dominant discourse in farmer/grazer 
conflicts and used variously by the different groups for their interest. Politics of belonging is a 
situation where particular groups claim territories and natural resources as their own, to the 
exclusion of others (Mostert and Pellegrini 2014: 7). Geschiere (2005a, 2005b) stresses that the 
politics of belonging results from a growing desire to exclude ‘strangers’ (allogenes) from 
                                                                                                                                                               
over their affairs because it was alleged that the oil industry was causing environmental devastation and the 
community was gaining very little or nothing. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Saro-Wiwa accessed 30/7/2014. 
11 
 
economically resources rich areas. This, to him is often perpetuated by politicians who fear that 
they would be outvoted by more numerous immigrants who would in turn gain access to these 
resources or occupy political spaces considered to be the reserve of the host community. It is 
therefore a strategy to ensure that the economic and political resources are controlled by the 
‘autochthones’ to the exclusion of the ‘allogenes’.Taking the cue, Nkwi (2006) lays emphasis on 
the strategies often used by the autochthones to exclude strangers from these resources and they 
may include stigmatisation, stereotyping and provocation to outright confrontations.  
Just as identity is constructed, (re) negotiated and (re) defined so to be discourse. According to 
Atanga (2010: 27) and De Wit (2011: 38), discourse is simply different ways of representing 
aspects of the world, and the way we view the world and talk about it.11. As Boye et al (2011: 
102) note, discourse about land claims is usually ‘constructed’ to convey messages that others 
would ‘find persuasive as grounds for the claim asserted’ For example, the (re)presentation of 
Fulani herder/farmer in a dichotomous manner simply reflects the way we would want to see and 
talk about the conflict.  
The different theoretical approaches analysed above are very useful for the case study of Wum 
because they give more insights and impetus to understand clearly the basis on which these 
conflicts emanate. Looking at the different approaches, it is clear that the conflicts in Wum are 
linked to  scarcity and diminishing resources and a weak land law that have ignited the politics of 
belonging through which contending groups hope to have access to these scarce resources to the 
exclusion of others. It is within the context of this scarcity, outdated land law and identity politics 
that the conflicts in Wum should be understood. 
1.4 Overview of the various Chapters  
The book is organised in nine chapters. Chapter one presents the setting, research 
problem/objectives and the main theoretical assumptions. Chapter two on the other hand presents 
the geographical location and the ethnographic information of the groups that make up the study 
                                                 
11 For more on discourse see, Frerks 2007pp 45&De Wit 2011pp39 who see discourse as not merely a speech or a 
text but a system of representation that gives meaning to things. In the same light, Nyamnjoh (2013: 109) considers 
discourse as ‘a game of perception, power, and strategic positioning, in which what is real is not what is but what we 
define and impose as real’ 
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area, Chapter three presents the tenure system from a historical perspective and the different 
perceptions of land by the various actors or stakeholders in the area. The chapter also focuses on 
the various agents that have contributed towards changes in land use patterns. Chapter four 
examines the power hierarchies and social exchanges and the different ways through which land 
is acquired and how alliances and loyalty are switched from one patron to another, thereby 
leading to mistrust and class animosity.  
Chapter five is focused on land governance by examining the loopholes of the 1974 law arguing 
that the law does not guarantee land rights of vulnerable groups such as women and the Fulani 
groups who are actually the ones who depend on land for their livelihood survival. I contend that 
the law lends credence to patriarchal as against matrilineal succession; the latter being the system 
which in the past ensured women’s access to land. In addition, the law favours the rich and 
political elites who have the power and financial leverage to acquire title deeds.  
Chapter six, documents the history of migration of the Fulani and the various strategies and 
policies that were put in place by the British colonialists to integrate them in the area. By limiting 
Fulani access only to grazing land rights, the British administration, for instance, legitimised the 
hierarchy between 'hosts' and 'strangers' as customary, and used it as the basis for land distribution 
within the rural communities, creating the conditions to keep strangers permanently in the 
position of minors (Bellagamba 2004: 384). This has been the basis and the genesis of identity 
politics in the area till today. 
In chapter seven, I analyse the different forms in which these conflicts manifest and also examine 
the role that key actors play in them. Chapter eight examines the phenomenon of huge land 
acquisitions currently being masterminded by the rich domestic elites for the establishment of 
agro-businesses and for other services. Their economic interests in land deals have further 
compounded the conflicts as they use the political positions and financial powers to evict rural 
women from their ancestral lands. Chapter nine presents the concluding reflections from the 
study.  
 
 Chapter Two: The Geographical and Ethnographic Context of Wum 
Central Sub-division 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and presents an overview of the geography and ethnography of Wum 
Central Sub division where the research was conducted within the republic of Cameroon. It 
focuses on the location (land), the peoples, and the social and political organisation of the area. 
An attempt has also been made to present the history of migration and origins of the different 
ethnic groups that constitute the main focus of this study. The methodology used in the realisation 
of this research has also been presented.  
2.1.1 Situating the Site of the Research 
The research was conducted in Wum Central Sub-division, one of the administrative units of the 
republic of Cameroon. The republic of Cameroon is situated within the Central African region 
with a surface area of 475,000km2 and a population size of over 20 million inhabitants (IMF 
2012). Although the population density is 4.2 per/km,2 the actual distribution is uneven as over 
52.7% of the population lives in urban centres (UNDP: 2012).The republic of Cameroon has 
international boundaries with the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the west, the republics of 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Congo to the South, the Central African Republic to the East and 
the Republic of Chad to the North. Cameroon’s diverse natural resource base shapes the 
agricultural, forestry, fishing, oil and gas sectors on which the economy depends (FAO 2012 : 3). 
Before oil production started in the 1970s, Cameroon’s agriculture accounted for 30% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), representing 80% of total exports (Wouonepo1992: 7). Much of 
the land is still unexploited as only 1.2 million hectares of the 5.9 million hectares of arable land 
is currently cultivated (op cit).  
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Figure 1 Map of Cameroon within the Central African Sub region1  
Wum is found in Menchum which is one of the seven divisions that make up the Northwest 
region2 of the republic of Cameroon. It lies between latitudes 5˚40̍ and 7 to the north of the 
equator and between longitudes 9˚45̍ and 11˚10̍ to the East of the Meridian. Menchum is located 
on latitudes 6˚30̍ 00N and longitudes 10˚10̍00E. The division is bounded to the northwest by the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and to the southwest by Manyu and Momo divisions, to the southeast 
by Mezam, Boyo and to the northeast by Donga Mantung. Kaberry (1952: 3), present day Aghem 
                                                 
1 Source http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cameroon-political-map.htm  accessed 26/07/2013 
2 Also known as the Bamenda Grassfields because of its unique savannah ecology 
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was formerly one of the 23 Native Authorities that made up the Bamenda Province,3and was 
subsequently split into four divisions (Nkwi 2011: 4). 
 
 
Figure 2: Map showing (Aghem and Bu) Sites for Research4  
The area is a sub-humid medium attitude zone with 1400mm -1700mm of rainfall per year 
(Ndenecho 2010a: 57), and falls under the savannah ecological zone which is largely dominated 
by grass, shrubs and patches of gallery forests. The dominant geographical features of the division 
are undulating hills and valleys which are favourable for farming and cattle rearing. The division 
is well drained by River Mezam that flows west to join River Momo. These two rivers form a 
confluence at lower Bafut and then give rise to River Menchum. The Donga, Katsina and 
Menchum rivers flow west to join River Benue in Nigeria (Nkwi 1998: 26). Menchum Valley is 
rich in alluvial deposits that help to enrich the soil especially when the river over flows its banks 
during the rainy season. The valley and river banks are suitable for rice cultivation, market 
gardening and also serve as water sheds and water points for cattle.  
                                                 
3 Kaberry, P ‘Intelligence Report on Wum and Nsaw in the Bamenda Province 1948’ National Archives Buea 
(hence NAB) No.Ad22 
4 Source: http://www.focodev.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/wum-map-color.jpg accessed 4/8/2014. 
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Figure 3 Partial view of the Menchum Valley: one of the hotspots for conflicts between farmers and Fulani 
cattle herders.  
Source (Author, 2013) 
A lot of importance is also attached to fishing and the production of cash crops especially Arabica 
coffee and rice (Nkwi 1998: 27). There are two main seasons; the dry season which begins in late 
October and ends in March while the rainy season takes over from March to the end of 
September. The highest rainfall of 65 inches is recorded between July and August. The mean 
annual temperature is between 17.60 C and 30.50 C, while the total annual rainfall per year is 
about 2.043.7mm (Anjah 2009: 1059). It should however be noted that temperatures rise during 
the day especially in the dry season and drop at night. The lowest temperatures are however 
recorded during the rainy season when temperatures fall drastically.  
2.2 The Peopling of Wum Central Sub-division  
This research was conducted in Wum Central which incidentally is also the divisional capital for 
Menchum and is situated about 77 Km to the north of the regional capital of Bamenda (Anjah 
2009: 1058). Until recently, it took almost the whole day to travel from Bamenda to Wum 
because of bad road but by the year 2005, most parts of the road from Bamenda to Wum have 
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been paved thereby reducing the time spent on the road by vehicles travelling to and from Wum. 
As a divisional headquarters, Wum has witnessed a steady growth especially with the 
establishment of missionary and government institutions which have led to an influx of people 
from other parts of Cameroon and beyond.  
2.2.1 The Aghem Federation 
The Aghem5 are a people of the north-western Bamenda Grassfields and by the turn of the 21st 
century the population was estimated at 6.000 inhabitants (Kopytoff 1981: 371). In 1953, the 
population of Aghem rose to 9,7106 but today it has increased to 67,878 inhabitants’.7 With a 
surface area of 776Km2 the population density has increased from 12.5pers /Km2 to 88pers/Km2. 
Aghem differs substantially from the other chiefdoms of the Bamenda Grassfields by being a 
federation of adjacent settlements each with its own tradition of origin (Chilver and Kaberry 
1967: 94). They tend to build their dwelling places in close crammed places, but in the past few 
decades the villages have grown together into a single ‘town’ of several quarters 
(NAB/N0.Ad/22), while their farm lands are kilometres away. The Aghem people who are now 
settled in this lush hilly savannah zone are said to have migrated from Sindong, an area around 
the Tiv region in Nigeria.8 A different source by Kopytoff (1981: 371) points to ‘Munshi’ as the 
place of Aghem origin but still from the Benue State of the Middle Belt of Nigeria.9 The different 
trajectories of Munshi and Sindong origin raise a lot of doubts as to whether they are referring to 
the same or different places and secondly, the Aghem do not show any traits of Tiv customs. The 
differences between the Aghem and Tiv are more visible as the former appear to be physically tall 
and huge as compared to the dwarf type of people in the Tiv region.10In addition, succession in 
Aghem is matrilineal while that in (Tiv) Benue is patriarchal. It is likely therefore that for the 
                                                 
5 The name ‘Wum’ is a German rendition of the Kom pronunciation of ‘Aghem’. Wum is sometimes used in this 
literature to refer to the Aghem people. For the purpose of consistency, and also to differentiate, Wum as an 
administrative unit and people of the area, we prefer to use Aghem when referring to the ethnic group.  
6 Chilver and Kaberry 1967,pp34 
7See Annexes Wum Council Development Plan 2011 Elaborated with the support of the National Driven 
Development Program (PNDN). 
8 They are therefore believed to belong to the Munchi ancestry of Benue State in Nigeria but other schools of 
thought hold that they originated from the Upper Mbam River area round Rifum and Ndobo of the Tikari ethnic 
group See a collection of ethnography notes, Bamenda archives NW/Aa/1983/1 and also see Chilver and Kaberry 
1967: 34 on a comprehensive account on the Aghem Migration and their neighbours. 
9 Also see RAB No NW/Ac.1960/1/BK. 
10 RAB/Nw/Aa 1983/1 ‘ a collection of ethnography notes: to all Aghem people. 
18 
 
Aghem ‘Munshi’ refers but to a region and not to the people (Kopytoff 1981: 371) and should 
therefore be taken as mere speculation. 
2.2.2 Aghem as ‘First Comers’ 
According to oral history, the Aghem migrated under the leadership of Nlom Nnam regarded as an 
abled and brave person. The reasons for this migration were attributed to the fact that the 
‘Munshi’ considered the Aghem as slaves but most importantly, the Aghem left the place in 
search of a more peaceful and free land for themselves.11 A different account by Kopytoff (1981) 
indicates that it was because of chieftaincy rivalries and wars that forced the Aghem to migrate. 
While Zinchem12 holds that the Aghem moved together to their present site, Nkwi (1998: 32) 
however notes that they migrated in waves until they became reunited at the present site defeating 
the early U’bwa settlers and sending some of them to Isu and integrating others in their group. 
Zongakwo claims to be the first-comer among the present occupiers of Aghem has also been 
disputed by Tseregha which has a Batum-list of 8 and alleged to derive from Isu.13 
The different trajectories in the history of migration notwithstanding, the Aghem finally settled at 
their present site. Because the founder of the Zongakwo lineage-Akwo soon found out that the 
family was too big for him alone, he then appointed 4 assistants.14 Each of the assistants 
constituted a lineage head but regarded the Batum of Zongakwo as the spiritual leader. The 
several village-heads then came together and formed a federation under the ritual leadership of 
one of them, the chief of Zongakwo (Kopytoff 1981: 371).When the federation was being formed, 
and there were six Aghem villages: Kesu, ChereGha, Zongafeu, WaeNdu Waana-Ngwən, and 
Zongakwo (Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 94). During this period also, the Aghem villages with the 
exception of Waana-Ngwən developed strong authoritarian chieftaincies (Kopytoff 1981: 372) 
and the latter was often considered by the Aghem as a foreign lineage (NAB/N0.Ad/22).The 
Aghem federation extended its influence over the small Beba and Befang villages and the Esimbi 
                                                 
11 See RAB NW/Aa 1983/1. 
12 Zinchem, T is a traditional Notable of the Aghem and also author of  ‘ a collection of ethnography notes: to all 
Aghem people in RAB NW/Aa 1983/1. 
13 RAB No NW/Ac.1960/1/Bk Also see Chilver and Kaberry 1967,pp.34. 
14 According to the Aghem, Akwo was just a town crier whose duty was to alert the Aghem people when there was 
need for a meeting or danger. Because he performed his duty so well, the village was named after him-Hence 
Zongakwo and he became the first Paramount leader of the Aghem see RAB NW/Aa 1983/1. 
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settlements of the Menchum valley.15A significant aspect of Aghem political history was their 
imposition of the oil-tribute on neighbouring peoples of the forest (Nkwi1998: 32; RAB 
NW/Ac.1960/1/BK).  
2.2.3 Aghem Social and Political Organisation 
As we noted earlier, the Aghem federation is made up of six semi autonomous section lineages. 
Each section of Aghem, under a hereditary Batum, the majority of whom follow matrilineal 
succession, is divided into wards (akon) under a ward head tshokon appointed by the Batum, who 
acts as ward representative at meetings summoned by the Batum for the settlement of disputes, 
and as his adviser.16 Each ward is divided into compounds, under hereditary heads, many of 
whom do not belong to the clan of the ward head or Batum (Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 95). Men 
on marriage frequently reside near their fathers and come under the jurisdiction of his Batum. 
Each Batum enjoys some autonomy in the affairs of its section but cooperate with the Batum of 
Zongakwo for ritual, military and judicial purposes (ibid). Batums are chosen by the members of 
their lineages, including the Natum or queen-mother of his predecessor.17 The main lodge for crop 
medicine is the Ndukenyə presided over by the son of the Batum of Zongakwo. ‘Its function is to 
protect and promote the growth of corn by the preparation and distribution of medicines on farms 
and road junctions during the period of growth and sacrificing in the lodge and on the graves of 
the Batum’s ancestors for a good harvest’(Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 95). It is therefore a 
hierarchical social structure with the Batums at the head and supported by traditional councils 
made up of quarter heads with women playing a more passive role in village governance.  
2.3 The Chiefdom of Bu 
The chiefdom of Bu is located some 8.2Km to the east of Wum town and was formally under the 
protection of Wum until it gained recognition as an independent chiefdom following a petition 
addressed to the colonial government in 1949.18 In their petition, the Bu highlighted the fact that 
                                                 
15 RAB No NW/Ac.1960/1/Bk. 
16 Masquelier (1985). 
17 Fon Mbambi interviewed 12/12/2013 Aghem Palace 
18See’Bu Quarter head petition by and others of Bu village Bamenda Division’ Addressed to the Chief 
Commissioner, Eastern Province, Enugu Nigeria on 22nd March 1949 in NAB No.1b/1949/2. 
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they are a distinct people with different ancestral origin and different history of migration from 
that of the Aghem. Secondly, the Bu argued in their petition that they were different because 
Aghem never conquered them in warfare and they have never paid tribute to Aghem in any 
animal skin as other sub villages did to acknowledge the supremacy of Aghem over them.19 It 
should however be noted that under British rule, Bu was part of the Wum Native Authority 
where the Chief of Aghem was President and had enormous influence and powers. It is likely as 
a result of this that Aghem continued to dominate the local politics.20  
The Bu are said to have migrated from Ndewum in the 18th century and the migration was caused 
by harsh climatic conditions until they finally settled at their present site at Bu. Initially the Bu 
people constituted part of the Laimbwe people until they split into different polities of Bu, 
Mbengkas and Baisso as a result of internal rivalry among lineages and the leaders. Generally, 
the process of migration of the Bu people took them to different settlement sites (Kah 2012: 87). 
In 1979 the population of Bu was 6,944 with a work force of 2,701. The population is sparsely 
distributed and nuclear settlement patterns are found along the main road leading into the village.  
Majority of the people are farmers and live on the slopes of the hills while farming is carried out 
mainly in the valleys. They are also engaged in related activities like hunting, pig and goat 
rearing, lumbering and fishing (Kah 2013: 59). Livestock serves as food for the home, used for 
entertainment, a source of income, provides the nutrition needs of rural families, provides 
manure for the soil, is raw material and also provides social and cultural identity to the 
population. Livestock is also used for sacrifices, payment of fines, to solicit the services of 
traditional healers, used during funerals, weddings, thanksgiving and Christmas (ibid: 57). The 
system of succession in Bu is also matrilineal. Most of the hills are used for cattle grazing by the 
Fulani who entered the area ca 1940. There is a government health centre, a government 
secondary school, a Primary school, and churches belonging to the Presbyterian, Catholic and 
Baptist Missions. The dominant transport means in Bu is the Motor bicycle commonly referred 
to as Benskin. Motor vehicles go to Bu only once a week –on Fridays which is the day for the 
                                                 
19 Esimbi-Beba-Befang villages paid oil tributes to Aghem see Masquelier 1985; Chilver and  Kaberry 1967pp94 
20 NAB, No. Ad/22 ‘Intelligence Report on Wum and Nsaw in the Bamenda Province by Phyllis Kaberry Lady 
Anthropologist 1948’ 
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local market. However, most of the indigenes of Bu cover the 8.2Km to and from the town of 
Wum by trekking.  
2.4 Matrilineal Succession as the Foundation of the Aghem and Bu Chiefdoms 
The history of origins of the Aghem and Bu are based on a matrilineal genealogy with account of 
a woman who came to Aghem from some nearby place such as Kom, Kuk, Bum, Mme (Bafmen) 
Weh, Isu (Koptoff 1981: 372; Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 94) and this is contradictory to an 
earlier version mentioned above claiming that Nlom Nnam and Akwo were the founders of the 
Aghem dynasty. Despite these inconsistencies and contradictions, women seem to play a vital role 
in the history of origin of the Aghem as they were incorporated into the Aghem society either as 
wives, ‘slaves’ or captives from the surrounding area and till today women have continued to 
serve as founders of new lineages (Kopytoff 1981: 372). The Aghem myth of origin with a 
woman at the centre seems to be generally accepted since the various ethnic groups in Aghem 
practice matrilineal system of succession. There is however the exception of the succession to the 
stool of the chief of Zongakwo which is patriarchal (Nkwi 1974: 288). Here again, it raises a lot 
of ethnographic issues because succession to the different household heads in Zongakwo is 
matrilineal and the reason why only the chieftaincy switched to patriarchy remains uncertain.  
In a matrilineal succession, in principle, a sister’s son will succeed to the social position and 
inherit the property of the mother’s brother (Vabo 2005). When a man in a family gets married 
and has acquired property and investments, if he dies, the son of the sister is the one to inherit the 
property and not his own son or the son of his sister. If there is no sister they must trace a 
successor from the family line. In a case where there are many sisters, one of them will provide 
the successor.21 Writing on gender matrilineal succession in the Laimbwe history, Kah (2012: 
116) opines that: 
One of the pillars of matrilineal system is male and female inheritance as this system is based on 
uterine relationship where people born of the same womb derive privileges and rights through a 
woman. The woman’s children therefore inherit her brother’s or mother’s property. The sisters 
and daughters on the other hand inherit the property of their late sister or mother. 
                                                 
21 Cheng interviewed 20/10/2013.In Kom the rules of succession are clear and based on seniority: the eldest son of 
the eldest sister inherits the uncle’s social position and property for more on this, see Nkwi (1974) . 
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Different schools of thought explain the practice of this system in Aghem and Bu but the one that 
holds currency is the fact that in these two communities, oral history points to women as the first 
ancestors (Kopytoff 1981: 372). Secondly, female influence is reinforced by the belief among the 
people that men and women came into the world through the woman’s womb (Kah 2012), what 
Kaberry (1952: 17) refers to as the ‘buttocks of the house’. The focus is on the buttocks of the 
woman because she is at the centre of procreation and ‘all people come out from there’ (ibid). 
However, the practice of matrilineal system presupposes that it is the woman who knows the true 
father of the child and so keeping family blood and property through the female protects the 
family lineage.22 Vubo (2005: 157) also argues that women are central to kinship continuity and 
growth because they constitute the key elements in the definition of clan identity. Kinship 
relations therefore operate not only towards preserving the memory of a people but also the estate 
and the continuity of identity. At the centre of these operations is the circulation and protection of 
persons and property. ‘In a form of asymmetrical reciprocity, persons succeed to the positions of 
and inherit the property of their mother’s brothers as their own positions and property are taken 
over by their own sister’s sons’ (ibid).  
According to Kaberry (1952: 8), all the sections of the Aghem federation were originally 
matrilineal but following a quarrel with a sister’s son, the Batum of Zongakwo decided to change 
the system of inheritance to patrilineal. This assertion is supported by oral tradition which holds 
that under the reign of Nunyom (about 1880AD), the apparent heir (nephew) of the chief refused 
to render him services when he was critically sick and the chief got angry and decided that his son 
and not the nephew shall succeed after him.23  
During the reigns of Akwo, Acham, and Nunyom, matrilineal heritage changed hands with 
patrilineal heritage. It happened that when Nunyom was getting weaker and weaker in his sick 
bed, his nephews refused rendering him certain services. These particular nephews, whose 
names couldn’t be recalled, refused running to Weh for a dog which was going to be used in 
treating the sick Dengkeghem. Because of this disobedience, the sick Dengkeghem sent his son 
                                                 
22 In an interview with  Fon Mbambi, he notes that the reason why the Aghem preferred Matrilineal succession was 
the fact that one’s sister or niece is the ‘pure blood’ of the matriclan which needs to be preserved and this is different 
from a wife who is usually from a different  lineage and in some cases could even be a slave that was incorporated 
into the Aghem society. 
23 Interview with Fon Mbambi the present chief of the Zongəkwo lineage .  
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Mih who joyfully effected the mission. On dying, Nunyom called his councillors and informed 
them that at his death, his son was to take over from him instead of his nephews who grossly 
refused acting according to his orders (RAB/NW/Aa 1983/1) 
While the reason for the change in the roles of succession in Aghem chieftaincy to patriarchy is 
blamed on a nephew who disobeyed his uncle, in Bu, succession instead switched to matrilineal 
because a man’s biological son refused to assist the father and so he decided to will his property 
to his sister’s son (Kah 2012: 90). The common denominator in the succession question in Aghem 
and Bu is disobedience. This binary opposition of a son and nephew raises series of unanswered 
questions and (dis)obedience cannot be the only sufficient criteria and condition for the selection 
of a successor in these chiefdoms. More importantly, sons have continued to disobey their fathers 
and nephews their uncles till today, and this cast a lot of doubts on the validity and authenticity of 
oral history because since then; succession to the throne of Zongakwo has remained patriarchal 
and in Bu matrilineal. This however poses yet another serious problem of historiography in 
explaining how a group claiming a common origin with patriarchal groups such as the Tiv should 
possess matrilineal institutions (Nkwi 1985: 182). In the pre-colonial days and even during the 
colonial period, the lineage was an important economic unit for its members and constituted a big 
labour force. In the matrilineal system, it was the nephews and nieces who assisted their uncles in 
varied ways and it was the duties of the uncles to also take care of the sisters’ sons. The lineage 
was a corporate body that ensured the interest of the unit. Throughout this period, Aghem villages 
have grown in size, absorbing additional population from the culturally and linguistically related 
Fungom and Kom areas, as well as from the more alien forest peoples.  
2.5 The Fulani Cattle Herdsmen  
Another important group which is found in the sub division are the Fulani who under the 
leadership of their late chief (Ardo Umaru) migrated from Jos, Nigeria and settled in Aghem for 
several decades now.24 While their leader was permanently settled at a location fenced with barb 
wire on the outskirts of Wum, many of his subjects and later day migrants were usually nomadic. 
Today most of them have built permanent houses mostly on the hills and reside in fixed localities 
and identify themselves as indigenes of the same area with other crop cultivators. There are 
                                                 
24 See ‘Petition by Fulani residing in Bamenda Province 1933 –Bamenda Archives file No NW/Qf/G.1933/1. 
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many people in Wum and elsewhere in Cameroon that still have that ‘nomadic’ appraisal of the 
Fulani engrained in their thinking. To such people, the Fulani are ‘outsiders’ that will one day 
go. The reality is that they have become an integral part of the communities where they reside 
and the probabilities that more will migrate into the communities are higher than the prospect of 
any leaving (Vabi n. d: 12).  
There are about 16.000 Fulani residing in Menchum and the division is the second highest 
producer of cattle in the northwest region with over 200.000 cattle.25 The Fulani in Menchum are 
predominantly grazers and Muslims although due to diminishing size of cattle some are now 
engaged in other economic activities such as farming, driving, trading amongst others(Dze-Ngwa 
2013: 18;Nyamnjoh 2013a: 119). As Tonah (2002: 43) documents in Northern Ghana, the Fulani 
are generally attracted to areas that are more favourable to cattle herding: pasture more readily 
available; rainfall is reliable and consequently crop yields are better. Wum seems to have 
provided all these conditions as the low population density and the initial hospitality of the host 
population attracted them to settle in the area. As Njeuma and Awasom (1988: 1) note, ‘less than 
twenty years after its introduction, pastoralism has made significant inroads into the economic 
mainstay of the Bamenda Grassfields’. Wum Central Subdivision has therefore become a 
cosmopolitan area with people from different ethnic groups co-existing with the Aghem 
indigenes. Because of the nuances and different nomenclatures that are used when reference is 
being made about this group, I have adopted one of the names. To put it clearly, I have decided 
to use ‘Fulani’ in this research as a generic name to encompass and refer to all the nomadic 
pastoralists in Cameroon and who have acquired permanent abodes including the Aku group. 
2.6 Methodology of Data Collection 
The six months field research started effectively in July 2013 after a reconnaissance visit to the 
area where I met the chiefs of the various villages and also acquainted myself with the area, and 
created the necessary social net works. To achieve these objectives, primary and secondary 
sources were use to collect the data. In the former, impromptu conversations, interviews, focus 
group discussions, observations became very relevant. Contrary to ‘hard core’ methods often used 
                                                 
25 See ‘Annual report of the Divisional Delegation of Livestock and Fisheries for Menchum (MINEPIA)2009  
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by anthropologists, impromptu discussions became a very useful method to gather information 
which otherwise would not be possible using ’traditional’ methods. That is why note taking 
became an important tool in the data collection process and through this the problem of missing 
links from group discussions and interviews were closed up.  
Five focus group discussions involving members of the various communities were organised.26 At 
each meeting, the purpose of the research was made known to members and this was followed by 
a lead question in which the data came from dialogue and general discussions among participants. 
The discussions were tape recorded and salient issues raised were noted and as the main 
facilitator, I made appropriate interjections and probes which helped to sustain the discussion on a 
particular question. This method was useful because I discovered the range of views and attitudes 
present within the various communities and offered an opportunity to observe the processes by 
which people interact, and hence I could made inferences as well. Because of the sensitivity of the 
issue I did not mix farmers and grazers as they could be inhibited in what they would have said 
(Bernard 2006: 215-288; Jankowicz 1995: 172). Data collected from these discussions have 
helped in the verification and corroboration of facts gathered through interviews thereby 
enhancing the quality of the data.  
Structured interviews were also used to gather data from key persons.27 Initially an interview 
guide was designed but as the research progressed; it became clear that I could not follow the 
questions strictly. This was partly so because respondents were of different social strata and play 
different key roles in land deals. Consequently, the questions and issues raised during interviews 
were not necessarily the same to all the respondents, though were in context. For the purposes of 
reliability and to achieve the objective of this research, mostly persons between the ages of 45 
years and above were chosen (both men and women) through snow balling techniques. It was 
hoped that this age category knows the land tenure system, and have good knowledge of the 
ethnographic and historical accounts of the communities than the youthful population. More so, 
they are users of the land and understand land deals in the study area. The sample population was 
                                                 
26  Two focus group discussions were organised for women (one in Aghem and another in Bu). In the same manner, 
I organised a focus group with men in Aghem and also one with men in Bu. The last group was organised with  
Fulani cattle herders. 
27  For instance key persons include, chiefs, state officials, women leaders, prominent farmers and herders. 
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made up of the administrative, traditional, and selected members from the different ethnic groups 
including Fulani pastoralists and farmers. This sample population was relevant because it 
constitutes the power hierarchy in the area and is directly linked to land issues either as users or 
controllers and managers. The final research is based on information that was collected at 
different levels.  
Primary sources included the collection of research material from the National Archives in Buea 
(NAB) and the Regional Archives in Bamenda (RAB) and this was basically data dealing with 
ethnographic accounts on the history of origins, customary tenure, migration and settlement in the 
area and previous conflicts. The use of Archives in this research was very useful because they 
provided first hand historical accounts which are very reliable and authentic. It is on the basis of 
such data that I have been able to identify the various ethnic groups, the histories of origin which 
also constitute the raison d’être for land claims and power relations in the area. This was also 
useful for both theoretical and empirical analysis of the data to be collected.  
Another method that I used was observation and both participant and non participant approaches 
were adopted and this enabled me to engage and participate in community activities as the 
opportunity arose. Here, I observed on a daily and routine basis (for at least one month) the 
various aspects of social life and participated at cultural events.28 I participated and also observed 
the electoral campaigns during the Municipal and Parliamentary elections of 30th September 2013 
which added impetus on the local social dynamics and how patronage is being used to mobilise 
resources and political support. 
The main language used for the collection of data was English, however, ’Pidgin’ which is a 
lingua franca and spoken by many people in the research area was also used especially during 
focus group discussions. Ali and Mohamadou, my research assistants contributed immensely 
towards the organisation, mobilisation of both material and human resources during this research 
endeavour. All interviews and focus group discussions from the field work have been audio 
recorded and transcribed; and the analysis are based on the data collected.   
                                                 
28 For instance, I participated at the Funeral of chief Ebua, of Zongafu and was able to observe some of the cultural 
manifestations which enhanced the data on the social organisation of the Aghem. 
 Chapter Three: Changing Land Tenure and Shifting Patterns of land Use 
in Wum Central 
3.1 Introduction 
The growing hostilities and skirmishes between women cultivators and Fulani cattle herders in 
Aghem have been attributed partly to changes that have occurred in land tenure arrangements 
thereby compromising access to land for rural farmers and other land users (Sone 2012b).These 
changes have not only influenced people’s perceptions about land but also brought about 
alterations and shifts in land use patterns. This chapter therefore makes an introspective analysis 
of the factors or agents that have contributed to these changes from the pre-colonial era till today. 
Like it is with the growth of other urban centres in Cameroon, Wum Central Sub-division is 
currently undergoing a dynamic and distinctive transformation within the framework of land 
possession and attitudes towards it. The main question that this chapter seeks to answer is: what 
are the major changes and how have they influenced land use patterns and perceptions about 
land? One of the areas largely affected is the customary tenure system which hitherto existed in 
Aghem and Bu and I pay special attention on women’s rights and access to land. Another factor 
has been the influx of Fulani and cattle in the early part of the 20th century. Other factors that have 
also brought about profound changes and affected women’s access to land include; colonial land 
laws; the introduction of cash crops which changed the value of land, government environmental 
and land policies and agricultural innovations. I argue that the manner in which most of these 
policies were made and implemented have contributed in different ways to the persistent land 
conflicts in Wum. 
I consider this chapter to be very important in this study because it serves as the gate way and 
provides a snap shot from which the entire research can be mirrored. Secondly, it is the node 
around which the other themes of the research have been formulated. Thirdly, it constitutes the 
basis from which I can interpret the multiple and competing images that make up the Wum 
Central Sub-division past and its history. From a historical perspective, I start by examining the 
customary land tenure and the traditional agricultural economy that existed in the area during the 
pre-colonial era substantiating with examples from other areas in Cameroon and beyond.  
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3.2 Overview of Customary Land Tenure and the Traditional Agricultural Economy 
In the pre-colonial era, access to land in Aghem and Bu was acquired through customary tenure. 
By customary land tenure system, I mean processes and rules of land appropriation and 
expropriation that are based on customs and traditions of the indigenous1 community considered 
to have been handed down from one generation to another because of their ancestral links to the 
land. This is however different from statutory (state) land law which refers to the legal provisions 
that Cameroon inherited from the colonialists at the dawn of independence and which are being 
enforced till today (see chapter 5). Land has different meanings to the different communities and I 
try to find out from the Aghem and Bu communities what land actually means to them. According 
to chief of Aghem: 
The land is actually for the community and we acquired it in those days when we fought for the 
land from the Beba after migrating from Nigeria-from the Munchi tribe because of leadership 
crisis. Till today people still fight over leadership. We by-passed the Beba people and came to 
where we are now. Land was (and still is) a communal property and that is why we have settled 
in one place and then go out to cultivate crops on communal land far away from the settlements. 
We have common customs and traditions. We do everything in common. Land is actually 
divided according to the lineages, Waindo have their land, Kesu has its own land and we also 
have our own land in Zongekwo where I am the leader.2  
Following the above narrative by Fon Mbambi, Larsen (2007: 79) sees customary land as being 
defined by particular communities who generally link rights with residence and perceptions of 
origin. This means that land and water rights are ascribed with reference to ancestral origin and 
that only persons associated with a particular origin-based identity may, in principle, live and use 
the land and water resources within a defined area. Customary claims have usually been based on 
first settlement and clearance of bush land, converting it into farmland and establishing some kind 
of covenant with the spirits of the area through regular offerings and sacrifices (Toulmin 2007: 
96;Lund 2008:  49). As the chief of the village narrates, it is also land that the people acquired 
                                                 
1 The term indigenous should be taken to simply mean indigenes and not the definition adopted by the UN in 2007   
on the Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People .Considered as tribal people in independent countries with 
social, cultural and economic conditions whose statuses are belated wholly or partially by their own customs or by 
special laws or regulations or who are seen as different and then marginalized. 
2 Chief Mbambi is the Traditional Ruler of the Aghem (Wum) ethnic group interviewed 12/12/2013. 
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through some sort of warfare and conquest before settling on the piece of land. Following this 
logic, rights in land are frequently intimately associated with rights in people.  
According to the Aghem and Bu traditions, land was owned by the community but held in trust by 
the chiefs. In Aghem, the land was actually divided according to the sub-clans and each Batum 
controlled unused arable land and granted it to residence in his clan (Kaberry 2004: 52). Since 
arable land was the basis of a farmer’s livelihood, the distribution of land was extremely 
important. In Bu, the responsibility to undertake the task to distribute the land rests with the chief 
(Fuai) but in consultation with his quarter heads while in Aghem it is the Batum of each section 
as earlier indicated. The central role of the Batums in the distribution and control of land reflects 
the power relations which emerge from the structure of land tenure regulations (Goheen 1996:  
108). Communal land control and management during the pre-colonial era has been summarised 
by Mbapndah (1994: 47) as follows: 
In the Grassfields, chiefs were the custodians of land in their respective chiefdoms and enjoyed 
the privilege of exercising proprietary rights to land. In principle, all land was controlled by the 
chief. He was the only one who could give out land, and it was usually attributed to family 
heads. 
Though women did not own the land, they had usufruct rights over the land they cultivated. The 
right to a plot was acquired through cultivation. Such a plot could be handed over to one’s 
successors (Goheen1988: 93). The same principle applied for plots designated for dwellings 
(Buchalik 2013: 208). A similar study among the Ide of Menchum by (Masquelier 1985: 111) 
reveals that in the economic sphere, for example, a woman retained full control over the products 
of her labour, which were mostly food crops. She stored them in her own house where she and her 
children dwelled (Kaberry 1952: 94). In order to gain access to farm land a woman did not need 
to be attached to a husband; as resident in a village, she enjoyed the privilege of using communal 
land, and she could always exercise the rights to farm plots (Masquelier 1985: 111) and the 
demarcation of boundaries was left to the women cultivators, usually under the supervision of his 
Natum or titular mother and not the Batum (Kah 2009; Kaberry 2004: 44-52). In sum, the land 
belonged to the community, but the proceeds accruing from the field was owned by the 
cultivators and in the case of fruit trees the men. In Aghem, all the Section heads with the 
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exception of two that are of foreign extraction have a monopoly of raffia (Kaberry 2004: 52). The 
following excerpt reinforces this notion of communality and the custodianship of the land by the 
chiefs which is still held by the Aghem and Bu chiefdoms today. 
The chief is the controller of the land and when you want a piece of land to build, you consult 
him and he will send a commission to demarcate an area for you. When you want a piece of 
land you see the Quarter head after you have identified an area that you like. When the council 
gets there they measure the land and put it in the council ledger. Actually nothing is paid for 
the land and there are no given dimensions. The council must measure the land in order to 
make sure that they know how much land has been given to you so that you should not claim 
all the land. The quarter has a small commission and it is made up of the representatives of all 
the families in that quarter. To show gratitude for the gesture, you are expected to give at least 
a bottle of beer to the Quarter head .You will also prepare 20litres of Sha for the members of 
commission (Kpwa Kennedy Interviewed 12/10/2013). 
From the fore going, the day-to-day management of the land was entrusted into the hands of the 
quarter councils under the headship of the village chief. Land was therefore seen not just as a 
resource for the cultivation of crops but also as a natural gift and asset created by God and put at 
the disposal of the community.3 In short, it is still considered as something given by God to the 
people to use, keep and pass it onto future generations.4 Land comprised not only of the soil but 
all that which is found in the biosphere (water, forest, animals, etc). Among the Aghem and the 
Bu chiefdoms, land is still considered as a source for the spiritual identity and belonging. That is 
why the chiefs intercede with their ancestors through ritual practices at the shrines of the 
chiefdom in order that the ancestors can ensure fertility, abundance of food and good health for 
the members of the community. The issue of land as it concerns the indigenous people is that the 
land is being regarded as ancestral land,5 it is not just land they occupied recently but land where 
the ancestors had settled definitely before the Europeans arrived for the purpose of colonisation 
(Socpa 2010:  556). Each person therefore needs only an ancestral land; the place where he would 
like to ‘rest’ at the end of his earthly life, where he would like to join with his/her ancestors (ibid). 
                                                 
3 Cheng  interviewed 20/10/2013. 
4 Walo Richard Interviewed 12/ 10/2013. 
5  Interview with Lawyer Nsoh Robert 23/11/2013 (Morning Safari 2013). 
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Aghem and Bu people also attach a lot of importance to the forest because that is where the 
village shrines and groves are located. The presence of these shrines, what Postel (2013: 247) 
refers to as ‘land shrines’ reaffirms the security of the people and their land rights. That is, the 
availability of the village shrines and the performance of annual rituals at burial sites have 
therefore become a legitimate way of reinforcing their collective history, landscape memories and 
claims to their land rights. By implication, the graves of ancestors have become simple 
monuments offering an alternative for official writing and legal land rights. At their graves the 
ancestors are honoured and they are people who had once conquered and developed the land that 
is now inhabited. They represent the continuity of human life and offer, just as in earlier days, a 
home and a past, i.e. a territory in both space and time. The authority of the Aghem over the land 
is also ingrained in the four pillars erected in front of the palace of the Denkeghem of Zongakwo 
where the oath of loyalty is taken annually by the four senior Batums (Kaberry 1967).  
Among the Bu, the land is still seen as the source of origin and of one’s birth, where their parents 
originated. There is therefore a strong link between land and traditions of origin in the Area. 
According to Bu people; the land they occupy belongs to the sons and daughters of the chiefdom. 
‘It is the source of life and even the Bible says that we came from the soil and we shall all end 
there’.6 Land is therefore not just the final home but the place where one will be buried. ‘You 
know home is home and each one of us has land that is the final home. Since we work out of our 
homes we need to build at least a house back in our homeland. As one writer puts it,’ we 
endeavour to live with the land but others live off it’.7 Not being able to have a house in the 
homeland is generally considered a disgrace. This is how Cheng sizes up the situation: 
I know of villages here in Menchum where there are rules that if you have not constructed a 
house in the village, and you die elsewhere, your casket should not be brought into that 
community. Or if they have to bring your corpse, a fine must be paid to the chief of that village’. 
In these societies, land is and was never considered a commodity and members of the community 
had only usufructs rights. Land was regarded as something that was to be exploited by members 
of the community. As one informant narrates, ’according to our tradition, any Aghem man can 
                                                 
6 Shiefu Ngala interviewed 8/11/2013 ( Morning Safari 2013). 
7 Enonchong  Tabey interviewed 8 /11/2013( Morning Safari 2013) 
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exploit an unoccupied piece of land and when he becomes tired, another person can take over the 
exploitation of that piece of land’. In Bu land is neither sold nor bought and nobody in Bu has 
obtained a land certificate.8 According to Bu tradition, land cannot be sold, but a family can lend 
someone the right to use their plots. Such arrangements do not involve fees, lease payments or 
voluntary gifts (Buchalik 2013: 209).9  
To Fon Fobuzee,10 land was and has remained the basic ingredient in the development of the 
community. It is used for the construction of houses and other economic investments. ‘It is the 
source of our livelihood and the centrality of everything.’ The Fulani consider land as the finality 
of everything to them and the source of life. ‘Land is very useful for the rearing of cattle and our 
forefathers were born into this, so a Fulani man may not survive without land and rearing 
cattle’.11 The land is where the cattle are kept. ‘It is a source of income that enables us to send our 
children to school, buy food. We use it to cultivate food and we have depended on land for all our 
lives. This land is all and all for us’. There is the central role of cattle in the way the Fulani 
conceptualize land and this shows how much importance they attach to it. Both the locals and the 
Fulani consider land as an indispensable asset on which all life revolves and God is at the centre 
as the creator, the giver and the controller of land. Definitely, this is reflected in their cosmic 
relations and constructions of the world and existence. In sum, Ndege (2013: 7) opines that 
‘landscape forms a larger entity as it refers to nature, cosmology, experience, life, being, and the 
totality of a people’s history’. Despite the fact that land is still considered as belonging to the 
community, several factors have affected the land use patterns and also influenced their 
perceptions as well. In the following sections, I shall proceed by examining some of those factors. 
3.3 The Introduction of Colonial Land Laws and Policies 
 In colonial Cameroon, as everywhere in Africa, the land problem was central to the politics of the 
European administrations. The chief endeavour was to obtain the right of disposal for one of the 
                                                 
8  In a conversation with Kpwah Kennedy of Bu just before the start of a focus group discussion in Bu 12/10/2013 
9  Also see Pul 2003, pp.62 on the same concept about land among the Dagombas and Konkombas of Northern 
Ghana. 
10 Fon Fobuzee is the Traditional Ruler of Chomba, and I interviewed him because he is a member of the National 
Land Commission which is working towards a new land reform in Cameroon. His opinions provide insights on the 
work of the land commission interviewed 8/11/2013. 
11 Mallam  Suleiman Guizo interviewed 7/10/2013. 
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most important means of production, namely land (Eckert 1996: 190). The inception of colonial 
rule brought along colonial land laws which facilitated European appropriation of land which 
altered customary tenure and introduced the notion of private land ownership. This rapidly 
replaced communal land utilisation and for the first time introduced rigid land boundaries 
(Werner 1993: 138). This also brought about the increasing role of the state in the control of land 
which also influenced local perceptions and reinterpretations about land ownership.12 First, land 
rights and ownership that hitherto were entrusted in the local chiefs were in principle transferred 
to the state.  
3.3.1 Dividing the People, Sharing the Land: Colonial Land Expropriation Policy 
The phenomenon of the state expropriating and appropriating autochthonous peoples’ land for 
‘reasons of public utility’ goes back to the colonial period and has continued till today (Ayee et al 
2011:  6). Before this period, no fixed boundaries existed among different communities although 
loosely defined areas of jurisdiction by chiefs were generally recognised (Werner 1993: 137). 
Drawing from studies carried out in Kenya, Boas and Dunn (2013:  57) note that with the advent 
of the British administration in Kenya, ‘nature started to be demarcated as ‘territory’: divided by 
international, regional and ethnic borders. Space became tamed, fixed and stabilised; immobile 
closed system in which land was both a material resource and part of ethnic identities’.  
In a similar manner, when the Germans gained sovereignty over the Cameroonian territory in 
1884, they built the first military station in Yaoundé (Socpa 2010: 554).  
They immediately effected the first partitions of the land. They only recognized the indigenous 
peoples’ property rights on the plots of land where they had their villages and plantations. The 
remaining territory was considered, according to German legislation, to be ’empty unoccupied 
lands’. In reality these lands would be incorporated into imperial property, and it would be the 
German state that would be responsible for administering them. The distribution of the ‘empty 
unoccupied lands’ was arranged quasi-exclusively to the advantage of German agricultural and 
forestry companies. 
                                                 
12 See 1974 Land Ordinances.  More has been discussed on this in chapter four. 
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Embedded in the idea of incorporating the ‘unoccupied land’ into imperial property was the desire 
to set up colonial plantations and to do that, they needed suitable and fertile lands. In most cases 
the ‘unoccupied lands’ were used for colonial economic interests and for the construction of 
European living quarters far off from the natives. As Geschiere (1993: 159) demonstrates about 
German incursions on the Bakweri13 lands in Cameroon; ‘the fertile volcanic plain between the 
coast and the mountain proved suitable for the establishment of large-scale European plantations, 
and the best land of the Bakweri was rapidly expropriated’. In another case, Joseph (1974:  671) 
notes that in 1911, the Germans took the decision to expropriate the Douala people from their 
coastal lands and to resettle them further inland and the purpose of this plan was clearly to create 
an area for European settlement on the increasingly valuable land adjacent to the port. To ensure 
their effective control of the port, they needed to send the natives to marginal lands. Some of the 
indigenous communities that were evicted from their ancestral lands include the people of the 
Joss plateau in Douala, Bali and the Douala Bell clan that were relocated into a new quarter 
known as ‘New Bell’ (Joseph 1974:  671; Schler 2005:  93). As it was all over colonial Africa, the 
alienation of ever increasing portions of land for white settlers implied that large numbers of 
people were resettled onto more marginal land.  For example, Werner (1993: 144) in a similar 
study in Central Namibia demonstrates how the Herero pastoralists were forced to give up land 
east of Windhoek only to be relocated in more marginal areas in the east of the country. In the 
example cited above, the colonial administration had to resort to violence to force communities to 
move to the eastern reserves (ibid). 
By early 1900s, land began to be expropriated by the German colonial administration as ‘crown 
lands’. The German national government hoped to exploit local resources like rubber, palm oil, 
ivory and cocoa for European consumption (Diduk1992: 210; Clarence-Smith 1988). It was in 
this manner that the Germans were able to secure land for the establishment of European 
plantations in the colony.14 The appropriation of land for cash crop production by the colonisers 
through land concessions brought the colonised into a money economy and fostered the creation 
                                                 
13 Also see Clarence-Smith (1988: 2-3) for details on the Bakweri rebellion of 1884-5 when the Germans attempted 
to exploit land concessions. Following this expedition, the German officer in charge was killed and it was until 1891 
that Bakweri was subdued. ‘the Bakweri are a small group. They live on the slopes of Mount Cameroon, a huge 
active volcano which rises steeply from the coast to the height of more than 12,000ft’ (4100m) above sea level. 
14 Also see Boye, S.R and Kaarhus (2011: 105) on a similar policy by the British in the Isiolo District of Northern 
Kenya. 
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of a wage labour force available to the plantations, mine, and factory (Merry 1991: 896). When 
German entrepreneurs first arrived in Cameroon in the mid-1800s they recognised quickly the 
fertile and productive potential of the land. Some Europeans did purchase land from local chiefs 
but generally for very little money.15 By the 1906 “all unoccupied land was declared crown land 
and commissions were appointed to explore and delimit these ‘unoccupied’ lands, and transfer of 
land to Europeans had to have the assent of the Governor”. “Occupied land” was considered that 
on which people built their compounds and cultivated. Fallow lands, between compounds, and 
lands intended for future community use were officially considered “unoccupied” (Diduk1992: 
202; Fisiy 1996: 226-9). 
Following the defeat of the Germans by the allied forces in 1916 when the First World War broke 
out, German Kamerun was divided between the French and the British as Mandated territories 
(Ngoh 2004:1;Jua and Konings 2004: 4).  After the French took possession of their own sphere of 
Cameroon following the defeat of Germany, they made considerable efforts to establish a regime 
of land registration.16 The Minister for the colonies, Albert Sarraut, wrote in a report to the 
President of the French Republic on July 27th 1932;  
As indicated in the previous report of 31st October 1931, which reintroduced into Cameroon 
the provisions of the local decree of 5th September 1921 pertaining to organisation of land 
ownership in the territory, the transcription regime would be replaced by a system of 
registration as soon as some stability in property transactions could be achieved. The document 
[…] authorizes, through the registration procedure, a complete purge of all actual rights and 
occult powers that are harmful to property and lead to precarious transactions(Socpa 2010: 
554). 
The major concern of the French administration was to impose its laws and the rights of French 
citizens on the colonial land heritage. Implicitly, customary land rights that they created and 
                                                 
15 As Clarence-Smith (1988: 4) notes, African chiefs were persuaded to part with vast and ill-defined tracts of land 
for the sake of some alcohol and assorted trade goods. The average price paid in the second half of 1880s was 
between half a Mark and a Mark a hectare (a Mark being worth roughly a British shilling. Also see Atangana 
1997,pp.87 on details on land sales between the chiefs of Douala and the Germans in the 1900s. 
16 For details on French land registration policy, see Eckert (1996: 192),regarding land questions during the colonial 
period, profound transformations took place in Douala following the ‘Decree of 21st July 1932 instituting land titling 
regime in Cameroon under the French law. Between 1934 and 1959, more than half (2818) of the 5652 registered 
land titles were made in Douala alone. 
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entrusted in the chiefs were not more recognised and land heritage was considered to be ‘empty 
unoccupied’ land. While the French tried to incorporate the colonial state into the French system 
of administration by assimilating the people, the British administered its own territory through 
indirect rule using the chiefs.17 Between 1932 and 1972, a series of administrative (texts, decrees, 
orders, edicts) regulated the organisation of land and estates in Cameroon (Socpa 2010:  555).The 
sharing of land brought about a completely new conception about land rights and as each ethnic 
group was assigned a particular land area with fixed boundaries, kinship system and social 
affiliations on which local communities relied were weakened. 
In the wake of independence in 1960, the expression ‘empty unoccupied lands’ was gradually 
abandoned in favour of the preferred term ‘national ownership’ which was later on enshrined in 
the 1974 land law.Declaring national ownership of the land by the Cameroon state was considered 
an aberration and tantamount to seizing the populations ‘ancestral lands’ on the grounds of the 
principle that the lands were empty, indeed unoccupied and therefore without rulers or owners for 
the people thus expropriated.  
Different perceptions about land started occurring in Aghem and Bu when the 1974 land law was 
introduced and the state was now at the centre of land management (see details in chapter 5). 
Following this logic, one of my informants (Cheng), notes that ‘all land now belongs to the state 
but it is managed by the traditional ruler in collaboration with the administration. She notes 
further, that the traditional ruler of the village is part of the state and works in close collaboration 
with state authorities.’ Implicitly, it was not only the authority over land that was transferred to 
the state but the chiefs were also co-opted into the state machinery as auxiliaries of the 
government (Geschiere, 1993). We already see the shift and the emergence of a different notion 
over the control of land as influenced by state land ordinances and an imminent clash between 
chiefs and state officials. By implication, the chief who hitherto had the monopoly as the 
custodian of the land has been pushed aside in the current dispensation of land governance. 
Another economic activity worth mentioning was the introduction of extensive cattle rearing by 
                                                 
17 Indirect rule was adopted formally or de facto by most colonial powers and continued by most independent 
governments in various forms. It operated with an administrative hierarchy wherein villages make up the lowest unit 
answerable to statutory administrative units at higher levels. This form of nested territorial authority has taken a 
variety of forms, from chiefs being formal auxiliaries of administration to secular village administrators .Also see 
Lund and Boone (2013,pp.5). 
37 
 
the Fulani during the advent of the British administration (Kaberry 1952: 89). The policies and 
strategies that were used to integrate the Fulani and their herds of cattle have been discussed in 
details in chapter six. 
 3.4 The Introduction of Cash Economy 
The major economic change of the colonial period was the development and expansion of the 
production of agricultural produce for sale in world markets (DeLancey1988: 2). Although 
plantation agriculture, usually under European control, was important […] the most significant 
changes occurred in peasant agriculture (ibid: 2). Coffee18 is one of the main cash crops that was 
introduced in Aghem and Bu by the 1950s and it provided an opportunity for the people to 
generate income (Kah 2012: 289). Subsistence economies that were largely self-sufficient were 
altered into mixed subsistence and export economies tied to the international economic system as 
inferior partners in a division of labour that largely defined Cameroon as a producer of raw 
materials, mainly agricultural, and France and England as the suppliers of finished goods 
(DeLancey 1988: 2). It was the export crop, Arabica coffee, which finally took off. It is said to 
have been introduced to the Bamenda plateau by a returned Bali migrant worker from a French 
plantation in 1923 and by the 1930s; coffee became quite popular around Santa19, very close to 
the border with French Cameroon, and at Bali (Chilver 1988: 6). As DeLancey (1988: 12) notes, 
due to the close contacts with the coffee farms in these areas and motivated by the money that 
this crop provided, coffee cultivation started in the Bamenda Province. By the end of the British 
period, coffee had become a major cash crop, not only along the border areas of Bamenda (and 
Mamfe) where it began with African initiatives, but over widespread interior areas of the 
territory.  
By 1959, at least 1300 tons of Arabica were exported, and this was produced almost entirely 
on peasant farms in Bamenda. In addition, 1000 tons of Robusta were exported, mainly from 
peasant farms in the Mamfe and Victoria areas. Cooperative growth paralleled the expansion 
                                                 
18 For other cash crops that were introduced in the South and French Cameroon ,such as cocoa, rubber, banana see 
Geschiere 1988; DeLancey 1988; Henn 1979; Konings 2012), The climatic conditions of the Grassfields did not 
favour the cultivation of these crops. 
19 A 1942 survey indicated almost 300 planters with some 231,000 trees in the Bamenda area see DeLancey 1988,pp 
11. Also for more on coffee cultivation in French Cameroun see Mbapndah (1994). 
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of coffee and after repeated demands by growers, a cooperative milling society opened in 
1950. By 1979 there were 24,000 members of coffee societies in Bamenda (Delancey 1988: 
12). 
Coffee cultivation was regarded as the men’s crop while women were more concerned with food 
cultivation. Its production actually flourished throughout the Bamenda division and it was a 
source of revenue for men (Teboh 2002: 171). In the 1980s, Cameroon was facing an economic 
crisis due to a fall in the prices of export crops in the international markets. This affected the 
production of coffee adversely as most farmers became discouraged (Awung and Atanga 2011: 
95). Fonjong (2004: 22) notes that both Arabica and Robusta coffees, for example, which was the 
principal cash crop in the Province, saw a drop from 3.417 tons in the 1996/1997 to 1.287 tons in 
1997/1998 farming seasons; thus representing a 62.3% drop in production within a year. Walo20 
who was a coffee farmer in Bu notes that coffee cultivation was a lucrative business in the 1960s 
and it is from coffee that he was able to raise money for the bride wealth of his wife, educate his 
children and also pay his way to the cocoa plantations in the coast. Most of the farmers of his era 
in Bu he said, abandoned their farms in the 1980s to seek for greener pastures in cocoa and rubber 
plantations in the southwest region of Cameroon once coffee became unproductive. He states 
further that, the cultivation of coffee took about three to four years before the crop was mature 
and so needed a lot of time and patience and this were discouraging to many farmers. 
Consequently, coffee production was given little or no attention once rice was introduced in Bu. 
Apart from the fact that coffee cultivation was time consuming and could not provide for the 
immediate needs of the people, the prices were always fluctuating and so many farmers became 
discouraged (Kah 2012: 289). In fact, only vestiges of coffee farms can still be found in Bu and 
Aghem today as most of the farmers have resorted to the cultivation of rice and other food crops.  
3.4.1 The Introduction of Rice Cultivation in Bu  
Apart from coffee, rice was also introduced as cash crop and till today, it has become the 
mainstay of the Bu economy. The introduction of upland and swamp rice cultivation in 1953 and 
1957 respectively transformed the economy of the Bu chiefdom in a more significant way.21 The 
                                                 
20 Pa Walo is about 90 years old and is Presently a member of the Bu traditional council interviewed 12/11/2013. 
21 Rice was introduced from Abakili, Nigeria see Kah 2012,pp288 but it is not clear who introduced it in Bu. 
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climatic conditions in Bu favour the cultivation of rice such as the availability of water and 
swamps for inland rice cultivation. The Bu rice fields also served as experimental farms for the 
Wum Area Development Authority (WADA).22 It did not only alter the land use pattern but also 
the land rights, as men now claimed ownership of the rice fields and used the money accumulated 
from its sale the way they wanted(ibid). ‘Rice cultivation made […] people to own permanent 
pieces of land and a farmer, previously considered to be the user of the land, now became its 
owner (Kah 2012: 288). Prior to this, they were used to shifting cultivation of food crops and 
people did not have claims over land. As it was in most of the Grassfield, developed land was 
acquiring value as a commodity (Chilver 1988: 10) especially where coffee and rice farms were 
established. The changes were accelerated by the introduction of the monetary economy e.g 
through taxation and the introduction of these cash crops (Buchalik 2013: 211; Chilver 1988: 8).23 
Rice cultivation became a status symbol and the way to get money for investments in other 
sectors like livestock and establishment of small scale businesses (Kah 2012: 289). ‘At first, the 
cultivation of rice was considered a man’s work but today its cultivation is undertaken by both 
men and women because of the importance of the crop for domestic consumption and its market 
value’.24  
The cultivation of rice in Bu has transformed the lives of the people and has also improved their 
living conditions. ‘Money generated from the sales of rice has enabled the people to construct 
better houses and also to sponsor their children in school. Some farmers have been able to 
established lucrative businesses in the Bu community, thereby making available articles that 
ordinarily they would have bought from Wum town.’25 Most of these items include basic needs 
such as matches, candles, kerosene, beer, and corn mills. ‘It is from the cultivation of rice that I 
have been able to raise money to renovate and operate this store. In the past, it was difficult for 
us to have the basic things here in Bu but with the store life has become easy.’26  
                                                 
22 WADA was an agro-industrial plant established by the government of Cameroon see Fonjong 2014 
23 Also see DeLancey 1988 ‘the expansion of coffee production in Bamenda and Bananas in the Southwest’ in the 
political economy of Cameroon: historical perspectives, African Studies Centre, Leiden 
24 Kpwa Kennedy, interviewed 12/11/2013 in Bu. 
25 Toh Josaiah, interviewed 12/11/2013, Bu. 
26  Koi Dorothy, interviewed 12/11/2013 Bu  she owns one the few off licenses in Bu and  is also  rice cultivator.  
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Figure 4 View of Bu Rice fields    
Photo: Courtesy, De Bruijn 2013 
Towards the end of the rainy season, farmers prepare the low land fields for rice cultivation by 
ploughing and tilling the rooms. Rice seeds are planted in September and October just when the 
rains are about to cease. The swampy area is drain by River Menchum which forms a confluence 
with River Mezam in the Bafut area. When the river over flows its banks, the soil is enriched with 
alluvial deposits. The river valley is therefore very fertile for market gardening and for rice 
cultivation. ‘The planting of rice seedlings may take a day or several days depending on the size 
of the farm and the labour force available. Weeding is the most exhaustive and labour intensive 
work. The cultivation of rice in Bu is also a very strenuous exercise owing to the fact that the 
fields are located right down the deep valley (about 3Km from settlements) with no access 
motorable road’. Access to the farms is by trekking using footpaths through very steep hill slopes 
and this also makes the transportation of farm produce and harvested rice very tedious since all of 
it is transported by head load or sometimes in canoes through Bafut. 27 The weight of 50Kilos of a 
bag of rice is sold at 18. 000Frs and the amount of annual revenue generated from rice depends on 
the farm size, labour and the application of farm inputs. Generally a good harvest is considered to 
be anything between 100 to 150 bags of husked rice and anything below that is considered poor 
                                                 
27 Towah Jonas, interviewed 12/11/2013 in Bu. 
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harvest.28 Rice is harvested during the dry season with December and January being the peak 
periods. The increase cultivation of rice began in 1973 and led to the establishment of a rice co-
operative in Bu known as the Bu/Mbengkas Rice Co-operative Society Limited (BMRS Ltd) by 
1979 (Kah 2012: 289).29 The machines that were offered to the Bu/Mbingkas Rice Cooperative 
Society by the Wum Area Development Authority (WADA) are all bad due to poor maintenance 
and the unavailability of spare parts and ever since the WADA project collapsed.30 Nowadays, the 
husking of rice has become very difficult and farmers have to travel as far as Wum town or to 
(Tingoh) Bafut where there are rice husking mills.31  
 
To conclude, this chapter sets out to examine the various factors that have brought about changes 
in the perception of land and patterns of land use. One of the fundamental changes was the 
introduction of colonial land laws which affected customary tenure arrangements adversely by 
introducing private property rights as opposed to communal land ownership. Land was therefore 
not seen as a communal asset but as a commodity. It is the introduction of cash crops that also 
increased the value and the scramble for land by individuals.The introduction of cash economy 
did not only create an opportunity for people to generate revenue from their produce, but equally 
let to wealth accumulation through land acquisition. Another factor that also influenced land use 
patterns in the area was the introduction of extensive cattle rearing by the Fulani. Cattle rearing 
did not only change the political economy of the area but brought about a different mode of 
production which was at variance with the traditional agricultural economy system.   
Following Goheen (1996: 118), I conclude that the greatest force of change in land tenure system 
and conflict in Aghem and Bu have come from, i) Colonial land laws and policies, ii) increase in 
herds of cattle and population iii) the introduction of cash crops and v) government land and 
environmental policies (vi) the commoditisation of  land.
                                                 
28 For instance, Kpwah Kennedy makes a profit of about 450. 000Frs from rice production during a good harvest in 
a season. 
29 Presently, there are three rice mills in Bu unfortunately due to poor maintenance, none is functioning and farmers 
have to transport harvested rice to Bafut or to Wum town by head load in most of the instances.  
30 WADA is an agro-industrial plant developed established by the government of Cameroon in the 1960s to boost 
agricultural production and also to assist local farmers with farm inputs and also to empower local farmers. In the 
mid 1980s and 1990 that Cameroon was in economic crisis, WADA was closed and automatically, the assistance 
that farmers got from them equally ceased. For details on W.A.D.A, see Fonjong 2004. 
31 Koi Delphine, interviewed 12/11/2013 in Bu. 

 Chapter Four: ‘We are Strangers in our Land and our Chiefs now belong 
to the Fulani ’: The Paradoxes of Changing Patron/Client Relationships 
in Land deals 
4.1 Introduction 
For most rural communities, the control and management of land was the power base of the 
chief and was at the heart of control over people […] where such control over land has been 
whittled away, they have lost their grip over the people. As paramount, the Fon could exact 
from his subjects allegiance and tribute as a sign of their submission to him. This submission 
was clearly manifested by the payment of a tribute of allegiance that included surrendering all 
‘royal game’, such as python, leopard, and buffalo to the Fon. All these practices are now on the 
decline (Fisiy 1995: 50-52). 
The upsurge of inter ethnic boundary disputes  in Cameroon (Nkwi, 2011) and the persistent land 
conflicts in Wum Central Subdivision have brought to the fore the debate about power struggle 
over access to land and control between local authorities, the state and the communities. These 
struggles have been attributed to the legal and social transformations that customary tenure has 
undergone from the pre-colonial period and have resulted in the co-existence of different 
institutional frameworks from which contradictory discourses and agendas have emerged (Fisiy 
1995: 5). The issue is not just over the control of land but contests for supremacy and who the 
competent authority to handle land matters is. As we have seen in the previous chapters, before 
the introduction of colonial land laws, it was the chief who was the custodian of the land. The 
chief constituted the nucleus of political activities within the society (Bejeng 1984: 267).  All the 
land in the chiefdom was under the custody of the chief who ensured its protection and 
distribution to members of the chiefdom. He was the force that united the final authority of the 
chiefdom being the final authority in the settlement of litigation and gathering the people around 
him through frequent acts of generosity (Chilver or Kaberry 1967; Bejeng 1984: 268). Through 
his generosity, he enjoyed a lot of support from his people in so many ways and also considered 
everybody in his chiefdom as his people. Land was therefore not considered a major determinant 
to ones identity and belonging, but was also a situation in which wealth and power of the chief 
depended on rights in and control over people (Merry 1991: 899). The social networks of 
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obligations, expectations and privileges that existed between a chief and his people were based on 
patron/client relationships.   
For several decades, customary tenure has undergone dynamic transformations and these have 
tended to erode the power based of chiefs that was rooted in the control and management of land 
and their influence or authority over their people has been on the decline. This shift in authority 
over the control of land also has implications on the social networks, trust, expectations and 
obligations and royalties those chiefs enjoyed in their communities in the past. In most instances, 
loyalty has switched to state bureaucrats as they have become the new patrons with chiefs playing 
a peripheral role in land issues now. The chiefs are contesting the transfer of power to manage 
land from them to the state and have continued to forge ahead with customary tenure on grounds 
that they are the ‘rightful’ owners of the land.  
In this chapter, I focus on chiefs and state bureaucrats who are considered as patrons and the 
different ways in which they negotiate their control and management of land and how their clients 
switch alliances and loyalties from one patron to another and the implications on access to land 
and conflicts in Wum. The chapter therefore explores the relationship between patrons and clients 
and how these relationships are created, endured and used within the changing historical contexts 
of land rights and politics in Cameroon. I try to show and argue that  farmer-herder conflicts are 
not only about crops destroyed by cattle and access to land but also a reflection of  local power 
relations and the role governmental agents and local chiefs play in them (Dafinger and Pelican 
2006: 134). 
Rather than focusing on land patronage alone I argue that in modern day Cameroon, it is difficult 
to separate land from political patronage since land in itself is politics. I therefore try to show the 
interplay between land and politics in patron-client relationships and how these are used to serve 
different interests. The following questions are therefore relevant for this chapter: Who is a patron 
and who is a client? Secondly, how are patron- client relationships established and sustained? 
Thirdly, how are they utilised in the politics of land and despite the political and socio-economic 
transformations that Cameroon had undergone why does patron-client relations continue to exist? 
This chapter therefore attempts to provide answers to the above questions by examining the 
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continuity and transformations of this practice into the post-colonial times and contexts 
(Bellagamba 2004: 385). I therefore adopt a socio-historical approach to give account of the shifts 
and changes within the present context of land patronage in Wum Central Sub Division.  
4.2 Understanding Patron-Client Relationships 
A lot has been written on the relationships that exist between patrons and clients by Africanist 
scholars within the past several decades (see for example, Onoma 2008; Olumuyiwa et al 2010; 
Albert 2005; Gabriel 2007). Yet, understanding these relationships are as complex as the social 
structures and networks that shape them and from which they are rooted. While there is no 
common or agreed definition to these key concepts, the basic elements that revolve around the 
phenomena have always been highlighted by different scholars though sometimes taking different 
angles. In a study on political patronage in Nigeria, Joseph (1983) examines the social exchanges 
that exist between patrons and clients in terms of allowances in kind or rights to use of land in 
return for services, where these allowances or rights are not granted on hereditary principles, a 
situation he refers to as Prebendal politics. At the state level he focuses on the social networks 
which provide the link between ethnic groups and villages a phenomenon he calls ethno-
clientalism. ‘Central to these relationships is the exchange of various kinds of patronage for 
assistance, support, and loyalty’. He contends that these patterns of political behaviour justify the 
principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilised for the 
personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their reference or support group. Clientilistic 
relations to him have ‘served in Africa to reinforce and even promote ethnic clustering as 
individuals provide the conduit for the transmission of resources from their own patrons 
downwards while ensuring in exchange the support of a reliable constituency’ (Joseph 1983: 29). 
He goes further to note that this is often done through ethnic competition and he demonstrates that 
the politics of competition is the means through which part of state resources ‘a share of the 
national cake’ are attracted to one’s community. Szeftel (2000: 437) moves in the same direction 
with Joseph but focuses on the factions that exist within the party and how they compete against 
each other to gain control over public resources and that this is often transcended and articulated 
through the language of ethnic and sometimes religious identities. Intra-party and inter-party 
competition for political power is therefore, in most instances, based on inter-ethnic competition, 
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as different ethnic groups compete for or retain political power in a bid to have access to 
resources for political patronage ( Mwangi 2008: 269;Nkwi 2006: 123).  
Albert (2005) has developed the syndrome of ‘godfatherism’ that permeates Nigerian politics and 
considers godfathers as ‘men who have the power personally to determine who gets nominated 
and who wins an election’. He gives a succinct analysis of how godfathers (patrons) use their 
clients for selfish aims. Put the other way round, it is a relationship based on exploitative 
tendencies of patrons whom he refers to as ‘godfthers’ over their clients.  He aptly puts it as 
follows:  
Their main goal is to use their client to attain selfish goals; the latter too do the same. The 
relationship between the two of them thus has little or nothing with the larger society the two of 
them claim to lead. The relationship between the godfathers and their clients has little or no 
enduring purpose that could hold both of them together. It is thus common to find them going in 
separate directions shortly after a ‘contractual agreement’ is reached between the (Albert 2005: 
81). 
Kea (2010: 5) concentrates on the incorporation of strangers or ‘late comers’ in communities and 
examines the reciprocal rewards that patrons (host) and clients benefit from each other, stressing 
that in most cases the hosts have the duty to integrate strangers into the community from whom 
they expect all forms of support including labour recruits for the cultivation of the farms of their 
host for some days a week. Hosts in turn, acquire political support and /or an extensive following 
from their clients. ‘In those days the people were called upon to cultivate crops for the chief once 
a year. In return he provided food to the villagers’ (Ebua Amisen interviewed 30/10/2013). 
During the pre-colonial era when chiefs still had a lot of respect, each quarter had to tilt the farm 
of the chief and even harvested maize for the chief. The men did the clearing and the women 
cultivated his estates for free. All he gave to us was food and the people were very happy with 
such gestures (Emmerencia, interviewed 7/10/2013).   
Bayart (2009:  228) and  van Velzen, on their part see patron /client relations as essentially social 
networks of unequal relationships and involve a sort of social relations in stratified socio-political 
systems whereby valued resources are exchanged between the ruling and the ruled. Most often, 
these systems are themselves producers of inequality. Frequently the literature on patron-client 
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relations assumes that the balance of exchange inevitably favours the patron, the stronger party in 
the relationship (Ravenhill 1985: 32).Valued resources may be material resources such as land, 
gifts, money and other forms of wealth and immaterial resources may include prestige, rights, 
power, trust, privileges, alliances, titles, and positions among others. What are important to note is 
the various forms that these relations and social exchanges take and are being (re) negotiated 
between the Patrons (rulers) and the clients (ruled). Irrespective of the context and situation, 
patron/client relationships are always fluid, not constant and subject to changes, renegotiations 
and even contestations. 
 4.2.1 People as the Source of Authority of the Chief 
In the introductory paragraph of this chapter, I stated that in the pre-colonial period in most of the 
Grassfield chiefdoms, the power and wealth of the chief was in people and not in land but also 
based on the magical powers that he wielded and this was a source of prestige, wealth and also 
gave him control over his people (Merry 1991: 899, Fisiy 1995). In pre-colonial Kenya (Boas and 
Dunn 2013: 57), people’s communal identity was shaped by their subsistence-farming, herding or 
a mixture of the two and loyalties were constructed at the micro level through marriage alliances, 
age groups, trading partnerships and so forth and not in land. In a study carried out among the 
Nso’ of Cameroon by Chem-Langhee (1995: 179), he demonstrates that:  
[…] people counted wealth and measured prestige in terms of the number of mouths one could 
feed or in terms of the number of persons under ones control or authority: the larger the number, 
the wealthier one was said to be, the higher the prestige, the easier it was for one to acquire a 
title or a higher status in society. Such a concept created avenues for the acquisition of slaves as 
a means of increasing one’s followers in order to be considered wealthy and thus gain a higher 
status and prestige in the society.  
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Figure 5 Fon Mbambi of Aghem and Researcher in his palatial Reception hall. 
 Courtesy, De Bruijn 2013 
In most African societies, the easiest means to increase the number of persons under ones control 
was through slave trading and raiding since slaves were exchanged for money and this was also a 
means of wealth accumulation. Aghem raided for slaves and was also involved in the trading of 
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palm oil. Its most powerful rival to the south was Bafut with whom it competed for control of the 
middle Metcham valley. With Kom it traded oil for kola, with Kasimbila  it exchanged slaves and 
oil for guns, gun-powder, salt and the blue and white cloth; and also had trading links with 
Takum.  
Although the Aghem were not aware of any large-scale slave trading, people (usually children 
and young women) were bought and sold on an individual basis (Kopytoff 1981: 377). Most of 
the slaves were acquired from the direction of Kom and some of Aghem are said to have traded 
on this as middlemen, using oil to buy a child or woman in Kom and immediately selling them in 
Isu or Munshi for goats, salt, or ammunition(ibid).‘A number of villages in the Beba-Bafang and 
Esimbi areas were also in loose tributary relations to the Batums as slave and oil- providers: the 
Su Batum had the largest number’ (Chem-Langhee 1995). During slave raiding most of the war 
captives were women and young boys and girls whom the chief (Batum) disposed of as he saw fit. 
While most of the boys were retained to assist the palace attendants in keeping custody of the 
property of the chief, most of the women and girls were distributed to deserving persons as wives. 
Furthermore, the first children of such slave wives belonged to the chief; who either married the 
girls himself or gave them out in marriage (Chem-Langhee 1995: 182). Slaves played an 
important role in the agrarian system since they constituted the labour force in most societies. As 
Amanor (2007: 34) demonstrates in the situation of most pre-colonial African societies, ‘powerful 
states raided neighbouring peoples or established tributes in slaves, who were put to work in the 
farms and in land colonization’. The labourers were more important than the land itself because 
the people were often expropriated to the land as slaves and then incorporated into society as part 
of the agricultural labouring people (ibid). However, a slave could migrate from his slave hood 
and become integrated especially if he was of good behaviour or achieved success.  
By implication, what was important in the pre-colonial setting as demonstrated above, was one’s 
membership, community, trust, social networks, social relations, commitment amongst others that 
kept the community together; but not land. Although no slave descendants can still be identified 
in Aghem and Bu, their involvement in slave trading and raiding also contributed to the expansion 
of the Aghem and Bu chiefdoms and constituted a source of wealth. As Kaberry (1950:  370) 
notes ‘the Fon often says: what is Fon without people? I am in the hands of my people’…the Fon 
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has everything; the Fon is a poor man’ and the Fon rules the people, but the people hold the Fon’. 
The authority of the Fon was determined by the number of people he had under his control and 
this was the parameter in which the might of the chiefdom was measured. This is the principle on 
which the Chieftaincy Law in Cameroon was formulated.1  
4.2.2 The Changing Context of Authority of Chiefs: From Wealth in People to Wealth in Land 
The inception of colonial rule in Africa introduced the notion of customary law and tenure system 
and this brought about changes in power relations as local chiefs were bestowed with the rights to 
control land. Customary land tenure did not only emerge through the economic changes brought 
about by the colonial system, but also through the political alliances through which colonial 
administration was established. This delegated rural administration and regulation of natural 
resources to chiefs, who in return for their participation in the colonial administration were 
recognised as holding customary ownership of land as well as rights to royalties, fees, taxes and 
labour services of their subjects. To maintain control over land the colonial administration formed 
an alliance with chiefs under the Native Administration system and invested trusteeship and 
ultimate ownership of land rights in chiefs (Amanor 2007: 36). In societies where chiefs did not 
exist, chiefs were invented and imposed by the colonialists on their subjects (Geschiere 1993: 
152, Ranger 1994). 
During this period, rights and access to land that were determined by membership of a social 
group; were now under the control of a hierarchy of patrons and distributed to clients (Kea 2010: 
10; Beekers and Gool 2012: 7). In such arrangements, ‘less resourceful individuals were able to 
secure access to pieces of land to cultivate, have a steady job, material goods, wealth, physical 
protection or direct assistance in times of scarcity or illness’ (ibid). Cleintelship therefore offered 
the weaker parties the opportunity to claim special advantages in the relationship on account of 
their weakness (Ravenhill 1985: 23). While clients depended on their patrons to acquire necessary 
services, social insurance and resources, patrons in their turn needed a clientele to maintain 
labour, security and thereby secure their status and power. This social network of patrons-clients 
                                                 
1 See Decree No 77/245 of July 1977 which provides the framework for the recognition of genuine sources of 
Traditional rule. According to the law, chiefdoms are classified into three categories 1st,2nd and 3rd class with 
population amongst others as the main criteria used for this classification. 
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created an imbalance over land management and the resources although it ensured  mutual trust 
through which even strangers and new comers were integrated in the community by the ‘hosts’.  
Within this backdrop, land was conceptualised as consisting of a number of domains: Allodia 
rights that were vested in chiefs (Patron) and usufructuary rights invested in peasant farmers 
(clients). This meant that the ‘patrons’ had powers as trustees of the community to regulate and 
allocate land to community members who were their ‘clients’. At the level of the ethnic group the 
king or chief served as the trustee and the control of land was entrusted in him who allotted 
unoccupied lands at will, but was not justified in dispossessing any person or family who was 
using the land except for crime or treason or for public purposes, such as the building of a new 
capital (Goheen 1988: 93).  
4.2.3 Being or Becoming a Patron or a Client 
There are several ways of becoming a patron or a client but for the sake of this chapter, I shall 
focus on patrons that emerge as a response to their links in land ownership, control and the 
capacity to distribute the land and resources to their clients and the expectations and obligations 
arising from that. Furthermore I have included state bureaucrats (patrons) who are the main actors 
in the neo-patrimonial state of Cameroon at different levels. Within the African societies, land 
patronage is generally acquired through inheritance or succession. Since inheritance and 
succession are the social norms and rites through which property is handed down from one 
generation to another, becoming a successor is the surest means to climb the social strata and 
become a patron. In this way, patronage is acquired through ascription following normative rules 
which are peculiar to a given environment or the society in question. Unlike in most societies in 
Cameroon where succession is patriarchal, in Aghem and Bu it is matrilineal with the exception 
being that of Zongakwo where patriarchy is practiced. It is in this kind of social arrangement that 
the Batums of the six sub clans that make up the Aghem chiefdom and that of Bu inherited clan 
lands and their resources. Like other chiefdoms of the Western Grassfields of the northwest of 
Cameroon, Aghem is a state-like society headed by a hereditary Fon who is recognised as the 
senior title-holder in the highly stratified social, political, economic and religious systems which 
constitute the social organisation of the village (Simo 1995: 82).The Batum enjoyed a lot of rights 
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and privileges such as the control and dispossession of clan land and also the prerogative to keep 
a hunting reserve which other commoners could not. In the old, during hunting expeditions on his 
reserve special parts of the game (booty) were reserved for him alone. In fact the superior status 
of the senior Batum was recognised by the formality of rendering the skins of slain leopards to 
him (Bejeng 1984; Fisy 1995). For example, see figure 5 (page 48) showing the pelt of a leopard 
on which Fon Mbambi places his feet on as a carpet.  
Within the neo-patrimonial state of Cameroon today, where land rights have been formalised 
through the acquisition of land title deeds, a new breed of government administrators (patrons) 
charged with land management have emerged. The chief has not only lost his rights over hunting 
grounds but is even forbidden from killing such veracious animals or possessing parts of the 
game. Hunting and the killing of animals is now regulated by the state.2 Land acquisition has also 
come under the ambit of the state with different modes of access to land. In this way, patronage 
can be acquired through title deeds from the state, achievement or purchase and not based or 
restricted to inheritance. Although the powers of the chief are declining, they have adopted 
different strategies in land management especially as they have been co-opted as members in the 
land commissions (see details in chapter 5). 
Clients on the other hand are those who are within the lower strata of the social rank and can only 
have access to these valued resources through established networks and social exchanges with 
their patrons. In most cases access to these resources goes with certain obligations, expectations, 
respect, obedience, allegiance, trust, and provision of services to their patrons amongst others. 
Clients may be ‘free born’ (commoners) in the community or may be ‘strangers’ or ‘slaves’ that 
have been assimilated or integrated into the society. Following this presentation, the chiefs, 
lineage heads and state bureaucrats constitute and are herein referred to as ‘patrons’ while 
members of the community and ‘strangers’ constitute ‘clients’. Irrespective of the means through 
which one becomes a patron or a client, patron/client relationship is a hierarchical structure in 
which power and dominance reside in the hands of those in control of valued resources. Two 
trajectories of patron/client relations can quickly be distinguished, those based on land and 
political patronage. I now proceed by examining how patron/client relationships operate and how 
                                                 
2 See Cameroon forestry law of 1994. 
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they are used to consolidate the political and power base of the patrons while subjecting the 
clients under their control. 
4.3 Attribution of Land to Strangers and the Different forms of Social Exchanges 
In the chiefdom of Aghem, there is a social structure and laid down procedures on how to receive 
and integrate strangers. The use of the word ‘strangers’ is not limited to the Fulani but include 
Cameroonians from other ethnic groups or regions of the country who have migrated and settled 
in Aghem and Bu. This is what Ebua Amisen has to say about the process of integrating strangers 
in Aghem. 
At moment, were have a village council and if anybody wants a piece of land the council will 
demarcate the land but he has to ‘follow the tradition’. That means he has to feed the Council, pay 
the development levy about 25.000 FRS and then Zinc to the Chief of the village.  If he likes to be 
part of us there is no problem. But he has to be initiated into the various secret societies if he gives 
‘food’ to the members. In that way we will consider him an Aghem man. 
Land acquisition takes different forms (purchase, leasing, borrowing, gift, inheritance) but 
definitely go with certain obligations as we find in the narrative below. I add to the list of patrons, 
the members of the Aghem and Bu Traditional Councils that constitute networks of patrons who 
work in collaboration with the chiefs. Incorporation of strangers is not only based on ‘following 
the tradition’ but also involves integration through ritual initiations. As Kea (2010: 5) 
demonstrates, in patron/client relationships, clients give gifts to local rulers, which in turn 
increase the latter’s power and wealth and facilitate a relationship of reciprocal obligation in 
which hosts provide material support and help strangers to establish themselves in new 
communities. 
Reciprocity refers to the exchange of non comparable resources, usually effected by means of a 
package deal. For both parties the objective is to obtain resources that they perceive as being 
valuable and that would not otherwise be readily available to them (Ravenhill 1985: 32). In the 
case of Aghem, material and social exchanges enhance the relationship between patrons and 
clients. For instance, the Fulani make regular assistance to the Fon as a sign of respect and 
submission by donating cows and fowls to him on special occasions and the Fon enjoys the 
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privilege of also being recognised by the Fulani as their leader. In exchange, they receive an 
allocation of land (Bellagamba 2004: 389). Social exchanges have always been used by chiefs to 
enhance their prestige and also increase their sphere of political influence. The strangers do not 
only increase his population but are also used as the basis for political lobbying. These social 
exchanges also include visitations and celebrations during feasts such as Sallah, or Ramadan 
where Aghem people usually take part at such festivals in huge numbers and the Fulani also ‘pay 
back’ during Christmas. During occasions such as Christmas, the Fulani present their problems to 
the chief. ‘If we also have problems on this land, we will tell the chief. I once had a problem on 
this land and he intervened and the matter was solved. A certain Peter who was a fish seller came 
and  took a large portion of my farm and wanted to establish a palm plantation, luckily through 
the intervention of the chief, the land commission drove him away and  since then he has not 
trespassed on the land again.’3 In receiving new arrivals the chief who is also the political leader 
of his community considers them as his subjects since he is not only a political figure but also the 
custodian of the land. This has been explained by Fisiy (1995: 54) as follows: 
It is in his political capacity that the chief can rightly claim ‘this is all my land, and these are all 
my people’ in this capacity, the chief welcomes all new arrivals as his ‘strangers’. They in turn, 
are expected to pay tribute to him as their Fon and as a sign of their respect and submission to his 
authority. Even though these new arrivals might be given land by any of the land-owning lineages, 
they are still accountable to the Fon as his people. It is also in that capacity as political leader that 
land attributions, such as for a school or other development project, are made by the Fon in 
consultation with the land-owning lineage. 
In the Bu chiefdom, the Fulani were settled on a specific piece of land offered by the village chief 
-Chu. The piece of land allotted to the Fulani by the chief of Bu was given for ‘free’ but has 
always gone with certain obligations, expectations and reciprocity. Each year, the Fulani are 
obliged to send a cow to the chief of Bu and also make annual levies for the up keep of the palace.  
As a reward for giving the cattle to the chief, the Fulani have been recognised and integrated as 
members of the host communities and given all the protection that they need. For instance, the 
national identity cards issued by the state of Cameroon to the Fulani carry Aghem and Bu as their 
villages of origin. Today, the Fulani have been integrated into the Bu community and are now 
                                                 
3  Suleiman Guizo, interviewed 7/10/2013,Bu Road 
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considered as Bu people. Some have even been co-opted as members of the Bu Traditional 
Council and other social groups.4  
In Aghem the Fon does not recognise the Fulani as Aghem people, but he however values the 
presence of the Fulani in his community as very useful because of the mutual benefits (symbiosis) 
that each of them stand to gain. Fon Mbambi has this to say: 
You cannot eat only food (maize) without meat, we also need meat from the cattle owned by the 
Fulani’ The Fulani have lived here for more than sixty years and you cannot drive them away 
because they are now your brothers and sisters. You do not only have to eat meat always or Corn 
Fufu but have to mix the two. I advised them to allow the Fulani and then adopt shifting 
cultivation method of farming. You can farm here today and allow the cattle on the other piece of 
land. After four years the cattle return to that piece of land.  
This statement made by the Fon of Aghem comes from the backdrop of agitations from the 
Aghem people who have persistently seen the Fulani as strangers, but Suleiman thinks that this 
attitude has changed and a symbiotic relationship is being established. He sums up his views in 
the following excerpts: 
 At first it was difficult living with them because they felt that our place was in the hills. Today 
their attitude towards us has changed. We now live peacefully with them. Initially they were 
suspicious of us and they considered us as strangers but the situation has changed.  They wanted 
us to go to the marginal lands up the hills and not to settle around the valleys or fertile spots. 
Today they have come to consider us as indigenes because since we arrived here, I delivered all 
my children here and I have nowhere to go to. My parents were all buried here. This is my place 
and even Ngoundere where we came from is Cameroon so we see ourselves as Cameroonians 
that can settle anywhere.  Some of them also have cattle and so they see us as one.5  
They also send their children to public schools and use other state institutions such as markets, 
health centres and public utilities such as water and electricity with the Bu people. The Fulani and 
the Bu people have established long lasting social networks be them at the social, political and 
economic levels. For doing this, the Bu people are also allowed access to cow dung from cattle 
                                                 
4 For instance, the President of the Parents Teachers Association (P.T.A) of Government School Mujang is Dabu- a 
Fulani herdsman. 
5 He owns a large herd of cattle and the parents migrated from Ngaoundere about one hundred years ago. He and his 
two brothers have about 75 cattle and are also involve in the cultivation of  food crops notably pepper. 
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owned by the Fulani for vegetable production. The people of Bu are predominantly engaged in 
the cultivation of upland rice and the Fulani constitute the first category of their clients who 
purchase much of the rice. The relationship is therefore not only reciprocal but also 
complimentary. In Aghem, farmers and grazers exchange gifts when they meet in the fields. Fon 
Mbambi insists.  
4.4 The Nexus between Land and Patronage as Instruments of Political Mobilisation 
The use of land to generate political support has received considerable attention, since the 
(re)introduction of multiparty democracy in many African countries (Konings2001; Onoma 2008: 
148). Clientelism has widely been employed as a mode of political mobilisation in most of neo-
patrimonial Africa where politicians use land rights to reward followers, buy the support of 
would-be opposition members and punish opponents. Like elsewhere in the continent, clientelism 
is nearly always based on the politicization of identity and landed class relations do play a part in 
compelling the loyalty of tenants and farm workers (Szeftel 2000: 437). In particular, it has been a 
feature of societies in which peasant populations or migrant or otherwise excluded communities 
have been mobilised or organised politically (ibid) especially groups such as the Fulani and 
landed migrants from other parts of Cameroon (Geschiere 1993; Konings 2012). For being 
integrated in the host community, ‘late comers’ or ‘strangers’ are expected to support their hosts 
through votes. The tendency for individuals in the public sphere has always been to identify 
themselves or to be identified with a specific ethnic group and this has resulted in ‘identity 
politics in the public sphere (Orji 2010: 168). Usually, political parties recruit supporters directly 
through the politicization of kinship, ethnicity, religion and other forms of identity and political 
parties then build coalitions of these competing factions in order to gain power and have access to 
state resources. I use the September 30th 2013 elections that took place in Cameroon to show how 
patron/client relationships manifested and influenced the outcome of elections. 
4.4.1 The September 30th 2013 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections 
During the period of my field research, municipal and parliamentary elections were organised in 
Cameroon on 30th September 2013. I use the conduct of the campaigns and the results of the 
elections that I was involved as a participant observer to show how the various competing 
57 
 
political parties recruited militants and voters through land patronage. I also try to show how land 
politics can also be used as a political tool to drum support and to create conflicts. It is important 
to note that in Aghem and Bu, there are two main political parties-the ruling Cameroon Peoples’ 
Democratic movement (CPDM) and the main opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF). 
According to Cameroon’s electoral calendar, the elections were supposed to have taken place in 
2011 but this time table was not respected for reasons that this researcher cannot explain.  
The elections started with the selection of candidates to constitute the municipal lists and 
parliamentary seats by the competing political parties in each constituency. The compositions of 
the various lists were configured along ethnic lines which enhanced out right political 
ethnicisation.6 The lists and choice of candidates were dominated by ‘sons and daughters of the 
soil’ who could easily determine the outcome of the results.7 Generally, in order to ensure victory, 
each political party puts an ‘influential’, rich, candidate or popular ‘son of the soil’ as the list 
leader who is also a ‘crowd puller’.  
In a similar scenario in Nigeria, Joseph (1983: 29) underscores the fact that party formation or 
selection of candidates has often consisted of a fierce competition to recruit the men or women 
whose affiliation to the party can mean the inclusion of a community of followers varying from a 
handful of village to the block vote of an ethno-linguistic group. Apart from the fact that each 
ethnic group must be represented on the list, the position of candidates on the municipal list also 
determines the voting pattern. There has always been the struggle by the various political parties 
to win the affiliation of popular candidates with the knowledge that they would bring with them 
the greater majority of members of their ethnic groups during political elections.8  
                                                 
6 Cameroon electoral code stipulates that candidates for municipal elections must reflect the sociological 
composition of the municipality and failure to comply with this, the list shall be rejected by Elections Cameroon- 
ELECAM. 
7 See Nkwi (2011),’Sons and Daughters of the soil’ and those who claim to be the rightful owners of the land and 
consider any other person out of this as a stranger,’ intruder’ or simply the ‘others’, See Geschiere (2005a)for details 
8 In most cases, those who are nominated by the various political parties are rich domestic elites, who are likely to 
distribute part of their wealth in exchange for votes. 
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Just two weeks to the polls-precisely on the 13th of September, President Paul Biya signed a 
decree allocating monthly allowances to traditional rulers.9 In a similar manner, during the 
countdown to the 2007 Municipal and Parliamentary elections, new administrative units-what 
Onoma (2008: 153) refers to as ‘gerrymandering’ were created with pro-opposition strongholds 
being the most affected. The two regions that were the most affected were the Littoral and the 
South; the former known for its pro-opposition tendencies and the latter, the most loyal Biya 
bastion.10 This was seen by the SDF as a strategy to lobby for support and to mobilise voters 
through traditional authorities and local or regional notables. This had far reaching implications 
because it made the chiefs not only to vote for the CPDM, but there was fierce competition 
between the various chiefs and ethnic groups to ensure victory for the CPDM in their homelands. 
Most chiefs in Cameroon have always shown their loyalty to the ruling party in return for 
privileges and support from the party. In most cases they have awarded titles to Paul Biya as a 
sign of  their submission and loyalty to him and his CPDM party. ‘He is even considered by 
traditional rulers as one of them’. In the northwest he is known as ‘Fon of Fons’ and in the South 
region he is Nnom ngui-loosely translated as the ‘chief of chiefs’ 
Personally, I have gained recognition. I have the immunity from the party. I have been given 
medals up to the rank of Commander. I have other advantages which are helping me. As a true 
militant, when I go to Yaoundé, no body holds my hand into an office. They know that I am a 
strong supporter. You know most of the Ministers are of the ruling party, so I get special 
attention from them (Fon Mbambi).  
4.4.2 Election Campaigns: The Politics of Gift-giving and Promises 
Ethnic contradictions have always been used by politicians to manipulate the hostile relations 
between groups to their own advantage in their election campaigning (De Bruijn et al 2005: 63) 
and sloganeering. During the Municipal and Parliamentary election, there was an overwhelming 
                                                 
9 Traditional Rulers in Cameroon are governed by Decree No. 77/245 of July 1977 and are considered as auxiliaries 
of the administration. Within this framework, traditional rulers are recognised and classified into three categories, 
viz 1,2 and 3rd classes. According to a Decree signed on 13th September 2013 fixing monthly allowances for 
traditional rulers, 1st class traditional rulers shall receive a monthly allowance of 200. 000 Frs while 2nd and 3rd class 
shall receive a monthly allowance of 100.000Frs and 50.000Frs respectively. “Traditional Rulers ‘swear’ by Paul 
Biya’ in L’Action Newspaper 17/9/2013 http://journal.rdpcpdm.cm/content/monthly-allowance?page=1 accessed 
26/7/2013 
10 See Decree No.2007/115 of April 2007 creating new administrative units. 
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display of wealth and power by the different candidates. Opposition candidates also held rallies 
with music and dance. More importantly, some of the musicians played out of political 
conviction, others played for money. While some musicians sang in support of President Biya and 
his program of Grand ambitions or Greater achievements11, those of the opposition parties sent 
out counter messages intended to dissuade the electorate not to be convinced by the promises of 
the CPDM regime but also as a strategy to mobilise support (Angwafo 2014: 49). Like it is 
elsewhere in Cameroon, ‘people from other areas are frequently and repeatedly reminded that 
they are ‘strangers’, “settlers” or “come-no-go” especially when elections are near, they are 
reminded to go back to their villages of origin to register and vote’(Nkwi 2006: 124). In Wum, 
most of the ‘strangers’ were forced to register for the elections back in their homelands. As the 
date for elections approached, there was massive exodus of ‘strangers’ back to their villages of 
origin where they would vote for their own people. 
In his capacity as the CPDM Campaign Manager for the northwest, Prime Minister Yang 
constantly reminded the people of Aghem and elsewhere in the region that voting for the 
opposition is synonymous to deciding to remain underdeveloped as they do not control the 
budget. He called on the ‘sons and daughters’ of Aghem and Bu to vote for the CPDM as a sign 
of gratitude for the appointment of a ‘son of the soil’ as one of the pioneer Senators in Cameroon 
and the promise made by the President to develop the Menchum Hydro-electricity project and the 
Kasina Ala Dam.12 The Prime Minister castigated the SDF as a ‘barren mango tree’ that bears no 
fruits while referring to the CPDM as a ‘fertile mango tree’ that produces fat and juicy mango 
fruits. In deed, the Prime Minister even suggested that the barren mango trees should be cut down 
(Angwafo 2014: 74). This metaphor of threats and use of coercion was directed towards strangers 
and the opposition. Thus, perceived opposition strongholds (Waindo & Magha) were openly 
threatened through statements implying that the state would not provide for them if they made the 
wrong electoral choice (Nyamnjoh 2013b:1;Medard et al 2013:  552). 
                                                 
11 Paul Biya’s program of ‘Grand Ambitions’ simply refers to the political rhetoric of the CPDM regime on their 
intentions to transform Cameroon into an emerging nation by 2035. 
12 Menchum Falls is located in Wum Central Subdivision and apart from being a touristic site; it has the potential 
that can supply hydro-electricity for the entire northwest region. Menchum Falls has always been used for political 
sloganeering and promises by the Biya regime to develop the hydro-electricity project for several decades and till 
today, nothing has been done for more, see  http://allafrica.com/stories/201311280583.html  accessed 26/7/2014 
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Figure 6 Royal paraphernalia of Fon Mbambi.Also seee poster showing his relationship'with Paul Biya' 
through patronage politics.  
Photo courtesy: De Bruijn, 2013 
During the campaigns Fon Mbambi encouraged his people to ‘vote for the CPDM-the party that 
has the capacity and the means to distribute the resources of the state. This is one of the means 
through which the CPDM mobilises support and sustains itself in power. This reciprocity is also 
seen in the financial support that militants make for the up keep of the party. In appreciation for 
that, most of them are often appointed into the Central Committee of the CPDM.13 Those who are 
not interested in party politics but have economic interests to be protected also contribute to the 
parties campaign funds directly or indirectly.14 Politicians therefore practice what Bayart (1999) 
refers to as ‘belly politics’. The main campaign slogans of the CPDM party were directed against 
Ni John Fru Ndi-the Chairman of the opposition SDF party whom they accused of having seized 
their land for personal gains. The people said that for over 23 years, the Aghem people have 
                                                 
13 See the comprehensive list of the CPDM central committee with the names of the economic elites in the country 
who own all the huge companies and industries. Most of those who are languishing in jail today in Cameroon 
because of embezzlement of state funds were leaders of the CPDM Teams to their various home constituencies, 
Fonjindam, Mebara, Ephraim Enoni, amongst others. 
14 On similar election manouvres, also see Mwangi 2008 pp,272 on the Kenyan elections. For details on political 
corruption in Cameroon see Angwafo 2014,pp 49-74 
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supported the SDF but have never gained anything in return.15 To them, Ni John has made 
personal gains by grabbing much of their land on which he has established a huge farm and life 
stock rearing. This message was repeated at almost all rallies in Aghem and this is probably one 
of the reasons why the SDF was defeated by the CPDM in Wum. In addition to that, the People 
saw the SDF as not having the power to influence the national budget or provide social amenities. 
The general call was for the people to vote for the ruling CPDM Party that has the ‘knife and the 
yam’ and has the ‘power of the pen’ that can sign for their development.  
When results were released, the ruling CPDM party won the Parliamentary and Municipal 
elections, in Wum Central. However, the SDF won at the Mbinjam polling station situated about 
one kilometre from his farm at Booho with absolute majority.16 The victory of the SDF at this 
pulling station was understandable because those who voted here were mainly the labourers who 
work in his farm. ‘Ni John Fru Ndi is the one who constructed the road from Mbinjam to Booho 
and it was normal for us to ‘pay back’ for the good work that he has done for us here’(ibid). 
Elsewhere in Aghem, Wallang Richard, the parliamentary candidate for the CPDM won the 
elections and the Aghem people voted massively for him because he is their ‘son’ and has brought 
a lot of development to the Aghem community and also influenced the provision of electricity in 
Bu.17Informed by this, I conclude that patrons can only secure rural patronage by presenting 
themselves as privileged elite seeking to identify with the grassroots and that can provide their 
needs. While patrons enjoy loyalty of their clients’ they at the same time serve as facilitators for 
the conception and implementation of development projects, (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010: 
464). From the foregoing, therefore, the various campaign strategies adopted by the various 
parties were based on Patron-client relations and exchanges. 
                                                 
15 Until the 2013 Municipal elections, Wum was the bastion of the leading SDF party but now taken over by the 
CPDM. 
16 Yaya one of the Workers of Ni John Fru Ndi Interview 8/10/2013. 
17 Honourable Wallang  has constructed the Aghem Community hall, built bridges, roads, provided assistance to 
schools and donated a football trophy” Wallang Football competition’ that has always kept the youths busy during 
holidays. 
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4.5 Mistrust and Disillusionment 
To imagine that there has been a smooth relationship between patrons and their clients in Aghem 
and Bu will not be a fair judgment of what really exists in the field. I stated earlier that patron 
/client relations are subject to changes, contestations and renegotiations and this seems to be what 
has taken place in the Aghem area. Today there is growing mistrust, switch in loyalty and 
disillusionment and lack of confidence between patrons and their clients leading to the emergence 
of new social networks. Several reasons account for this change of attitude. Firstly, the arrival of 
the Fulani was highly welcomed and as Vabi (n. d: 11) Konings (2001: 178) note, the local chiefs 
encouraged them to come and it was big wealth that the Fulani came with cattle into the region. 
They were allocated grazing land by the chiefs for free though the Fulani paid royal tribute in the 
form of cows, gifts and cow tax (Jangali). In most cases they were settled on marginal lands but 
their rights over the land was restricted only to grazing activities (Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 134; 
Stenning 1959: 6).18 This did not only ensure the recognition of the chief as the overall landlord 
(Patron), but was a good source of royal revenue. The advantages accruing from the arrival of 
Fulani and their cattle has been summarised by Fisiy (1995) as Follows: 
Chiefs have always perceived cattle graziers as a source of revenue through their payment of 
tribute. Similarly, the colonial administration also viewed the arrival of Fulani graziers as a 
reliable source of income through the payment of Jangali taxes. The Fulani were subject to 
double taxation, in form of tribute to the Fon and in taxes to the state. This is ample struggle for 
control. 
With the enactment of the 1974 land Ordinance and as a consequence of local politics, the Fulani 
grazers were persuaded not to pay this tribute to the chiefs as was the case before (ibid). 
Immediately this source of revenue was curtailed, silent conflict of interest developed between 
chiefs and the Fulani, since they (chiefs) could no longer rely on tributes and free services or on 
small stipends, gifts and tax commissions and women cultivators (Chilver 1988: 9). So a valuable 
source of royal finance was lost. This has been acknowledged by Fon Fobuzee and this is how he 
puts it: 
                                                 
18 Also see Konings pp177, in the Bakweri Area of South west Cameroon, the Stranger offered only a big pig to the 
villagers and he was accorded Usufruct rights without the payment of rents. See Tonah (2006: 155) for similar 
practices in a study he carried out in Northern Ghana between Fulani pastoralists and indigenous farmers. 
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Royalties that came in the past and enabled the chief to run the palace are not coming again. Now 
traditional rulers run the palace with no means and the only option open to them is to sell land. 
We should be very honest that while we condemn the practice by traditional rulers to sell land we 
should also condemn the practice of the populations who have abandoned traditional rulers to 
their own fate. What do they bring to the Fon now? A bottle of whisky and envelop may be 
50.000 or 100.000FRS .So we are only enabling them to spend their time drinking and in the long 
run they are useless. Traditional rulers are helpless before the present situation.  
The switch in Fulani loyalty from the chiefs to the Senior Divisional Officer has reconfigured new 
patron/client relationships where the chiefs have been relegated to mere auxiliaries of the 
administration (Geschiere 1993: 152) and have no powers over their ancestral lands any more. It 
is the fact that the control of the land and the allocation of grazing land have been transferred 
from the chiefs to the Senior Divisional Officers that has constantly made the chiefs to oppose 
state bureaucrats. Seeing that they have lost grip over their land, most chiefs have resorted to 
selling the land in order to generate income and survive. The commoditisation of land which has 
became an important source of wealth and power for individuals, communities and the state 
(Komey 2010: 64) is crucial.  
As far back as the early 1950s the Fulani started clamouring for land rights and for recognition as 
citizens in a place they hitherto accepted their status as strangers.19 The recognition of Sarki as the 
Fulani Ardo (chief) by the state in 1977 further weakens the power of the Batums of Aghem and 
Bu chief. Consequently the dependence, allegiance, loyalty and obedience that the Fulani paid to 
their hosts-the chief of Kesu, their initial land lord has been eroded especially as most of the 
Fulani have become very wealthy. This is even more crucial in the case of Suleiman who now 
seeks to establish a title deed on the 100ha of land that was given to him by the chief of Kesu. As 
Bellagamba (2004: 391) notes, today they go as far as challenging the authority of their hosts and 
trying to sever their links of submission to their old hosts.  
Another issue that the Fulani have against the courts is the arbitrary assessments and financial 
extortions by court officials. ‘The Fulani do not trust the justice system and feel that money is 
simply being extorted from them because the State counsels (courts) have the feeling that they can 
                                                 
19  See RAB No NW/Qf/g.1933 ‘Petition by Fulani residing in Bamenda Province’ 
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just sell a cow and pay for what damages there may be’. This discriminatory practice has been 
summed up by Abdoulaye (interviewed 7/10/2013) as follows: 
Once a cow has trespassed on their farms, even if what has been destroyed is not up to 20.000 Frs, 
when the matter is reported to the State counsel, you will be forced to pay a huge amount say 
150,000 Frs. Generally, no evaluation is made, the State counsel just gives an arbitrary amount 
and we are obliged to pay. We have complained several times against this discriminatory practice 
but nothing has been done. We even prefer the DO because an assessment will be done by the 
Agricultural Department. But once the matter is reported to the State Counsel, the first thing is that 
you are thrown in the cell and you have to bail yourself out.  
The protracted farmer-grazer conflicts in the area are not unconnected with the mistrust and 
disillusionment that now exist between farmers and herders, chiefs, administration and the court 
officials in Aghem. Under such prevailing circumstances, Omobowale and Olutayo (2010: 455) 
note elsewhere, that aggrieved clients can exert leverage by changing, or threatening to change, 
their patrons. This in most cases is orchestrated through corrupt practices and to paraphrase 
Balogun (2007: 248), bribery that was once a shameful deed appears to have become a legitimate 
way of conducting business nowadays. It is these corrupt practices that have resulted in the lost of 
trust and confidence in the administration, chiefs from their clients.  
In the old, the women were usually mobilised to tilt the land for the chief and the chief showed 
his generosity by providing food and meat to his population (Kaberry 1952; Chilver and Kaberry 
1967; Mbapndah 1994: 47).The secular authority of the king extended throughout his chiefdom 
and his legitimate authority was never challenged which would tantamount to treason, and 
punishable by death (Fisiy 1995). Because the Aghem women do not more trust their chiefs, they 
have stopped rendering services to them and even challenging their authority. The Aghem women 
also accuse the Fulani for carrying acts of atrocities on them and this has generated a lot of 
insecurity and mistrust between the two groups. ‘In 2006 we protested against these people 
because we have lost hope in our chiefs’ This has been summarised by Mua Delphine 
(interviewed 7/10/2013) as follows: 
They are now Aku chiefs because they have violated the tradition. The chiefs do not more 
recognise the Aghem woman and the women have turn their backs on the chiefs as well and do 
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not more do such services again. It is of no use suffering for a chief who does not care about 
your welfare. Last year one of our six months pregnant daughters was raped by the Fulani 
when she went to harvest maize and she later on died. We cried all night long and the chiefs 
said nothing because they were bribed by the Fulani. The chiefs are the ones who have given 
land to the Fulani. When the Fulani entered Wum they were settled on land only on temporal 
basis. They did not own the land and the land was given on friendly basis and for free.   
On the other hand, the Fulani do not more give-gifts to chiefs as was the case before since they do 
not get the protection of the chiefs any longer.  
Because they have invaded our grazing lands, we have also suspended to give any gifts to the 
chiefs (very angry). Even if the chief request for assistance from me now, I will not give. I have 
made an enclosure round my compound and I consider myself as being in prison. Even the track 
that my cattle used to get to the stream has been blocked by the farmers.20  
It is this mistrust and lack of confidence that seems to be the cause of the so many land conflicts 
that we have discussed in chapter six.21  
4.6 Why do Patron-Client Relationships Persist? 
Patronage has been one of the means through which rent-seeking individuals or communities use 
to gain access to state resources in most of African regimes. Patronage has also become a strategy 
for lobbying for land by strangers and for state resources by communities. Again one of the 
reasons why land patronage has continued to exist is the fact that the chieftaincy institution which 
was believed will soon wither away as elected officials assume political power has not fully 
materialised (Fisiy 1995: 49), instead they have been co-opted into national politics and 
customary chiefs are still charting new spaces on the political landscape (Geschiere 1993). 
Furthermore, chiefs do not derive their authority solely from a material base but rather from ritual 
and moral authority supported and enhanced by a regulatory society (opcit).  
                                                 
20 Idrissou Mohamadou  interviewed 7/10/2013. 
21 For instance, it is because of this mistrust that Mua has persistently wanted the Fulani to pay him the colossal sum 
of 500.00FRS for crop damages caused by the cattle of Idrissou. This also explains the so many tensions recorded 
between the Fulani and farmers and even the increasing hatred manifested on the traditional rulers and the state 
administration See interview with Mua 7/10/2013 it is for the same reason that Ebua Amisen abandoned his grazing 
land to the Fulani because he was afraid of his life and the danger of his cattle being killed by the Fulani. 
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Traditional rulers have established new alliances and social networks with local bureaucrats 
through whom they exchange land for money or for favours. The rich elite and bureaucrats now 
use their money to ‘purchase’ titles from traditional chiefs in exchange for land (Ndjio 2009: 79). 
Title-holding has always been an important aspect of social life. While in the past acquisition of 
titles was based on inheritance or personal achievements (in war, hunting, palace service) 
nowadays all men seem to crave for titles because of the prestige and respect which it brings to 
their  holders (Simo 1995: 89). This trend clearly signals the commoditisation of cultural symbols 
and artefacts. Formerly, these were accorded mythic and ritual connotations, but have now been 
transformed into commodities and circulate in a broader social context (Fisiy 1995: 53; Nyamnjoh 
2011: 709). Following Fon Fobuzee, most traditional rulers trade with these titles because they 
are poor and are unable to cope with the financial burden that tradition imposes on them.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to show how power hierarchies that were invested in ‘wealth in 
people’ gradually shifted into ‘wealth in land’ with the inception of colonial rule. This created 
hierarchies of unequal social networks and exchanges between patrons and their clients. These 
networks have been exploited by land and political patrons not only as a means to maintain their 
positions and articulate their political ambitions but also as a means to channel resources from the 
state to their homelands but also to accumulate wealth. However, patron/client relationships have 
constantly been shifting and subject to renegotiations due to the economic, social and political 
transformations that have taken place in Cameroon. This has not only resulted in the formation of 
new networks and alliances but also in shifts in loyalty. The formalization of land rights through 
title deeds have led to a major shift in tenure system towards private ownership and has resulted 
in stiff competition between chiefs and state bureaucrats to gain control over resources. This has 
also brought chiefs into confrontation with state bureaucrats because of the peripheral role that the 
latter now play in land deals. This has pushed chiefs to indulge in corrupt practices and this has in 
no small ways contributed in the upsurge of the numerous land conflicts that are in the research 
area. Patron-client relationships are therefore seen as useful means towards wealth accumulation. 
In the next chapter, I examine how these patron/client relations have continued to generate 
contradictions within the frame work of a fragile Land Ordinances that was passed in 1974. 
 Chapter Five: Land Governance, Women, and the Politics of 
Dispossession  
5.1 Introduction 
The reunification of Cameroon in 1972 provided for the harmonisation of the reforms of the 
different land tenure systems since colonial times (Tegomoh 2013:  223). On 15 July 1974, the 
Cameroon Head of State enacted, by ordinance, laws that were expected to change the entire legal 
landscape on land ownership, control, and management (Fisiy 1996: 87). Cameroon’s land tenure 
is therefore currently being regulated by three ordinances.1 Apart from decree No 2005/481 of 
December 2005 to complete and supplement the 1974 Ordinances and 1976 decrees, Cameroon’s 
land tenure regulation has not witnessed any significant and impacting reforms.2 One of the main 
objectives of the Land Reform Act was to ‘enhance farmer’s access to credit and to ensure that an 
individual’s productive resources are not diverted to unproductive, rent seeking behaviour, curb 
disputes among competing claimants, ensure the “rational” management of all lands and also to 
ensure farmers land rights’ (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999: 1116). Following the passage of this 
law, the state took over as ‘guardian of all lands’.3   
Unfortunately, apart from the fact that land has increasingly become a scarce and valuable 
resource, the land law seems not to have generated the agrarian revolution that was intended.  
This chapter is therefore intended to investigate how the 1974 law regulates land tenure in 
Cameroon with particular focus on the problems and loopholes that emanate from the application 
of the law and why the primary aim of the law has not been attained. The main questions here are: 
who are registering land under the new law and how are they using the law for different purposes 
                                                 
1 See Ordinance No 74-1 to establish rules governing land tenure in Cameroon, Ordinance No74-2 to establish rules 
governing state land and Ordinance No 74-3 to establish expropriation procedures for ‘public purposes’ including 
the terms for expropriation passed in 1974. In 1976, three Decrees (No 76-156 to establish the conditions for 
obtaining land titles, No 76-166 to establish the terms and conditions for the management of national lands, and 
No76-167 to establish the terms and conditions for the management of private properties of the state) were signed to 
supplement the 1974 ordinances. See details in the 1974 Land Ordinances in Cameroon Decree No.76-165 of 27 
April 1976 to establish the conditions for obtaining land certificates, amended and supplemented by Decree No. 
2005/481 of 16 December 2005. 
2 Also see  the ‘National Engagement Strategy on Land Governance in Cameroon’ of February 2014 
3 Also see the 1994 Forestry Law No. 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and Decree No. 95/466-PM of 20th July 1995 on 
wild life. Both laws specify in Article 9 ‘special products’ such as ebony, ivory, wild animal horns, endangered 
animal species and plants as ‘protected’ and the possession of whole or parts of these species is punishable by law. 
For more on this, see Ingram, (2014; 112) on statutory frameworks regulating Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). 
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and what benefits accrue from it? What are the challenges and problems emanating from the 
application of the law? The chapter underscores the fact that customary law also exist side by side 
with the statutory provisions but it is not given the importance that it deserves within the system 
of land governance in Cameroon. The problems that flow from their coexistence have become 
even more acute in recent years (Twaib 1996: 81). In this chapter I argue that the present land law 
does not guarantee access to land for vulnerable groups such as women and the Fulani and this 
has contributed in fermenting the land conflicts in Cameroon. In addition, the non inclusion of 
customary rights in the law and the manner in which the state has dealt with customary tenure 
leaves much to be desired (ibid). Put the other way round, the absence of ownership right restricts 
the vulnerable groups from accessing land certificates which by this law is the only authentic 
proof of a private property (Sone 2012b:  90), and this has inherently kept rural users in perpetual 
conflicts and poverty. In support of the above assertion, the chapter discusses the policy of land 
expropriation from local communities for ‘public purposes’ by the state and the principle of 
compensation that have been contentious issues in the country. While most vulnerable groups are 
alienated from their ancestral lands through this policy, it also illustrates the precarious and 
chaotic nature of land governance in Cameroon. Particular provisions of the law have been 
extrapolated and analysed to show the dilemma that prevails in Cameroon, and Wum Central 
provides an interesting area of study because of its farmer/grazer relations and matrilineal system 
of inheritance. I use case studies largely from the area to emphasise and show in different ways 
how the law contributes to conflicts in Cameroon. 
5.2 Towards the 1974 Land Ordinances 
The issue of land titling has been a subject of debate among scholars for some time now.  Some 
have been in favour of titling for various reasons why others see it as unprofitable business. I 
therefore present different views that have been expressed by proponents in favour of land titling 
and those who are against it. To begin with, land titling takes is roots from the colonial period and 
that has shaped the process of land governance in most of post colonial Africa. At the beginning 
of the 20th century, African colonial states were introduced to European imported land ordinances 
and reforms (Bennet and Vermeulen 1980: 206).  As (Ndege 2012: 20) argues, the colonialists 
saw land itself as abundant, ’underutilised’ or ‘unoccupied’ and therefore considered as 
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something to be appropriated and owned by individuals for capitalist accumulation and for the 
production of cash crops for the metropolitan markets. This was further accentuated by the idea 
that ownership to land rights was only through a title deed and so all unregistered land was 
considered ‘unoccupied’. This in most cases provided the opportunity for the financially viable 
and politically influential elites to grab most of the ‘unoccupied’ land. White (2013: 38) however 
argues that what (was) and is being called ‘idle’ land in reality often belongs to the community 
and is governed by customary rights.  
Other scholars in support of land titling contend that customary tenure system appears to be fluid 
and ambiguous in its understanding and implementation. Furthermore, the promulgation of land 
law in most countries in Africa was based on the premise that customary land tenure is complex 
because multiple users hold rights to a single resource and the Western notion of private property 
rights cannot accommodate this complexity.4 In addition, customary law was seen as archaic and 
could not meet up with the exigencies of modernisation. This tended to view customary 
arrangements as backward while promoting formal titling (Amanor 2007: 33). While the latter 
were perceived to be in keeping with the demands of modern society, particularly in the public 
and commercial spheres supported by the state; customary tenure has often been considered to be 
simple, dynamic, flexible, equitable and linked to societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Bennett and Vermeulen1980: 206; Amanor 2007: 33). However, other still hold the 
view that despite its ambiguity and complexity, customary tenure system is being upheld by most 
communities because they consider it inevitable as it still reflects the traditional African culture. 
One of the reasons in support of titling has been the idea that land registration will ensure security 
over the private property of individuals and will also curb conflicts over land rights. In support of 
this assertion, Firmin-Sellers and Sellers (1999: 1116) note that ‘the government of Cameroon 
hoped that titling will end disputes among competing claimants and will preclude future disputes 
because titling will ensure that an individual’s productive resources are not diverted to 
unproductive, rent seeking behaviour’.  
                                                 
4 For example, women, men, and traditional authorities may all hold rights to a single piece of land. Women may 
hold usufruct rights to cultivate food crops, men hold usufruct rights to plant trees crops; and traditional authorities 
have the right to harvest the ‘fruits of the forest’-wild  game, timber amongst others. Also see 
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Land titling, it has been argued, is to a large extent the result of the liberalisation of land markets, 
a policy adopted in the early 1990s that has contributed to the commoditisation of land and other 
natural resources (Olanya 2012: 6). Proponents argue that land is just another factor of production 
and should be placed at the disposal of those who can afford it and only through land titling can 
there be an agricultural boom. In line with this, Firmin-Sellers and Sellers (1999: 1118) note that 
‘with the passage of the 1974 Land Ordinance, Cameroon government hoped to encourage the 
formation of an agrarian middle class, a group of farmers capable of managing large mechanised 
farms in the rural areas’. As they continue, it was hoped that private title will enhance individual 
tenure security […] and to give farmers access to credit markets making it possible for farmers to 
invest. To this end, ‘the ownership of land will facilitate access to credit, give the poor more voice 
in the political arena, contribute to higher investments in children’s education, and thereby arrest 
the intergenerational transmission of poverty’(Elhadary and Obeng-odoom 2012: 60). By 
implication, land has become a veritable source of income for the rich both at national and local 
levels where people can make a lot of profit. 
 However, critics have argued that titling only favours a tiny segment of the population and rather 
inevitably disinherits a substantial portion of the population who are usually women, migrants and 
youths and has tended to increase instead of decreasing overall insecurity of tenure. As Goheen 
(1988: 92) opines, ‘although the explicit purpose of the land Ordinances was to protect the small 
farmer by giving security of tenure, which, in turn, should increase production, the actual effect 
has been an increasing concentration of land and other resources in the hands of an emerging rural 
elite-an elite which is almost exclusively male’. Statistics on access to land titles by Fisy (1992) 
reveals that women continue to experience unequal access to land as compared to men despite the 
fact that women form 52% of the total population of the country.  
Others see titling as prohibitive and unattractive because they do not offer increased access to 
credit; the process is very expensive and do not allow the applicant to respect customary 
obligations.5 For instance, the transfer of authority and control over land from local chiefs to state 
bureaucrats does not only weakened the power base of  chiefs but also has a negative effect on the 
traditions and customs of indigenous people, and this has been another source of power struggles 
                                                 
5 See ____(2014) National Engagement Strategy (NES) on land governance in Cameroon  
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between local authorities and the state.6 While there is no end to these debates, they however help 
towards our understanding of the conditions under which the land law emanated. 
5.2.1 The Basic Tenets the 1974 Land Ordinances 
To better understand how the 1974 law regulates tenure in Cameroon, it is important to examine 
the general conception of the law and its provisions. In doing so, I hope to identify the loopholes 
in the law and how it has resulted into conflicts from its inception to application between the state 
and other land users. As I noted in the introductory part of this chapter, colonial conquest and land 
policy enabled European settlers to acquire for themselves large tracts of land, together with the 
introduction of commercial crops. To achieve this aim, land was generally classified as ‘occupied’ 
and ‘unoccupied’.7 This provided a leeway for the Europeans to appropriate the ‘unoccupied’ 
lands for their own interests. It is within this same logic of land occupancy that the 1974 law was 
formulated. First, the law recognises three categories of lands in Cameroon: 1) Public property 2) 
Private property and 3) National Reserves.8 Public property is land that the state has already 
appropriated from local communities for public utilities often considered as ‘unoccupied’ and 
private land refers to land that an individual(s) or local communities have acquired a title deed on 
the said piece of land and considered as ‘occupied’ lands. National reserves include ‘virgin’ lands, 
game reserves and sanctuaries, national parks, zoos, botanical gardens, protected forest, water 
sources, highways and groves. By the provisions of the law, all lands whether occupied or 
unoccupied are mere parcels of national land. Like in most of Africa, all land in Cameroon 
belongs to the state and as Kea (2006: 132) also confirms in a study conducted in Gambia ’the 
state owns the land and the people have usufructuary rights to it.’ 
The division of land into these three categories has generated serious conflicts between local 
communities and the state. First, communities argue that the fact that land is not put into effective 
use does not mean that the land is not owned by individual lineages or communities. The basis of 
                                                 
6 By Decree No 77/24J of 15 July 1977,all ‘traditional rulers/chiefs’ have been turned into auxiliaries of the 
administration and are therefore accountable to the Senior Divisional Officer of their area of jurisdiction.For details 
on this see Fisy 1995,pp.52. 
7 Within the ambit of the law,’ unoccupied land simply refers to land that is not in use or is not owned by individuals 
or communities, while ‘occupied’ lands are thought to be land that is in effective use, often seen in terms of 
investments, construction or the availability of landed assets such as crops fruit trees etc. 
8 See chapter 0ne: General Provisions of the 1974 land law. 
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local argument has been that, by their customary laws, all lands have landlords, though they might 
not be occupied. Still in line with this, Liversage (2010: 3) contends that it is increasingly 
recognised that, while some land may be underutilised, very little is not owned, vacant or unused. 
According to Olanya (2012: 34), ‘the perception that land is abundant is misleading because “idle 
land” is as an important source of livelihood for the rural poor, which provides them with 
resources for subsistence farming, such as access to edible wild plants, grazing, water and 
firewood.’ 
Secondly, in most of the Grassfields chiefdom, land is communally owned and each community 
or chiefdom has precise boundaries and maps which mean that a village is not only a social reality 
but also a geographical location and therefore ought not to be considered as ‘unoccupied’. Most 
communities in Cameroon have continued to resist and challenge the idea that their lands are 
‘vacant and ‘unoccupied’. As Fisiy (1992: 120) puts it, ‘the customary guardians of ancestral 
lands have continued to behave as if such law had never been enacted and have kept on respecting 
local principles of land tenure in their communities’. Consequently, there is often a clash between 
customary law and statutory provisions over land rights and management.  
According to customary tenure, land rights were based on one’s membership and kinship ties in a 
community and this gave full rights (usufructs or allodia) to people, but the new law has instituted 
the notion of land registration and a land certificate has become the only official document of real 
property rights.9 Implicitly, Cameroon’s official land legislation does not recognise land 
ownership claimed under customary law any more. From a first glance at the legal provisions 
contained in the 1974 Ordinances, one gets the impression that the customary guardians of 
ancestral lands have been completely marginalised. The state ignores them and deals directly with 
persons in effective possession of landed property. It guarantees to the latter free enjoyment and 
disposal of their lands (Fisiy 1996: 121). That is, the land title remains the only legal justification 
of land ownership. This therefore nullifies the concept of land rights based on ancestral land and 
gives the right for anybody to have a land title even outside his own ancestral land and without 
the consent of the chief (Tegomoh 2013: 225). By its provisions, any plot of land whose self-
declared owner does not have a land title belongs ipso facto to the national property of the 
                                                 
9 See Article 1 of the 1974 Land Ordinances. 
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Cameroon state even if the owner has occupied that piece of land for centuries (Firmin-Sellers 
and Sellers 1999: 1117). Following the law, most people who are unable to register their land 
have become frustrated as one of the informants expresses: ‘It is very sensitive because you are 
using the land; you even have the feeling that it is your land, you have developed it yet you do not 
own it. It is like a deliberate attempt to make that law difficult for people to acquire the land 
certificates’.10 This renders vulnerable communities including smallholder farmers, women and 
indigenous people who are not able to obtain land titles for several reasons and who are claiming 
land ownership under customary law even more exposed to various forms of land rights abuses 
perpetrated by rich individuals, large companies and even land administrators. The situation has 
been described by Nsoh Robert as follows: 
The indigenous people are particularly threatened because of the legislations that we have in 
Cameroon. Because it is only when  your land is registered and you have a land title then can we 
say you are on your land but if the land is not registered, you are on ‘National Land’ it can be 
‘occupied or unoccupied’ national land.  
In its article 11(3), the law states that ‘applications concerning lands which are entirely 
unoccupied or unexploited shall be inadmissible under the procedure. Such applications shall be 
made in accordance with the procedure for grants.11 Another loophole with the law is the fact that 
it does not recognise property rights for those who were born after the law was promulgated. For 
instance, the law only recognises property rights for those who were born before 5th of August 
1974 and are illegible to apply for a land certificate.12 For any Cameroonian who was born after 
the law was promulgated, it is illegal to apply for a land certificate.13Consequently, all those who 
                                                 
10 Lawyer Nsoh Robert interviewed (Morning Safari 2013). 
11  Grants are special concessions that one has to apply for before s/he can be allowed to use or occupy such lands. 
This is in a situation where the state may want to reverse land to a community. Unfortunately, most communities 
have hardly succeeded to get back their ancestral land. the renown case where the state has given back land to the 
indigenes is the Bakweri community.  
12 Article 9 (a) of Ordinance No 74 of July 6th 1974 is very clear on that and it reads that ‘customary communities, 
members thereof, or any other person of Cameroonian nationality, on condition that his occupancy or the 
exploitation predates 5 August 1974, date of publication of Ordinance No 74 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules and 
regulations governing land tenure are illegible to obtain a title deed’ 
13 Article 11(12) however stipulates that applications for lands occupied or exploited after 5th August 1974 shall also 
follow the procedure for grants unless it is established by the Land Consultative board that the development was 
preceded by a non convincing occupancy or exploitation implemented before 5 august 1974. The Land Consultative 
Board is made up of 7 members with the District head as the chair, Sub delegates for Agriculture, Lands, a surveyor, 
the traditional ruler and two notables .Also see interview with Theodore Nde Private Secretary to the Divisional 
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were born after the above date, cannot acquire land titles, even in an event where he is a trustee of 
an inheritance; is not allowed to obtain land certificates for its property in his name.14 ‘I faced 
such a problem when I wanted to matriculate a piece of land in Bambui. There was some 
opposition and I had to negotiate and pay 500.000Frs for the village not to indicate that I did not 
own the land before 1974. These are all things which make it so difficult. When I paid for the 
opposition, the land title was granted to me.’15 Actually, for Cameroonians that were born after 
the promulgation of the law, they can only have title deeds through a join application with 
someone who was born before that date or simply cannot apply for the certificate. Because of 
these constraints, some family members that were born before the law was enforced have used 
this advantage to acquire titles on parcels of land owned by younger family members (especially 
successors) who are not allowed by the law to apply for title deeds. This has led to struggles over 
land claims between family members and also resulted into serious conflicts and land 
dispossession as the anecdote below shows (Sone 2012b). I cite the example of Kum George of 
Naikom to substantiate this position. 
 Following the rules of matrilineal inheritance, Kum George was crowned the successor to his late 
uncle in 2004 and landed property was handed to him by the Mua family covering an estimated 
surface area of 9ha including a raffia palm bush. Kum George decided to sell parcels of the land 
in order to secure a visa for South Africa. By the time he left for South Africa in 2009, he has sold 
over 6ha of the land to non indigenes without the consent of his family members but with the 
connivance of his father’s sister-Koi Patience. These people have long acquired title deeds on 
these pieces of land with the chief of Kesu as signatory. When the other members of the family 
learnt about the land deals, they protested to the chief to no avail as the chief himself could not 
revoke the land titles. Today, the land is out of the control of the family and has become the 
private property of the purchasers.16 
                                                                                                                                                               
Officer for Wum Central  08/10/2013 . What they do is that they buy the land; deliberately forget about the 
documents that they used in buying the land then misrepresent saying that they bought the land before 1974 and 
there is often no person to challenge that. That is why the same piece of land can be sold to more than ten people. 
14 See article 10 of Land Ordinances of 6 July 1974. 
15 Kah Muam interviewed 20/10/2013. 
16  Fon Mbambi interviewed 12/12/2013. 
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One of the problems with the law is the fact that the state of Cameroon gives credence to patriliny 
over matriliny. Put the other way round, although the land law allows for women to have tittle 
deeds,the state civil status recognises the father of the child (Patrilineal descent) and not that of 
the mother and customary law does not permit women to acquire title deeds in their names(Sone 
2012b: 97). In most cases nephews who inherit the property of their uncles as we have seen in the 
case cited above, do not take care of the widows and the children .Some actually dispose of the 
land that they have inherited and this has generated a lot of conflicts between nephews who 
succeed their uncles and the children of the deceased which is contrary to the roles of matrilineal 
system of succession. Among the Aghem, and Bu there is a matrilineal ideology that historically 
allowed a woman to gain access to land from her maternal kin prior to her marriage. The system 
also gave an opportunity for daughters to inherit land from their mothers (Davidson 1988: 17) but 
today the land law does not recognise such practices. In matrilineal societies such as Aghem and 
Bu, people are therefore forced by such legislation to look for means to circumvent traditional 
practices and ensure that the property they have acquired is bequeath to their children when they 
will not be alive. By implication, the system of succession and property inheritance that used to 
move from uncle to nephew is being altered and challenged. This does not only compromise 
women’s access to land but there are conflicting interests over succession and land rights. 
5.3 Traditional Rulers facing the State   
The control and management of land in pre-colonial times has always been under the trusteeship 
of chiefs and this gave them enormous powers and was also a means for them to accumulate 
wealth.This has been discussed extensively in chapter four. Control over land after independence 
then shifted from the local to the state and this was reaffirmed in the 1974 Land Reform Act 
which officially abolished customary tenure systems and introduced individual, state and national 
lands (Moritz 2006: 113). The occupation of the public sphere by state bureaucrats has given 
them the opportunity to manoeuvre, manipulate and organise themselves in ways that the local 
people and their chiefs have become powerless. At the sub divisional level, the  authority over the 
control of land resides with the Sous-prefets  indicating that they are gaining more and more 
control over the land (Moritz 2006: 113;Kuba 2006: 58). In this way, the government has 
attempted to exercise control and political power over people and their economic production 
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(Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 138). The struggle over property is essentially related to a struggle 
over power relations and political influence. Within the current dispensation, the chiefs feel that 
the state bureaucrats are now benefitting from their land (Sone 2012b: 91).17 The shift in authority 
over the control of land has been a source of conflicts between the state and chiefs. Fon Mbambi 
does not hide his feelings when he says;  
They behave as if the land is owned by them. Just because they have been given the 
opportunity to be in the Land Consultative Board as the Chairmen and anything about 
land is referred to them. They look corrupt and very dishonest and take a lot of money 
from people.  
The mistrust is caused by the fact that the law does not recognise the authority of the traditional 
rulers and customary law. While chiefs admit that the land now belongs to the state of some sort, 
they still lay claims over the land as the rightful owners. As most of the chiefs of the Grassfield 
maintain, Fon Mbambi has continued to insist that he is the owner and custodian of the land of 
Aghem and not the state. He puts it succinctly in this way: 
As the Paramount ruler, I have a say in all the land in Aghem. That is why in 2004 during the 
Famer –grazer problem they all gathered in my compound when women complained that 
grazers have invaded their farm lands. It was not only Zongakwo women, others also came 
from Kesu and Zongafeu and so I had to manage to swim through. I actually closed the gap. 
Their land claims are legitimate more importantly because ‘inhabitants of the communal area still 
refer most land matters and requests to traditional leaders’ (Spierenburg 2005: 120). Most land 
cases are still tried by the traditional rulers although according to the law, the authority to handle 
land matters resides with the D.O. Unfortunately, most of the Divisional Officers are unable to 
handle land issues because they come from those regions where chieftaincies were a colonial 
creation but are sent to administer local communities with established customary chiefs (Fisiy 
1995: 52). The local communities even consider government administrators as strangers and 
intruders (ibid). 
                                                 
17 Also see Konings 1996,pp.335 and Fisiy 1995pp.52 on the Bakweri Land Claims where there is an on-going 
conflict between the Bakwerians and state administrators . the Latter have been accused of grabbing and selling land 
that the Cameroon Development Corporation –CDC has given back to the Bakweri community. 
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 On the other hand, the law makes it possible for Traditional rulers to collaborate with the rich to 
amass community land, thereby depriving the local farmers of land to live on (Sone 2012b: 92). 
In a way, chiefs are now being held accountable by members of the community as the ones who 
endorse the transfer of communal lands to private property. This has often resulted into serious 
conflicts between chiefs and the local elite who have constantly accused them of giving away the 
land for money. As it is with all other traditional rulers elsewhere in Cameroon, Fon Mbambi of 
Aghem finds himself in a web of entanglements on how to respect the customary tenure of his 
chiefdom as the custodian of communal land and how to forge ahead  as a member of the Land 
Consultative Board. In these circumstances, the Fon while preaching the notion of communality 
also facilitates the acquisition of land deeds in his chiefdom. He therefore mediates between 
tradition and state law.  
Realising that the land has slipped off their hands, most chiefs have also decided to acquire title 
deeds on land that was hitherto owned by the community as private property. ‘I have two land 
certificates in Aghem town and that is my private property’.18 As we see in the case of the Fon of 
Aghem, he has even acquired title deeds in his name and signed those belonging to some of his 
subjects and non indigenes. ‘I am paid for every title deed that is issued in Aghem’. This does not 
only weaken the idea of communal ownership of land but also the social bonds that have always 
existed between chiefs and members of their communities. This suggests that the chiefs have 
therefore not only lost respect among their people but also the power they wield. Using a study 
conducted in Northern Cameroon, Moritz (2006: 113) seizes up the situation as follows: 
Elsewhere in Cameroon traditional rulers have adopted different strategies to remain relevant in 
land deals. They now compel individuals seeking land titles to pay royalties or ‘put the Fon’s bag’ 
before he or his representatives can sign the form for a title deed. Traditionally, a person 
requesting the piece of land has to give a ‘bundle of zinc’ to the palace. The equivalence of zinc is 
considered to be 200. 000Frs. He also has to give food and drinks to the notables and the sum of 
25.000Frs.  
                                                 
18 Fon Mbambi III interviewed 12/12/2013 
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Fon Mbambi is not an isolated case as in some chiefdom what is given to the chief is much 
higher.19 He acknowledged having signed that of Cho Cyprian, while the Regent of Kesu, Henry 
Muam, has been signatory to the land acquired by the Member of Parliament - Hon Wallang 
Richard at Bu Road, Ni John Fru Ndi at Binjang, the Sarki of the Fulani on land amounting to 
some 130ha. This has therefore placed traditional leaders at daggers drown with the local 
communities. The law also makes it difficult for land to be reclaimed once a title deed has been 
issued. The only authority that can order for the cancellation of a title deed is the Minister of Land 
Tenure and State Property.20  
5.4 Land Acquisition for ‘Public Purposes’ and the Politics of Dispossession 
The Cameroon land law stipulates that all land belongs to the state and it is referred to as ‘national 
lands’. By implication, the state can expropriate and appropriate parcels of land for ‘public 
purposes’ when need arises.21By the same token, any individual(s) or communities can be 
disposed from their ancestral land if the government wants to carry out ‘development projects’ on 
a particular piece of land. If it is ‘occupied’ land, the present occupants will be evicted and the 
law provides that those displaced have the full right to financial compensations. However, the 
same law makes it clear that such compensations shall only be for investments22 ‘development’ 
that have been carried out on the piece of land at the time of eviction. This law raises a lot of 
concerns particularly with regards to vulnerable groups such as pygmies, women and grazers who 
very often have the land but hardly do they invest on it. In most instances, they are evicted from 
their ancestral lands without compensations on grounds that no ‘investments’ were found on the 
land at the time of eviction.  
The pygmies have their habitat which is the forest and they rely on it for their survival. The 
forest is unoccupied and what is occupied is where they have their habitat. So too are the 
(Fulani) Mbororo, where they occupy is their land and the rest is National land. When you are 
                                                 
19 Evidence from the field indicates that in rural areas they are given scotch whiskey and about 10.000frs to 
25.000frs, while in Urban centres like in Mankon, the ‘Fon’s bag is 100.000frs. It therefore becomes difficult for the 
chief to tell his people not to sell land when they accuse him of also reaping from land sales. 
20 See Article 20 of the 1974 Land Ordinances amended and supplemented by Decree No.2005/481 of 16 December 
2005. 
21 For example, land may be appropriated by the state for the construction of public schools, hospitals, roads, and 
other public utilities. 
22 See details on the modalities for compensation in Article 13 of Land Ordinances 6th of 1974  
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on national land you can be disposed on that land at any time. If you have any development on 
land that is national land then that land can be expropriated upon for another use and there will 
be compensation but that can only be given to you for the development that you have put on 
the land. In which case, it will only be the houses and food crops.23 
Even in cases where there was effective recognition of the indigenous peoples customary laws, 
these people would not necessarily be fully protected from expropriation for needs of public 
utility (Socpa2010:  558). I also gathered from our informants that some of the land compulsorily 
acquired for ‘public purposes’ are being sold to non-indigenes and foreigners and this is seen as 
contrary to the law and spirit of acquisition of the land for public purposes’ and therefore illegal.24 
The law does not take into consideration the land rights of marginalised and vulnerable people.25 
At this juncture, I present some case studies on how the loopholes in the law have not only 
dispossessed communities from their ancestral land but also generated conflicts among land users 
in the area. 
 Case Study One 
In the early 1960s, the government of Cameroon expropriated 500ha of land from the Aghem 
community for the establishment of an agro-industrial project known as the Wum Area 
Development Authority (WADA).The main objective for the establishment of WADA was to 
‘boost food production in the area, curb rural-urban migration and also provide jobs for the youths 
in the area’ (Fonjong 2014: 16-17). Over 100 Aghem families were evicted from their ancestral 
land at the expense of this project without any compensation from the state. Until 1984 when the 
country fell into economic crisis, WADA was a heavy producer of milk, rice and maize within the 
northwest region of Cameroon. Considering that cattle is also one of the main economic activities 
in this area (especially because of the heavy presence of Fulani herders), a dairy production 
scheme was also installed at WADA where milk was processed for local and international 
                                                 
23  Fon Nsoh is the National Coordinator of the NGO, ‘Movement for the Right to Food’ Cameroon interviewed 
12/10/2013  
24 Also see Ayee et al,2011pp,15 and a petition from Mankon to the Cameroon Government, Also see the 
accusations by youths of Bakweri against their chief for selling out the land reclaimed from the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (CDC) to strangers http://cameroonjournal.com/page565.html  accessed 22/4/2014 
25  Those considered to be marginalized or vulnerable are the Fulani and Pygmies who are either seen as strangers or 
are being pushed out of their ancestral lands. This categorization however raises a lot of controversies because it is 
difficult to say which group or community is vulnerable or not since all land now belongs to the state. 
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markets.26 When the country slipped into economic crisis and the government could not more 
service it’s external and internal debts and was also unable to maintain this agro-industrial plant, 
the WADA project collapsed. Workers were retrenched and others redeployed into different 
government services, the equipment and installations of WADA went into ruins and most of the 
workers have never received their retrenchment benefits till today. The land ceded to the state for 
this project is the ‘fertile crescent’ (Menchum Valley) situated about six kilometres away from 
Wum town along the Wum-Zhoa high way. The valley favours the production of cereals such as 
maize, cocoyams, beans roundnuts and vegetables and so most of the villagers depended on it for 
their livelihoods and survival. 
After the land was ‘seized’ by the state, the population that was pushed to the margins could not 
go back to their land because the land was declared public property. Since then several attempts 
by the Aghem traditional ruler and his Councillors to regain control over ‘their’ land have failed 
and many have died landless and homeless. Today, the land is under the control of the Senior 
Divisional Officer (SDO) for Menchum who gives out parcels of the land to Aghem women on 
lease basis. ‘If you want to cultivate in the WADA estate, you have to apply to the government. 
All this land that you see used to be our land but now that the government has taken it away from 
us, we have no choice but to pay before we work if you really want to work there.’27 I tried to find 
out why the state did not compensate for taking away the land, Emmerencia said, ‘it is the chief 
who can answer because we know that the chiefs here like money a lot. If they received money 
from the government we will not know. That is why you see them dying like that’. She added.  
According to the stipulations of the law, compensations were not made because they held 
informal rights and hence were considered not liable.  
Case Study Two 
The site selected for the Wum Cattle Market was allotted by Fon Mbambi III to the Wum 
Municipal Council at no cost. Unfortunately wrangling between farmers and grazers has made it 
                                                 
26 See  Wache, F ‘on Mount Mary Anglophones stand 20years after the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) Buea 
http://www.franciswache.com/2013/04/on-mount-mary-anglophones-stand.html#sthash.2LC4jAWA.dpuf   accessed 
18/03/2014 
27 Met Emmerencia Youh at the DO’s office when she came to report a Fulani herder whose cattle has destroyed her 
crops in the farm at Naikom, interviewed 07/10/2013.   
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difficult for the market to go operational (Dze-Ngwa 2013). When I met Fon Mbambi, he was not 
very happy with the treatment that he has received from the Mayor of the municipality. The Fon 
has silently been expecting that the Mayor will ‘reason’ and then compensate him for the land, a 
thing which the Mayor is probably not reflecting on. Like in other instances including land that 
his father gave out for the establishment for schools, churches and other government services for 
free, the Fon has made desperate attempts with little or no successes to get back most of the land.  
My father gave it for free in those days and so I could not change the situation now since they 
have already implanted themselves on the land. I have been able to squeeze out a little. Like in 
the case of the cattle market now, I gave the place to the council at no cost, nothing at all! We 
just went there and I demarcated that they should build here. Luckily, my son has come up as a 
Major. I hope that one day he might think of me and do something in compensation for the land. 
Case Study Three 
This particular case is not found in the area of research but it is important for several reasons. 
Firstly it shows how a community can ‘fight back’ and reclaim their land rights and secondly, it 
reflects the daily occurrences and challenges that other people in Cameroon go through and shows 
the weaknesses of the land law and how the state is unable to keep to its own commitments by not 
respecting the provisions of its own law.28 In 1981, the government expropriated 480 ha of land 
from the Mankon29 community for the construction of an airport. In the build up to this project, 
278 families from Mankon lost their farm lands and about 50 families were displaced. The 
government carried out an evaluation on crops and property belonging to the members of the 
community which amounted to over 2 billion Francs. This period also coincided with the 
economic adversities that the country was facing. In the light of this situation, the people wrote 
several petitions to the government threatening to go back to their land if the government would 
not compensate them for the loss of their ancestral land and property. All the people got from the 
government were mere promises and after serious protests and pressure, only about 10% of the 
amount has been paid to selected individuals. After waiting for over 25 years, most of the 
community members have gone back ‘illegally’ to occupy unused portions of their ancestral land 
                                                 
28 Also seen the Bakweri Land Claim Commission in Konings (2001) 
29 Mankon is a Fondom located some 65 KM from Wum where the research took place. 
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and most have died without being compensated. An airport was after all constructed on this piece 
of land but the government turned it into a military barracks; something which has angered the 
population as they do not see the benefits of such a project. Another issue which angered the 
people is the fact that the airport was given a different name (Bamenda Airport) instead of the 
official gazetted name-Ntambeng where the airport is located and stated in the presidential decree 
expropriating the land.30 
 Case Study Four 
Bouba Hawe is a (Mbororo) Fulani and the Assistant Secretary to the Mbororo Social, Cultural 
and Development Association (MBOSCUDA).31 She is among the few Fulani that earned a 
University degree and has been working with this association in an effort to empower the 
Mbororo girl-child. Bouba recounts the difficulties her parents went through to obtain a title deed 
on the piece of land they now occupy. According to Bouba, the difficulties stemmed from the fact 
that they are being considered as ‘strangers’ and each time her father applied for a title deed, he 
was always referred to the local chief who was always reluctant and not comfortable signing his 
documents for the title deed. ‘My father struggled for two decades before he could obtain a land 
certificate for the land where we are settled in Bambui. It took almost all that he had to get a land 
certificate’. The eviction of the Fulani from their lands has continued in Cameroon unabated and 
this is wide spread all over the country. On the 6th of April 2014, over 300 Mbororos (Fulani) 
were evicted from the land they have been occupying since the 1920s in Banjah by state 
bureaucrats and about 46 ha of their land seized and handed over to the Catholic University of 
                                                 
30 See decree  creating an Airport in a place called Natmbeng and petition to the Cameroon government by the 
Mankon Traditional Council .Similar name changes have brought about serious problems in Ghana  between the 
state and the Communities of Afram and Kwahu see, Ayee et al 2011,pp.9 Also see letter of 29 July 2012 addressed 
to the SDO Mezam by Fo Angwafo III on the ‘ illegal’ boundary between Mankon and Mendakwe and Letter from 
Mankon Elite of 6th October 2012 in support of the Fon of Mankon. 
31 Interviewed 20/11/2013 : Also note that , MBOSCUDA Stands  for "Mbororo Social and Cultural Development 
Association". It was conceptualized in1987 and officially recognised by the Government of the Republic of 
Cameroon in accordance with Law No 90/053 of December 19, 1992 and receipt of declaration of association No. 
RDA/06/BAPP of 21st October1992 as a non-partisan, not-for-profit social-cultural development Association. More 
on MBOSCUDA and its activities can also be found on www.mboscuda.org  
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Bamenda on grounds that the said area is situated within the Bamenda City and so not suitable for 
cattle rearing.32 
The different case studies show the weaknesses of the law and the over bearing influence of the 
state in land expropriation but equally generate anti-government sentiments. Section 11 of the 
1974 Ordinance No. 74-3 of 6 July 1974 provides that any claim for compensation resulting from 
expropriation should be forwarded to the Prefet of the Division to the Minister of Lands and State 
Property. Here again, the channels are all administrative, the final decision on the applicant’s 
claim being reserved for the minister.33 It is not surprising that most politicians in these areas 
have always used their land claims against President Biya’s Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic 
Movement (CPDM) party during campaign rallies.34 In spite of this, the alienation of indigenous 
peoples from the right to use and enjoy their lands has continued.  
The acquisition of a title deed goes through a series of processes and modalities that makes it 
difficult for the poor to engage into. The land law is not only complicated, cumbersome and 
expensive for the common man to follow but takes a lot of time.35 This has been summarised by 
Nsoh Robert as follows: 
The assessment on the use or occupation of land is done by the Land Consultative Board. The 
law makes the budget of the Land Consultative Board to be factored into the budget of the 
Ministry of Lands and State Property but that is not done. Rather, the board requests money from 
the applicant before an assessment can be done on the piece of land. There is no fixed amount for 
land inspection but is allowed to the members of the board to do what they like. This is the same 
scenario nationwide. This makes it very costly and the traditional authorities too need money to 
come and justify the land and after spending the money unjustifiably the surveyor is expected to 
come to the site and survey before the pillars are planted. The applicant has to pay for the survey 
fee and also has to independently negotiate with the surveyor to come and do the job. There is no 
fix amount and so it depends on your bargaining power with the surveyor. At the end of the day, 
                                                 
32 See ‘Eviction of The Fulani from their ancestral land at Banjah’. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47545&Cr=cameroon&Cr1#.U1fDsCjtA5g Accessed 15th /4/2014 
33 See Section 12 of the 1974 Land Ordinance. 
34 The Present Mayor of the Bamenda II Council, Balick Fidelis Awa castigated the government for failing to pay 
the compensation promised several years ago and so called on the population to give a sanction vote by voting 
against the ruling Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM). 
35 Fo Fobuzee, is a member of the National Land Review Commission and Traditional Ruler of Chomba interviewed 
8th  November  2013 
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for one to have a land certificate in Bamenda one must be ready to spend at least 500.000fr or 
more. Families need money to educate their children, take care of their medical bills and other 
important expenses and that is why they think that to spend this money to register the land is 
huge waste36. It is even illegal to apply for a land title now.  
The entire law does not give provision for customary tenure, rather it abrogates previous laws 
concerning the procedure and functioning of the land registration and the registration of 
traditional land rights.37 According to the provisions of the law, two rival claimants over a piece 
of land have the right to plant land markers (pillars) pending the judgment of the Land 
Consultative Board giving room for unnecessary expenses and corrupt practices.38  
5.5 The 1974 Law Ordinances: Women and Vulnerable Groups as Losers  
Both statutory and customary laws do not recognise women and vulnerable populations (Logo 
and Bikie 1998). As Larsen (2007: 79) opines, customary laws are grounded in given cultural 
understandings, and as such they also include their own system of discrimination. One concern 
when considering customary rights is precisely that different rights and responsibilities are 
usually associated with different categories of persons, for instance persons differentiated by 
gender and /age (ibid). For example, women at best have users’ rights which are in turn dependent 
on the nature of their relationship with men either as husbands, fathers, brothers,  (male relatives) 
or  her status as a daughter, sister, mother or wife (Englert and Daley 2008: 1; Fonjong 2012: 
24;Larsen 2007: 78). As Sone (2012b: 97) notes, female farmers have been caught between 
cultural restrictions that do not allow women to own land and the inability to own land under the 
expensive and prolonged procedure stated by the 1974 Land Ordinances. There is, for instance, a 
gap between the restrictive customary rules on women’s rights to own land and the statutory 
provisions that propagate equal rights to own land in the country (ibid).   
In Cameroon, the ratio of women involved in food production is ten women to one man (MDG 
2012). Despite their numerical strength, rarely do they have adequate access to land nor make 
                                                 
36 At the initial stage, the applicant has to pay 25.000FRS to the DO, after the approval, he pays 70.000FRS as the 
inspection fee to the DO, Then 25.000FRS to the surveyor,25.000FRS each to members of the 
commission,50.oooFRS to the chief of the village. Each pillar is evaluated at 5000FRS; the value of the land is 
negotiable. The applicant also has to ‘facilitate’ the easy movement of the officials to field. Each boundary neighbor 
must be given ‘something’ as well. 
37 See for instance Decree No. 66-307-COR of 25 November 1966 on the registration of traditional land rights 
38 See article 17 of Decree No 2005/481 of 16 December 2005 being an amendment of the 1974 law. 
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major decisions pertaining to the allocation and usage of such property (Fonjong 2012: 24). Some 
traditional practices that exclude women in issues of inheritance and also not allowing women to 
be in certain places have been recorded in most parts of West Africa, (Englert and Daley 2008: x). 
For instance, in most parts of Cameroon, the girl child is not allowed to inherit property and this 
restriction on the female child gives a lot of rights to the male child who does not only have 
control over landed property but can dispose of it without the consent of the female child. Like in 
most of Africa, customary law with particular reference to inheritance states that ‘land ownership 
is the prerogative of men and land rights are inherited from father to son’ and in this way, the girls 
are therefore excluded from inheritance of family land (McAuslan 2010: 117). This practice of 
gender inequality is most pathetic for widows and orphans with disturbing consequences of 
property grabbing from them by male relatives of the deceased husbands or fathers. Again, 
women do not have ownership rights over land and so reside on land more for social security 
purposes than for agricultural production (Aliber et al 2009: 436). Consequently, this 
marginalisation prevents them from having access to secure livelihoods and basic necessities 
which have kept rural women in persistent poverty.  
5.6 Closing the Gaps: Towards a new Land Reform? 
The outcome of both customary and statutory laws is that they rather generate their own inherent 
contradictions. One of the fundamental problems of the 1974 Land Reform Act is the fact that it is 
not inclusive enough. What should be done in order to take into account the interests of other land 
users that have been left out by the law? ‘We also came out with pronouncements that the women, 
Fulani, the pygmies and other minority groups  should have access to land and also stop nomadic 
life style and should begin to settle down. A good number of them are already doing that’ (Fon 
Fobuzee). The ability to negotiate landownership depends mostly on people’s socio-economic and 
political power in any given society be it in the gender, class or tribal domains. Power relations 
between the rich and the poor help to shape the forms and terms in which negotiations over 
landownership can be effected (Sone 2012b: 91). Thus, some of the influential and wealthy 
farmers (elite) and even herders have acquired land certificates which have given them long-
lasting security and control over their production means, and have encouraged substantial 
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investments and sustainable land use.39 The spirit of the 1974 Land Ordinances was to ensure that 
everyone is entitled to the guarantee of ownership, but this guarantee is contradicted by what 
obtains in the area, where statistics from the Divisional Delegation of Land Tenure and State 
property reveal that less than 5% of peasant farmers have acquired land titles.40 ’The majority of 
titles to land have been awarded to state elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and businessmen’ 
(Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999: 1118) who have the financial means to procure title deeds. The 
role of domestic elites in land acquisition has been discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
 As a means to come out of this quagmire, Fon Fobuzee has the following proposal to make; ‘We 
think that these political elite should have a corporate responsibility towards these communities 
and not to acquire land and leave the people poorer that they were before’. He believes that ‘when 
the traditional rulers would have been put at the forefront of community lands this would mean 
that they have been empowered to get into such negotiations since there will be the bargaining 
power. Calls for the inclusion of traditional rulers in land reforms have been recorded in most 
African countries.41 
The Fulani at best only have grazing permits issued by the D.O and that is why Bouba is 
optimistic that ‘when the new land or pastoral code will be established, it will give the Mbororos 
the right to own the land they have been using for over a century and that will ease the procedure 
for obtaining a land title’. To her, this pastoral code will demarcate land in a different way and it 
is going to make corridors for the cattle.  
Another issue which women suffer from because of lack of rights and access to land is the 
difficulty in getting financial credits from banks (Gbetnkom 2008: 280) since title deeds are often 
demanded as collateral security for loans. Farm households which are dependent on agricultural 
production, and which would directly benefit from agricultural improvements and access to 
capital (finances) required for such improvements cannot afford such facilities (ibid). This is 
particularly important as women do the vast majority of work in agricultural smallholder 
                                                 
39 Sarki of Aghem, Danpollo are Fulani but have multiple land certificates. Details on this in chapter 7 
40  Interview Jean Guendjom 3/10/2013 Divisional Delegate of lands Menchum 
41  For instance see Spierenburg 2005pp120 and Ayee et al 2011,pp28 for similar reactions in Ghana and Namibia. 
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production, producing between sixty percent and eighty percent of all food grown in African 
countries (Englert and Daley 2008:  xi), and Cameroon in particular. Fon Fobuzee notes; 
We proposed for example that women should be given access to land. In other words, parents 
should be made to distribute land to their sons and daughters and that woman should eventually 
obtain land titles. Even when living in their marital homes, nothing should stop them from 
owning land. We thought that the traditional rulers should be made to play a primordial rule in 
the management of land at the village level. The world is moving ahead and we cannot stay 
behind and stick to traditional practices that do not favour all sectors of society.  
Conclusion 
The ultimate goal of the 1974 Land Ordinances was to lay down a homogeneous legal framework 
for land tenure all over the country, thereby enhancing State control over land (Fisiy 1996: 147).  
Unfortunately, the 1974 Land Ordinance has not achieved policy makers’ stated aims: it has not 
brought Western-style private property rights to Cameroon’s rural areas, and it has not generated 
an agrarian middle class. Instead it has further complicated and alienated community rights over 
their ancestral lands leading to frictions, confrontations and outright conflicts between 
communities and their leaders. This has resulted in a conflict-generating relationship between 
modern laws and local customary laws that have complicated the resolution of land tenure 
disputes and created a situation in which multiple legal and administrative mechanisms vie for 
recognition. 
The historical evolution of the both the customary and the statutory land regimes have been 
highlighted in this chapter and I note that there are discrepancies and inconsistencies in the lands 
department. The land law is actually flawed with lots of loopholes, and ambiguities not only 
because it is considered obsolete and cannot meet with the present cultural and economic 
demands of the people, but also that people do not feel secured over their property. Despite their 
numerical strength, women have continued to be discriminated upon. It is thought that the 
emergence of conflicts are attributed on bias and other forms of discrimination that are enshrined 
in the land ordinances and have continued to exclude certain categories of people including 
women and Fulani cattle herders. In the next chapter I try to profile the Fulani who are found in 
the area with particular emphasis on cattle reaing as an economic mode of production. 
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 Chapter Six: Land, Cattle and Wealth: The Sore of Fulani in Wum 
Central Sub-division  
6.1 Introduction 
The Fulani constitute an important component of this research and as predominantly cattle 
herders; they are a focal point of reference in farmer-herder conflicts in Wum Central Sub-
division. There is abundant literature on the Fulani in West Africa and also on those in Cameroon 
(NAB No.17/10). A lot of these sources consider the Fulani as nomadic pastoralist who entered 
the region with cattle as ‘late comers’ or as ‘strangers’ (Manu et al 2014: 299) or what O’Rourke 
(2012: 97-8) refers to as ‘native foreigners’ or African diasporas. The history of the cattle industry 
in the Bamenda Grassfields therefore dates back to 1919 when the Fulani started settling in the 
region principally from Nigeria and former German Adamawa in considerable numbers (Njeuma 
and Awasom 1988: 1; Nyamnjoh 2013a: 106). In this chapter the main question that lingers is; 
how did the presence of the Fulani alter the agrarian economy and what are the consequences on 
rights and access to land for women cultivators? To do this, I start by identifying who the Fulani 
are and some of the colonial land policies which facilitated their integration. I try to show how 
national policies have contributed to the change of their status and mentality from the perceived 
‘strangers’ to citizens and the prevailing farmer-grazer relations in the area. The arrival of the 
Fulani into the area did not immediately raise ethnic considerations. Furthermore, I attempt to 
investigate why over time; their presence has become an issue to be worried about. I argue that 
the manner in which the Fulani were integrated in Cameroon coupled with the loopholes in the 
present statutory land legislation and customary tenure systems operating in Cameroon have 
paved the leeway for the present farmer/grazer disputes. I begin by identifying and tracing the 
history of migration of the Fulani.  
6.2 Fulani: Of Man and Cattle 
The Fulani entered Cameroon by the turn of the 20th Century and by 1920, they had reached 
Aghem area.1 The Fulani group is said to have originated from Senegambia (now Senegal) and 
                                                 
1 NAB No/Ab17/1 ‘Report on the Fulani Advisory Council  by F.M Woodhouse, District Officer Bamenda Division 
and letter addressed by Dr MDW Jeffreys-Senior District Officer to the Commissioner of Lands Enugu on 8th 
February 1944. 
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Mauritania and spread in some twenty countries of West Africa perhaps with the exception of 
Liberia to Ethiopia and Kenya (De Bruijn et al 1995: 228; Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 1; 
Stenning 1959: 1). Their migration was precipitated by a rinderpest pandemic and famine which 
decimated herds of African cattle in the mid and late 1890s (Vabi n. d 11; Stenning 1959: 78). 
Driven by a continuous search for new pastures, the Jafen of the Goshi family under Ardo Maya2 
started entering the Western Grassfields of Cameroon from the Kano Emirate during 1870-80 and 
came in a wide sweep mostly through Bornu, Ngaoundere and Bayo (Mbah 2008: 65; NAB 
No.Ab 17/7). They came from northern Cameroon, mainly the Adamawa Plateau, and established 
themselves on the Bamenda Highlands. The Aku followed later, from the 1940s onwards, 
attracted by favourable grazing conditions and administrative policies. The Aku entered the 
Grassfields from the Jos Plateau in Nigeria, and settled on the lowland pastures on the northern 
fringes of the Bamenda Highlands (Pelican 2008: 542). The Fulani community in the research 
area is internally diversified, comprising members of two sub-groups, namely Jafen and Aku 
(Vabi.n.d: 12). 
The name-Fulani has gained currency in national and international discourses when reference is 
being made to nomadic pastoralists and about issues involving farmer-grazer relations in recent 
times and even within academic circles (Adebayo 1991: 1; Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 1-2; 
Dafinger and Pelican 2006). Yet, the origin of the name ‘Fulani’ remains obscure and highly 
contested for lack of clarity.3 Although they are distinctively different from one another, they are 
often referred to as Fulani. According to British colonial accounts4 however, Fulani refers to a 
particular breed of cattle that is highly associated with the Jafen group. As Adebayo (1991: 1; 
Stenning, 159: 2) articulate, they have distinct ancestral origins and different names throughout 
West Africa. 
The fair-skinned people who inhabit the Sudan fringes of West Africa stretching from the 
Senegal valley to the shores of Lake Chad and who speak the language known as Fulfulde, are 
known by many names.' They call themselves Fulbe (singular, Pullo). They are called Fulani by 
                                                 
2 NAB No 17/7 ‘Fulani Intelligence report correspondence by the Resident Bamenda Division 1932 & See 
Davidheiser and Luna (2008: 78),by the year 2000, there were 13 million Fulbe speakers in West Africa. 
3 The Pheul of North Cameroon, the Kanuri , Fulfulde and the Akus are often referred to as Fulani and this is  
sometimes very misleading. 
4 NAB No Ab 17/1 ‘Correspondence by Woodhouse on Fulani Native Authority 1943’. 
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the Hausa of southern Nigeria, and this name has been used for them throughout Nigeria. The 
British call them Ful, Fulani, or Fula, while the French refer to them as Peul, Peulh, or Poulah.  
Another group of Fulani are the Fulbé na'i or Fulbé ladde, the cattle or bush Fulani- the 
Bororo'en who are essentially nomadic. The name seems to suggest their very close association 
with the cattle breed Bororo. In fact, ‘Bororoji is the name of the large, long horned, chest-out 
type of cattle common among the nomads but the real name of the people is Fulbé-Ladde or 
Jafen and they prefer to be called Fulani’.5 In the early part of the 20th Century, seventeen 
different Fulani groups were identified and spread throughout the Bamenda Grassfields. Each 
group appointed an Ardo6 who was recognised by the Fulani themselves. It should be noted that 
the first Fulani who arrived the Bamenda Province was Ardo Abdulahi Sabga who settled at 
Babanki Tingoh. He was recognised by the British colonial authorities as the supreme leader of 
the Mbororo-Fulani throughout the British Southern Cameroons and charged with the collection 
of Jangali tax.7 Today the Fulani are scattered all over the country and hardly do they constitute 
any single polity of their own, hence they are often considered as strangers where ever they are 
settled (Dze-Ngwa 2013: 6). As Mbah (2008: 64) concludes, the Fulani do not even have land 
that they can call home. 
In Aghem and Bu, most of the Fulani live on the hill tops/slopes and very close to their cattle 
while the host populations are mostly found in well developed compacted residential quarters. 
The Fulani tend to have a high degree of corporation and sense of unity among themselves. This 
has been captured by the Secretary to the DO (Ndeh Theodore interviewed 7/10/2013) and he puts 
it this way: ‘The issue is that when the Fulani have a problem they collaborate and easily regroup 
which is not the case with farmers. They even raise money to solve their problems as a group’. 
But it is important to note that this unity is only when they are threatened or confronted by other 
land users such as farmers, whereas the following paragraphs show that there are differences 
among the Fulani. First of all, there are two principal categories of Fulani in Wum- the ‘town’ and 
‘bush’ Fulani. As Mallam Bashiru opines, ‘the “town Fulani” do not inter marry with the “bush” 
                                                 
5 NAB No 17/9 ‘notes on the Fulani of British and French Cameroons, Cameroon Province 1943’. 
6 Ardo means’ leader’ and is someone fit and proper to represent their interests and advice the administration on 
problems concerning Fulani. See NAB No/Ab17/1 Appendix B Part A. 
7 NAB/No.1b/1938/3 ‘Fulani headman Ardo Sabga Bamenda Division Cameroons Province 1938’. 
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Fulani and those in the city look at us as uncivilised and have very little or nothing to do with us; 
and they always laugh at us’. Because they do not inter marry, each group has preserved its 
bloodline, having refused to become integrated into the host's society as well. Among the 
nomadic pastoralists, endogamy is highly practiced by bush Fulani and marriage of first cousins is 
regarded as optimal.8 
As I indicated earlier, there has always been a long standing cordial relationship between grazers 
and farmers in Wum. In a related study on classic host-client relation carried out by Moritz (2006) 
among the Mbororo herders and Gbaya farmers in the Adamawa region of Cameroon, his 
findings revealed that reciprocity constitutes the basis of a symbiotic relationship where 
substantive gifts and commodities are exchanged. In such social exchanges, Gbaya may give 
sacks of manoc and maize, while Mbororo may give one-year old calves (essentially dairy 
products) and other items such as radios and bicycles. Aghem and Bu people carry out social 
exchanges with the Fulani especially during festive period such as Christmas or Ramadan. Social 
exchanges may include milk, butter, meat, manure that the Fulani give in exchange for 
groundnuts, maize, and manure and crop residue.9 In Bu, women have sexual relations with the 
Fulani for want of money but generally abhor getting married to Fulani.10 They belong to the 
same political parties, their children go to the same school and markets, and they consult in the 
same hospitals and use the same public utilities such as water, electricity, communication 
amongst others.  
However, farmers and grazers retain their distinctive identities and compete for limited natural 
resources, but rely on each other for the provision of essential services and products (Hussein, 
Sumberg and Seddon 1999: 398). In line with what De Bruijn and van Dijk (2005: 61) refer to as 
the ‘internal contradictions’ between grazers/grazers or farmers and grazers, these conflicts may 
after all be motivated or embedded in beliefs that reflect a deep-seated mistrust between or among 
these two groups-Fulani on the one hand and Aghem /Bu or Fulani versus Fulani(Moritz 2006: 
10). To them, cases of crop damage are presented differently and they show a lot of hostility 
                                                 
8 Also see interview Suleiman Guizo, 7/10/2013. 
9For details on such exchanges among the Fulbe and Mossi of Cote d’Ivoire see De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005pp65. 
Here, the Fulbe participate in Mossi naming and marriage ceremonies and may maintain fictive relations with Mossi 
families. 
10 Beatrice Kah interviewed in Bu 12/11/2013. 
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towards each other in public: what they refer to as the ‘front stage’ and in private these problems 
are handled in a more cordial manner and they refer to such presentation as the ‘back stage’. In 
the same manner, Fulani grazers generally show a lot of concern and speak in unison when 
confronted by farmers whereas internally, there are striking differences and even mistrust between 
the Mbororo and the Akus.11These differences notwithstanding, most discourses often speak of 
the Fulani in a homogenous manner whereas; available sources reveal that they are highly 
differentiated, not only according to clans but also by their economic pursuits and way of life. The 
Fulani classify themselves into two main groups.12  
6.2 The Introduction of Extensive Cattle Herding Methods  
Wum Central Subdivision has the characteristics that favour the coexistence of pastoralists and 
crop cultivators. Livestock rearing had been in existence in the area before the introduction of 
extensive cattle rearing by the beginning of the 20th century. Chilver (1988: 9) notes that goats, 
smooth-haired sheep and fowls were well distributed throughout the area. The rearing of pigs, as 
reported by Zintgraff in 1889 as a specialty in south-eastern Moghamo was a feature of the 
western part of the area and highly developed in Aghem. Formerly dwarf shorthorns were held in 
far larger numbers than at present. They were in most cases royal herds under the supervision of 
retainers and cows were slaughtered only on important occasions.13 
There had been in the past several types of stock management in the region. Where pigs were 
bred and fattened for the market they were kept, in some cases, in sunken wallows also serving, 
saving your presence, as latrines and refuse pits. In others they were kept within nucleated 
villages, in and out of compounds, their dung collected with sweepings for infield gardens. The 
dwarf cows, usually a chiefly monopoly, were closed-herded by retainers with clappers and salt 
and in some up land districts were returned to trenched enclosures at night; vestiges of these 
could still be seen in the early sixties (Chilver 1988: 9).  
                                                 
11 One of the cases at the DOs office was between Mbororo herdsman and an Aku herdsman; the latter had accused 
the former on grounds that it was not his cattle that actually destroyed the crops belonging to Meh Philip. So it would 
seem when the cattle of Mbororo destroy or trespasses into a farm, the blame is shifted to an Aku grazer. 
12 See Stenning 1959: 1;Adebayo 1991: 1, The first group is the Fulbe siire, the "town Fulani" (known in Hausa as 
Fulanin gidah-also referred to in some literature as the Toroodbe or Toronkawa), the class of Muslim clerics who 
were responsible for the religious revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in West Africa. 
13 RAB/N0.NW/Ac.1960/1/BK . 
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There were several methods of herding small stock designed to protect food farms-for example 
the regular alteration of village lands on either side of a valley between grazing and crops, or the 
live hedging of cultivation areas. Access paths with young animals were also retained by 
triangular stock-collars or the fencing of fertile valley farm plots against goats. There was also a 
mixture of tethering, close-herding, fencing off tree crops and seasonal grazing of combined 
herds entrusted to a friend or relative in a remoter upland area (Chilver 1988: 10). 
Gradually, the methods and practices in the herding of stock changed with the arrival of the 
Fulani. Upon arrival in Wum Central Subdivision, they obtained grazing permits from the 
farmer-grazer service; a sub-divisional office of the Ministry of Livestock and Animal 
Husbandry responsible for issuing grazing permits (Scott and Miriam 1980: 15). Between 1919 
and 1960, the population of cattle rose from 10.000 in 1922 to 91,782 in 1940 and to 258,796 in 
1960 while the population of Fulani staggered from a few persons in 1919 to about 10.000 in 
1953(Njeuma and Awasom 1988 : 1). According to the most recent and available Population 
Census statistics conducted in 2005, there are  about 1.8million Fulani in Cameroon and the 
number of cattle are estimated at 6million with over 200.000 in Aghem.14 Individual animal 
ownership is not common and most animals are collectively owned by members of a household, 
including household-head, wife (or wives), blood-related brothers, parents and adult children 
(Vabi n.d: 16). In addition to cattle, most households rear sheep rather than goats because of the 
ceremonial role that sheep perform. Also because goats are less easily controlled, they increase 
the possibility of damage to crops (ibid).  
The co-existence of the Fulani with their host populations was smooth until when farmer-grazer 
relations were strained by the 1940s15 because of crop damages caused by cattle on farms 
belonging to women. The decision to demarcate grazing land from farm land was as a result of 
                                                 
14 Doing Business in Cameroon 2012 Edition. 
15 See Kaberry NAB No. Ab 17(10) ‘Report on Farmer-Grazier relations and changing pattern of Agriculture in 
Nsaw - South Eastern Federation, Bamenda, Southern Cameroons’ and also Vabi on the mass killing of Fulani cattle 
and public demonstrations of 1958. 
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disputes that were already noticed between farmers and Fulani in 193716 and this is what 
Woodhouse had to say. 
In recent years, there have been many and bitter disputes between the Fulani and the farmers over 
the question of trespass on farms and damage to crops. In places where the grazing areas have 
been already demarcated by Dr Jeffreys, these disputes have ceased entirely. In others they, are 
becoming more frequent, the farmers anxious to be able to lay claims to as much land as possible 
when the time for demarcation comes are rapidly extending their farming activities. It is obvious 
that the sooner the work of demarcation can be completed the better. 
As early as 1928, the District Officer placed the Fulani in each village under the chief of that 
village but the Fulani were not very comfortable.17 Because of this strain relationship, strategies 
were being developed by the indigenous ethnic groups to evict the Fulani from most of the areas 
on which they had settled. The claims for eviction by indigenous populations were reinforced by 
continued crop damage cases brought to the attention of the administration particularly by women 
of indigenous origin that constituted, and have remained the bulk of the crop farming population 
(Chilver 1988: 1). In some instances, the cattle have often been attacked and killed by local 
population. With the constant inflow of Fulani into the region, coupled with generalised 
complaints of crop damages by Fulani cattle, cattle control rules were enacted and enforced by a 
Native Authority Ordinance in 1947 (Vabi n.d: 14). The situation called for reorganisation of the 
land use pattern to take into account the widespread complaints by the indigenous peoples against 
crop destruction by cows (Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 2). This led to a reduction of cattle cases 
and the effort was welcomed by the women (Kaberry 2004: 90) but these measures were short 
lift.18  
                                                 
16 See Resident’s Correspondence of 18/8/1943 to the Secretary Eastern Province Enugu from the Provincial Office, 
Buea, Cameroon under the British Mandate. 
17 See NAB /1b/1938/3 ‘Fulani headman Ardo Sabga Bamenda Division Cameroons Province 1938’  
18 Since 1946, most Native Authorities passed Grazing Rules which gave them power to issue permits to Fulani to 
limit the size of herds, to stipulate the number of herdsmen, and to enforce rotational grazing. For more see Kaberry 
(1952: 100) 
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 In order to solve this problem, grazing land was demarcated and separated from farm lands.19 
Unfortunately, this approach did not work because Fulani cattle not only destroyed farmers’ crops 
but provoked soil erosion and exhaustion.  
Soil erosion and exhaustion were caused when too many cows overgrazed in a single area for a 
long period without allowing the top soil to rest and the vegetation to fully recover. The 
consequence was that wind easily blew the top layer which was reduced to dust by cow hoofs, and 
this rendered the area bare and exposed (opcit).  
In an effort to seek for permanent solutions, the Livestock Mission in 1950 designed an 
experiment (Fulani Settlement Scheme) intended not only ‘to change the nomad into a settler, but 
to improve the stock, preserve the grazing areas and to protect the interests of the local 
inhabitants’ which involved structural changes to accommodate the pastoral industry and a 
definite orientation of Fulani traditional way of life.20 According to the Commissioner for the 
Cameroons, the Fulani Settlement Scheme was considered invaluable because it would bring 
about a balance to the economy of the Bamenda Province but the difficulty was how to settle the 
Fulani ‘without noticeable disturbances to indigenous society’. It was also difficult to determine 
where to settle them and the size of land to be allotted to them. Another reason for initiating the 
Fulani Settlement Scheme was because the colonialists believed that there was abundant land and 
many of the hillsides were laying waste.21However, the colonial administration still went ahead 
and initiated the Scheme which advocated for the permanent settlement of the Fulani by building 
enclosures within which would be practice rotational grazing methods. This was not supported by 
the Natives who saw it as a means of taking away their ancestral land. It should however be noted 
that many settled rearing cattle but as more land was used for agriculture, the Fulani were faced 
with diminishing grazing land for cattle living them invariably in conflicts with sedentary farmers 
(Ndenecho 2010: 61).  
When the Fulani Settlement Scheme failed, a new land use pattern was introduced and this was 
the concept of mixed farming which involved the alternate use of land by farmers and grazers for 
                                                 
19 See NAB No. 17(6) ‘Application for lease of grazing grounds in the Cameroons Province’ 
20 NAB No. Ab /17(7) ‘Fulani intelligence report correspondence Bamenda Division 1932. 
21 See NAB/Ab/17(8) Commissioner of the Cameroons correspondence with the Resident, Bamenda Province on 
‘Fulani Settlement  Bamenda Division. 
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their mutual benefit.22By this, a section of a plot of land is reserved for farming while grazing 
takes place on another section. After several years of farming and grazing, farm land would be 
transformed into grazing land and vice-versa. This would permit crops to grow on former pasture-
land that had been fertilised by cow dung, while cattle would thrive on a new type of vegetation 
on the former land (Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 9). 
The idea behind promoting mixed farming was that the native people would realise the 
advantages of farmer-grazer land interchanges and the benefits of mutual co-existence with the 
Cattle Fulani. Again this scheme failed because, the Fulani continued to oscillate from one 
pasture to another and maintained their nomadic life style. As the commissioner of the Cameroons 
notes, ‘the Fulani were conservative and resistant to innovation and also considered the Natives as 
Pagans with whom they could not live together’.23 
Another scheme which had tremendous impact on the land use pattern was the Enclosure System 
which was intended to protect the farms of women from Fulani cows.24 Like the demarcation of 
grazing land, the scheme failed because to the Natives, its implementation would mean sharing 
their land with the Fulani (Njeuma and Awasom 1988: 11). Till today, there has been no 
appropriate solution for the farmer-grazer conflicts in the region and particularly in Wum. 
Frequent clashes and skirmishes between the Natives and the Fulani have been recorded for the 
past four decades. They do not own the land they live on. Other ethnic groups in Cameroon look 
at them as sub-humans and today the people want them to leave for good.25 This has led to a 
redefinition of the relationship between land rights and the management of identity (Boni 2006: 
168). Today, the Fulani are highly involved in the cultivation of maize, beans, potatoes, cassava 
and a variety of vegetables around their homesteads. These farms also help to reduce complete 
dependence on indigenous cultivators for food crops thus allowing reduction of cattle off-take 
(Vabi n.d) ‘We have even become farm masters and there is no one here that can cultivate maize 
                                                 
22 See Njeuma, M and Awasom (1988), This is also referred to as Night Paddock farming and despite  the efforts of  
the Cameroon government to  ensure its defective implementation, the practice has failed woefully. 
23 NAB, No. Ab 17(8) Fulani Settlement Bamenda Division 1954 
24 The strategy was to provide women with Barb wires to construct fences round   their farms often. This also  
referred to as the ‘Barb Wire Scheme’ 
25 Interview  Bouba Hawe 23/11/2013 
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as we do’.26 The Fulani also see their involvement in crop cultivation as a means of reinforcing 
their rights over the areas on which they are settled (Vabi n. d: 15). 
So far, I have made a brief description of the life style of the Fulani and also some of the colonial 
policies that were put in place for their integration in Wum. As it can be noticed, these policies 
were conceived by the British colonial administration and imposed on the local people because of 
their economic interests in cattle. Consequently, they were not in conformity with customary 
practices and in most instances were rejected by the farming populations whose access to land 
was already being threatened. Below, I try to show why the ‘harmony’ that existed between the 
Fulani upon arrival gradually developed into deep seated animosity and why the issue of land 
claims has become a common currency in the area.  
 
Figure 7 Mallam Suleiman Guizo instructing his son Bashiru (herdsman) about to take the cattle afield for 
grazing  
Source Author, 2013 
                                                 
26 Interview Abdoulaye, 7/10/2013,Bu Road Wum. 
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6.3 The Genesis of the ‘Unholy Alliance’ 
When the Fulani first came to Bamenda in the Cameroon Grassfields a century ago, all the 
parameters were there for them to settle and there was enough grazing land and water for cattle.27 
As Werner (1993: 137) notes in a similar situation in Namibia, ‘the maximization of pastures and 
water resources even required a high degree of mobility’. For example, Vabi (n. d: 11) notes that 
the chief of Kedjom-keku and his subjects perceived Fulani migration into their territory as an 
opportunity to reduce beef shortages in the village. He states further that information about Fulani 
settlement and the ensuing advantages to the people of Kedjom-keku also spread to neighbouring 
villages resulting in a scramble for subsequent Fulani immigrants by other local chiefs and their 
subjects. The local chiefs encouraged them to come and it was big wealth that the Fulani came 
with cattle into the region as they were highly welcomed and appreciated. ‘It was not by force, the 
chiefs were concern and because they had the financial backings and could sell two cows and give 
to the  chiefs, say 500.000 Frs for a piece of land. That was done and that is what actually 
happened’ (Fon Mbambi interviewed 12/12/2013). Thus Fulani movement into and settlement in 
the northwest did not immediately raised problems of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness relating 
to land use rights (ibid). But today after settling in the area for over a century, they are still 
considered as strangers or ‘outsiders’.28 One of the reasons for these conflicts is the perception 
that the Fulani are very rich and have their wealth in cattle. 
The Fulani are highly associated with the rearing of cattle and cattle have become a source of 
wealth. The general conception that the Fulani are wealthy was raised as far back as 1942 by 
Woodhouse, the District Officer for the Bamenda Division who insisted that they have to pay 
Jangali tax.29 Till today, they are perceived by farmers as very wealthy and this wealth is seen in 
cattle (Nyamnjoh 2013a: 121). However, not all Fulani have cattle and are rich. Indeed, there are 
wealthy Fulani and others who are poor. While the former control herds of cattle, and landed 
property, the latter in most cases work as cattle herders (Ganakos) tendering cattle for their 
masters or are engaged in other economic activities- see details on these activities below. I cite the 
                                                 
27 Adamou interviewed 23/11/2013. 
28 Robert Nsoh, interviewed 23/11/2013. 
29 See NAB NoAb17/1 ‘Fulani Advisory Council report’  Also see NAB Ab 17/1 on the Direct Taxation Ordinance 
No.45/1940. 
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case of Alhaji Baba Ahmadou Danpollo, an influential Fulani, who Krieger (2008: 78) refers to as 
a ‘powerful rancher and financier’ with economic interests as far away as South Africa. 
Danpollo’s political and economic connections with the present regime in Cameroon have made it 
possible for him to dominate not only the Fulani community in the Northwest region but also to 
be able to evict local communities from their ancestral lands.30 For instance, in Ndawara, ‘he 
evicted and displaced the inhabitants of Afoa village from their ancestral lands (FIDH, 2013). To 
calm the leadership of the Kom people, Danpullo is said to have bribed the Fon of Kom into 
silence,by providing him with handouts including most recently a four-wheel drive vehicle’(ibid).  
The Fulani have also appropriated this wealthness to the point where they violate government 
orders and also have become very boastful and disrespectful as Ebua Aminsen asserts: ‘If you tell 
the Fulani to get out of the land they will laugh at you since they can easily buy the conscience of 
the chief with money or cow, today money determines the direction of justice.’31 The lure for 
money by chiefs has been one of the driving forces that have facilitated the acquisition of land for 
grazing by the Fulani. As Cheng (interviewed 12/10/2013) notes further, ‘the chief will even ask 
you that if he sends away the cows where shall he get money to pay his children’s school fees?’ A 
similar situation has been documented by Tonah (2006: 166) in the Volta Basin in Ghana and he 
presents it as follows: 
Generally, chiefs in the area are eager to have Fulani herders settle on their land. They have 
seen the value of land placed under their jurisdiction rise since the Fulani started settling in 
the area. Indigenous and migrant farmers make only token payments consisting mainly of a 
bottle of Schnapps or local gin and some small amount of money for the use of farmlands in 
the area. Fulani herders, on the other hand, make substantial payments to chiefs and other 
landowners on whose land they decide to settle and herd their cattle. This usually consists of 
one or two mature animals every year. 
It is this believe that cattle is a source of wealth that has often led to the accusation of chiefs and 
administrators by farmers for taking bribes and gifts from Fulani in order to deliver justice in their 
favour. For example, ‘when an Aghem woman reports the Fulani to the Administration, you are 
                                                 
30 In recent years, a lot of Fulani have come under attack and have been harassed, arrested, imprisoned, threatened 
and brutalised by Danpollo. 
31 Ebua Aminsen is a retired Businessman interviewed 30/10/2013. 
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surprised that the administrator will change his language the next day because he has received 
money from the Fulani’ (Ebua Aminsen interviewed 30/10/2013). Consequently, cattle is not only 
a trigger of conflicts through crop damages and trespass but also a source of wealth and leverage 
or mechanism through which conflicts are perpetuated and reproduced in Wum. 
 Furthermore, the conflict between farmers and grazers is partly as a result of the policy of 
‘Grazing land and Certificates of Occupancy that was conceived and issued by the British 
administration to the Fulani as far back as 1941 and 1947 respectively’.32The Resident Cameroon 
Province (Murray) argued that it was better to give the Fulani some security of grazing land and  
to control overstocking, over grazing and also to prevent cattle from invading farm lands. The 
certificates restricted their activities only to grazing and they did not own the land. Instead of 
granting them land rights, the 1947 Ordinance repeated and reinforced the stipulations of an 
earlier Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1927 which conferred all lands to the natives with 
the exception of government-owned lands (Vabi n.d: 16).33The 1927 Land and Native Ordinance 
defined a native as one born of parents who originated from the area in which (s) he was living. 
Embedded in this law of occupancy was the notion that although the Fulani were using the land, 
they were strangers and not natives. In support of this assertion, the Cameroon land law has 
continued to maintain this idea by granting grazing permits to herders and not ownership rights 
(Moritz 2006). This means that a herder has a grazing permit (usufructs rights) but the land 
belongs to another person and this principle has continued till today and Fon Mbambi asserts. 
Actually it is not their land because they do not have the land titles (Land certificate) to the land. 
You can only say the land is yours when there is a land certificate. ‘Now that they are living on 
the land without the certificates, out people once in a while move in and encroach near to their 
doors and ask them to go elsewhere. So you can only expropriate land for farming and not for 
grazing’.  
Yes it is our land; they do not contest the ownership of the land because the Fulani pay 
allegiance to the various chiefs in Wum. And they know that the land belongs to the Wum. For 
                                                 
32 See NAB/N0/Ab 17/6 ‘application for lease of grazing grounds in the Cameroons Province and the certificate of 
occupancy and the Fulani Native Ab 17/1. The 1947 Land Ordinance stipulated that lands granted to non-natives 
prior to 1947 needed authority approval. For such lands, only the Governor General of Nigeria and Southern 
Cameroons could transfer native lands to non-native. The Ordinance further stipulated that such transfers had to 
conform to indigenous laws and customs regulating land distribution. 
33 Also see NAB/No 17/1’Fulani in Bamenda Division reorganisation’. 
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instance they know that Wum Central has boundary with Nigeria. So they have occupied part of 
the land right to the boundary and there is no Fulani village here except Wum. It is our land not 
their land (Fon Mbambi interviewed 12/12/2013). 
This notion is not only held by the Fon but by most women cultivators in Aghem and Bu as the 
following excerpts indicates:  
When the Fulani entered Wum they were settled on land only for temporal basis. They did 
not own the land and the land was given on friendly basis. It was for free but when a cow 
was sick, it was given to the chief to slaughter. They gave cattle to the chief and the land 
was never given to the Fulani to remain there permanently. Periodically a Fulani had the 
right to exploit the land even for more than five years but that did not give him the right to 
own that piece of land (Koi Delphine interviewed 19/10/2013). 
As Hussein et al (1999: 400) have documented in similar situations in Africa, the conditions 
under which the Fulani were settled have changed. First of all, the population has multiplied more 
than tenfold and there is stiff competition over water sources and fertile lands for farming and 
cattle rearing. This in itself constitutes a source of conflict between farmers and grazers since the 
resources are diminishing. The Fulani are now increasingly engaged in farming and their 
activities are not limited to grazing any more (Tonah 2006: 161). The Fulani were largely 
restricted and settled on marginal lands but today, they are in search of fertile grounds to carryout 
food cultivation. For example, the Bu Plain that is very fertile and provides ideal conditions for 
rice and dry season vegetable farming has come under pressure and also being competed for by 
both farmers and grazers. The continuous occupation of the plain by rice fields have not only 
deprived Fulani herders of key dry season pasture during transhumance, but has  made it difficult 
for livestock to access water and have also blocked water tracts used by cattle. 
In many settlements, farms are located next to fields reserved for grazing livestock. The 
increasing cultivation of bush farms by migrant farmers has also contributed to the increased risk 
of destruction of crops by cattle. ‘During the farming season herders have to meander through 
farms to reach pastures, and cattle are prone to trampling on farmers crops. In the pre-harvest 
period cattle frequently destroy or eat ripened crops as they are being led from the pastures into 
their kraals’ (Tonah 2006: 161). 
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It is gradually becoming difficult for the Fulani to practice transhumance during the dry season. If 
they must do that, they have to go as far as Obang and Bafut Valley.34 For that, they need to 
negotiate and pay huge sums of money or provide cattle to the local chiefs in these areas to allow 
them come over with cattle. I argue that increase in population and diminishing arable land and 
resources have contributed to the strained relationship between Farmers and herders. Again, both 
the colonial government and the local chiefs were more interested in the financial benefits that 
accrued from the cattle tax and so in order to attract more cattle, granted only grazing permits and 
not land rights to the Fulani. On the other hand, the Fulani have continued to consider grazing 
permits as the equivalence of land certificates.  
 
 
Figure 8 The immobility of the mobile Fulani has brought them in serious confrontation with indigenous 
farmers as they compete over land and diminishing resources.Abdoulaye Guizo-a Fulani farmer in his pepper 
plantation at Bu Road Aghem. 
                                                 
34  Mallam Suleiman Guizo Interviewed 23/10/2013. 
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In addition, many former arable farmers have now also taken up cattle herding (Sone 2012a). 
‘The hills that were given as grazing land to the Fulani are being transformed into government 
ranches, parks, game reserves, zoos and the rich non Fulani are grabbing all the hills for grazing 
thus depriving the Mbororos (Fulani) from using these resources’.35 To cope with the situation, 
most Fulani now tend to reduce the size of their cattle and this decrease has forced and pushed 
them to engage permanently in economic activities other than herding.36  
 
Figure 9 Despite Fulani occupation of this land for over a century, they are still regarded as strangers by the 
Aghem and Bu communities.   
Source: Author, 2013         
                                                                     
6.4 Farmer/Herder Relations 
The relations between farmers/grazers have been described and categorised by some researchers 
as competitive (Moritz 2006) and mutually beneficial or complementary by others (Breusers, 
Nederlof and van Rheenen 1998), and yet some consider the relationships as inherently 
conflictual (Kah 2009; Diduk 1992; Sone 2012a). Available sources and discourses on 
farmer/herder conflicts have, however, systematically lumped and referred to Fulani as grazers 
                                                 
35 Bouba Hawe interviewed 30/10/2013 
36  Most of them have become mobile not as herders but as intercity bus drivers, teachers, Benskin Riders, hawkers, 
while others are settled in some of the big cities in Cameroon and employed in different professions. Ali Abdou born 
in 1999,  Mohamadou the Son of Sarki and motor bike and bus drivers respectively. 
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and to the Aghem and Bu communities as farmers. Such a distinction is not only misleading but 
blurs our understanding and renders little justice to the complex reality of herder/farmer relations 
and how they navigate and negotiate various identity margins as indigenes and strangers, citizens 
and subjects (Nyamnjoh 2013a: 110).Their differences and incompatibilities notwithstanding, 
within the present context, it is increasingly difficult and complex to separate grazers and farmers 
into two ethnically distinct groups. Several reasons are responsible for this complexity. First of 
all, the economic boundary between Fulani and the Aghem and Bu people is fast fading away but 
for rivalry over land ownership and this is so because, non Fulani farmers and Hausa (also 
Moslems) keep livestock and Fulani who were hitherto cattle grazers are now engaged in crop 
cultivation (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon 1999: 398; Dze-Ngwa 2013: 18) and it is also 
increasingly difficult to know the proportion of the herd that belongs to  Fulani and those that 
belong to indigenous and Hausa Moslem stock-owners (Tonah 2006: 172).  
Furthermore, there are Fulani who are farmers and do not own cattle and farmers who own cattle 
but are not farmers. Evidence has shown that, cattle belonging to non-Fulani are herded by the 
Fulani and the Fulani ‘are no longer the cattle herdsmen of the Fulani but anybody’s herdsmen’ 
(DeBruijn and van Dijk 2005: 69). To put it simple, ‘it is more scientifically rewarding not to treat 
these communities as bounded and exclusive (Nyamnjoh 2013a: 106). These conflicts are 
therefore complicated and aggravated by competition over the same arable land and pastures and 
not necessarily as a result of crop damages. As De Bruijn and van Dijk (2005: 69) have 
demonstrated, ‘conflicts between herders and farmers can be seen as the result of incompatibility 
between different land use strategies and cultural and social factors as well as the growing 
similarities in their respective system of land use’. Moreover, conflicts may not necessarily be 
between farmers and grazers but may include conflicts between farmers and farmers, herders and 
herders, may even be inter personal, inter-ethnic and in some cases between local users and 
outsiders (land grabbers from elsewhere), and corporations and the state (Hussein, Sumberg and 
Seddon 1999: 400).  
I argue that very often farmer/grazer conflicts are politicised and the Fulani are usually seen as 
victims, what Nyamjoh (2013a: 107) refers to as ‘bounded victim community’.The politicisation 
of this Fulaniness is not only to draw domestic and international sympathy and support by the 
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Fulani who feel marginalised and victimised, but also to press, local and state power structures to 
protect them against land seizure, appropriation and the use by elite (Diduk, 1992: 192). It is also 
to advocate and lobby for new land reforms that would not only give them users’ rights but 
ownership rights as well. There are already growing fears that the over 1.8million Fulani that are 
considered as indigenous people will soon dominate other groups in Cameroon who do not have 
the same status and do not have land rights as well.37 This becomes very clear when we look at 
the situation of the Cameroonian woman, who does not have ownership rights over land though 
enjoys access to land and have rights as citizens.  
6.5 MBOSCUDA and Citizenship Rights: The Fulani Response  
Fulani marginalisation and victimisation can be traced back to 1943 during the colonial period 
when they realised that their pastoral interests were inadequately represented by local Grassfields 
chiefs, and so requested for a Fulani Advisory Council, an Alkali court, veterinary centre and a 
school from the British.38 Unfortunately, their demands were refused and instead they were 
regarded as ‘strangers’ and placed under Native Authorities. Although presently their citizenship 
rights are guaranteed by the 1996 constitution, they have continued to negotiate for recognition 
and representation with difficulties and lots of resistance from Aghem and Bu groups who 
consider them as foreigners. Thus ‘the Mbororo in the Western Grassfields had developed a 
conscious political identity long time ago’ (Pelican 2008:  544).39 It is against the backdrop of this 
marginalisation that the Fulani created the Mbororo40Social and Cultural Association 
(MBOSCUDA) in 1992. MBOSCUDA was established to protect Fulani rights, promote their 
development and to ensure their full integration into the society. As the constitution of 
MBOSCUDA indicates: 
                                                 
37 Tony interviewed 23/November, 2013. 
38 NAB/No.Ab17 (9) ‘Notes on the Fulani of British and French Cameroons,  Cameroon Province 1943’. 
39 NAB, No Ab 17/1 ‘Reply by the Resident Bamenda Division on the request for the creation of a Fulani Advisory 
Council I 1943’. 
40 The name Mbororo refers to a species of cattle which was introduced in Cameroon in 1920 by a group of herds’ 
men under their leader Goshi who migrated from the Kano Emirate. 
107 
 
The Mbororo believe that they are subjected to exploitation, oppression, humiliation and 
marginalisation as a result of their peculiarities-nomadic and pastoralist way of life, 
illiteracy, ignorance and lack of guidance and cooperation.41 
During the early years of its existence, MBOSCUDA attracted a lot of international and national 
attention which made them to receive funds from financial donors and carried out training 
programs to enhance the capacity of the Mbororo especially in the domains of human rights and 
political participation.42 Presently, MBOSCUDA has consultative status with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights recognising them as indigenous people.43 Since its creation, most of its founding members 
and other educated MBOSCUDA members have travelled abroad and even studied in some 
European Universities and this is what Pelican (2008: 546) has to say: 
Some educated individuals and MBOSCUDA representatives have benefited considerably from 
opportunities for advanced training and international travel. For example, over the past four years 
MBOSCUDA’s current provincial programme coordinator attended six international workshops 
in the United States, Britain, Tanzania and Nigeria, as well as three skill enhancement trainings 
in southern Cameroon. His wife attended a three-month Indigenous Fellowship Programme in 
Geneva organized by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  
Some of the issues that motivated the creation of the association were economic and political 
marginalisation. ‘Locals tell us that we should go away from here and that this is not our land, 
where do we go to? This is where I was born; this is where my father was born. When people say 
we should go away, where do they really expect us to go to?44  
                                                 
41 See Constitution and Internal Regulations of MBOSCUDA pp3. 
42 A number of these programs have been realised with the support of local communities and national or international 
nongovernmental organizations. Pelican 2008: 548.  
German Development Service and Village AiD, a UK funding-partner agency (Pelican 2008: 549) 
43It has been so difficult to come out with a definition of indigenous people because each country has its own 
definition with its specificities. Indigenous people and the issue of owning land has become more and more a problem 
in Cameroon the people are being taken away from land that is supposed to be their natural habitat and ancestral land.  
After several years, in 2007, the UN adopted the Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People. Unfortunately 
Cameroon has not ratified the ILO convention on indigenous people. Interview Lawyer Robert Nsoh 23/11/2013. 
44 Adamou interviewed 23/10/2013 
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MBOSCUDA’s extensive use of the social media (internet, twitter, face book, yahoo-groups etc) 
as the medium to raise awareness on the plight of the Fulani in Cameroon and to articulate their 
land claims have paid off. This is very crucial since they are scattered all over the place and can 
hardly be identified with a particular land area. The social media has continued to be a uniting and 
galvanizing force for the Fulani both at home and in the Diaspora. 
Despite the tremendous progress made by MBOSCUDA, it has gradually come under criticism 
from within and from without which has generated internal contradictions and led to the 
emergence of many factions that have weakened the association.45 Firstly, to the protagonists, the 
association does not represent the interest of all Fulani; this is because ‘MBOSCUDA’s founding 
members have distanced themselves from sedentary Town Fulbe in northern Cameroon and 
stressed their identification with (agro-) pastoral Fulbe’ (Pelican 2008: 548). Secondly, the 
association has become localised, functioning only in some towns of the northwest region where 
its national head office is located. Thirdly, it is argued that the name refers only to the pastoralists 
of the Fulbe clan and does not cover other groups such as the Aku and Hausas who are also found 
in Cameroon and engage in cattle herding. It is for this reason that the Aku decided to create their 
faction known as the-Aku Cultural and Development Association (ACUDA).46 Again, only a few 
influential and educated Mbororo elite seem to have benefitted from the association. 
Thus, the ‘indigenous peoples’ discourse benefits mainly the Mbororo elites. Against the 
background of these emerging new opportunities, it is not surprising that there are indications of 
increasing rivalries and ruptures within MBOSCUDA. Furthermore, criticism has also been 
raised by Mbororo leaders who submitted a petition to the British High Commission, accusing 
Mbororo intellectuals of falsely portraying the Mbororo as an impoverished people, and of 
misappropriating international aid (Pelican 2008:  553).47 
In recent years, MBOSCUDA members have come under attack and have been harassed, arrested, 
imprisoned, threatened and brutalised by Alhaji Baba Ahmadou Danpollo, an influential Fulani  
                                                 
45 For more on the embroglio between SODELCO and MBOSCUDA, See Nyamnjoh (2013a: 124-5) and Dze-Ngwa 
(2013: 22-23) the former is led by Alhaji Baba . 
46 Nana, S .S (n.d), why we refuse to align ourselves to reactionary forces against our Community  (unpublished),A 
letter published by Nana, Sarli in reaction to atrocities and acts of violence orchestrated by Alhaji Danpollo Baba. 
The use of the internet is one of the means through which the Fulani try to make their voices heard. 
47 Nana Sarli is a founding member of MBOSCUDA and a post graduate Student, Department of Comparative and 
Applied Social Sciences, Graduate Institute, University of Hull United Kingdom. Also see Krieger 2008,pp.77-78. 
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(Krieger 2008: 78). The Fulani are therefore not only facing external challenges but those coming 
from some Fulani who have close links and political interests in the ruling Cameroon Peoples’ 
Democratic Movement (CPDM), where Danpollo is a member of the Central Committee (Krieger 
2008: 78;Tegomoh 2013:226). 
While a few long-established and influential individuals have acquired land titles, the majority 
relies on the goodwill of local administrators and Grassfields chiefs (ibid) and continues to be 
impoverished and victimised. Even MBOSCUDA that was created to provide lasting solutions to 
the plight of the Fulani has turned out in most cases to favour only influential Fulani and the rich 
while a majority of them still suffer in victimhood. In such informal arrangements with chaotic 
outcomes, the land question only favours rent-seeking individuals who have the bargaining 
powers and the political leverage.48  
6.6 The 1990 Liberty Laws and Fulani right to Citizenship 
In 1990, Presidential Decree No 90/1459 of 08 November 1990 created the National Human 
Rights and Liberties Commission (NHRLC) and particular attention was given to  minorities and 
native populations (Hossain, Besselink, Selassie and Volker 2012: 170; Dafinger and Pelican 
2006: 146).49 Before this time, the Fulani were not considered as citizens in Cameroon but when 
the ‘1990 liberty laws’ (Law No. 90/052 of December 1990) were put into effect; they gained full 
citizenship rights as Cameroonians. Unfortunately, this ushered in new modes in the struggle over 
belonging and exclusion among ethnic groups (Geschiere 2005a; Konings 2008). Following these 
laws, any Cameroonian has the right to settle anywhere in the country. With that conception, the 
Fulani have acquired national identification papers with Aghem as the place of birth and as 
Cameroonians. This is the same scenario with other Fulani that are spread throughout the country; 
acquiring identification papers as members of the communities where they live (Scholte et al 
2006: 34). Regular reference to place of birth in particular, is considered as evidence of the 
permanent settlement of the Fulani and their assimilation into indigenous socio-cultural systems 
                                                 
48 Also see open letter of November 2011 by Nana about the activities of Danpollo’ Cameroon billionaire, land owner 
defies the government every time, all the time’. 
49 See Cameroon: Institutional situation 
http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/institutionnel/cameroon.html  accessed 10/01/2013. 
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of the northwest [...] region (Vabi.n.d: 13). ‘They thus see themselves as able members of 
Grassfield chiefdoms, and claim rights and belonging in the same way as their Grassfield 
neighbours (Pelican 2008: 550). Taking the cue from there, Vabi (n.d: 16) notes that a majority of 
Fulani pastoralists have settled, grow crops, and now practice a form of limited seasonal 
transhumance and there is therefore a clear trend towards the establishment of mixed farming 
systems.50 
These in so many ways have contributed in the Fulani identity change and their relationships with 
the local communities. With this identity change and as it is with other ethnic minority groups in 
Cameroon, the Fulani are not only competing with the local communities over resources but also 
for recognition and representation in the public space (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). Following 
De Bruijn and Dijk (2005: 61), I argue that the manner and the policies that were used to integrate 
the Fulani favoured livestock production at the expense of agricultural development51and also 
contributed in many ways towards these conflicts. ‘Because the Fulani population and the 
population of cattle increased tremendously in the region by the early 1940s, the colonial 
administration began to pay more attention to this group of people: as their numbers grew, so too 
did tax revenues from the collection of Njangali’(O’Rourke 2012: 107).  
In conclusion, this chapter has traced the historical path through which the Fulani arrived in 
Cameroon and also in Wum.  A brief ethnographic account of the Fulani has been presented and 
the conditions under which they were integrated in the area. Generally, the Fulani are considered 
as nomads and also associated with the rearing of cattle and their wealth is believed to be in cattle. 
But increasingly, Fulani have adopted a sedentary life style and are now involved in so many 
economic activities not even linked to cattle. This, in a way has resulted in Fulani identity change. 
With the enforcement of the Liberty and Freedom rights, the conception that Fulani are nomads 
has changed while the social and economic boundaries are fading away. One of the means 
                                                 
50  For example, Abdoulaye Guizo with three wives and sixteen children has only five cows that he has integrated 
into his elder brothers herd of cattle and now concentrates on the cultivation of pepper with manure that he gets from 
the cattle and generates over 2 million Francs as revenue each season interviewed 23/10/2013. 
51 Also see Sone (2012a) on a similar explanation. However, Moritz (2006: 18) holds a contrary view and rather think 
that development programs have been biased against mobile pastoralists which have reinforced the alienation of 
mobile pastoralists by supporting village claims over territory. This therefore suggests that the conflicts are basically 
as a result of competition between two different incompatible land use systems (De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005: 6). 
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through which the Fulani use to legitimate their claims over land and citizenship has been the use 
of the social media through which the imaginary of being perceived as strangers is deconstructed. 
Despite this identity change, they have continued to be marginalised, politically and economically 
while at the same time being stigmatised and victimised as outsiders. 
It is as a result of this stigmatisation and marginalisation that they created MBOSCUDA to defend 
their interest. MBOSCUDA has achieved alot in the domain of female empowerment, education, 
and human rights but has generally not been able to address the crucial problem of Fulani land 
rights. Instead, a few influential Fulani have used the association for personal gains. Rivalries 
among the Fulani have remained a crucial problem especially as some of them have political and 
economic connections with the regime in place. Thus, MBOSCUDA has remained a mere 
political tool than an agency that can solve the problems of the Fulani.In the next chapter, I 
present a detail analysis of the conflicts that exist between Fulani herders and women cultivators 
in Wum.  
 

 Chapter Seven: ‘When two Elephants Fight the Grass Suffers’: The 
Politics of land Conflicts and Contesting identities.  
7.1 Introduction      
In the previous chapters I focused on those factors1 that have not only influenced  changes in  land 
use patterns but have also contributed in different ways towards persistent land conflicts between 
women cultivators and Fulani herders in Wum Central sub-division. Following Fisiy (1992: 145), 
I argue however that these conflicts are embedded in customary practices, power hierarchies and 
history which have been internalised by the Aghem and Bu where respect for tradition is still 
optimal. For instance, once individuals have internalised a group identity they are often reluctant 
to dispose of it. As I indicated in chapter six, the Aghem ethnic group consider themselves as 
indigenes (first-comers) or the ‘rightful owners’ of the land and the grazers (Fulani) who migrated 
in different waves into the area much later are often regarded as ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’(Lenz, 
006;Konings 2001: 170 Nyamnjoh 2013c).2The bone of contention here is not just over land 
rights and resources, but also that of identity and the politics of belonging. It is a conflict about 
claims over who belongs where, who has the right to call a particular place their homeland (Page, 
Evans and Mercer 2010: 354). In this chapter, I try to show the different trajectories and 
manifestations of conflicts and the role that women and Fulani play in them. I also argue that the 
critical issues which cause land conflicts in Wum are not primarily caused by crop damages but 
the struggle over access to land and the multiple meanings that people attribute to land 
(Andersson, 1999) and how local chiefs and state administrators allocate land for activities such 
as farming, grazing and the building of houses or other services (Fisiy1992: 55). The various 
strategies that the contesting groups adopt in their land claims have also been analysed. The main 
question therefore is: why despite the farmer/grazer commission that has been put in place; the 
                                                 
1 For instance chapter three is focused on local power hierarchies and their involvement in land deals, chapter four 
examines the 1974 Land Ordinances and its consequences on women’s access to land, chapter five concentrates on 
the Fulani and grazing activities. 
2 NAB, No.Ab17/(3) ‘Report on Education for Nomadic Bororos by A.E.F Murray, Resident Cameroons, Province, 
Buea December 31st 1941, Also, NAB, No/17(10) by Kebbery, Phillis, on Farmer-grazer relations of 17/4/1959. In 
these reports, it is evident that the Fulani entered French Cameroon through Banyo and Adamawa by 1903 from the 
Emirate of Kano Nigeria and by 1920; they were in the British Cameroons although earlier contacts were there by 
1870-1880.  
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conflicts in the area are still persistent? It is within this frame that I would like to examine the 
land conflicts in the Aghem area. 
7.2 Women Protests and Confrontations with Fulani Herders 
In 1981, Aghem women mobilised in response to excessive crop destruction by unsupervised 
herds of cattle. Some were owned by local elites and most by nomadic Fulani who had been 
granted the right to seasonal pasturage for their herds (Diduk 1989: 339; Dze-Ngwa 2013: 25). 
The Fulani were considered by the women as strangers and the grazing of their herds on land that 
did not belong to the grazers brought about animosity between the women and the herders (ibid). 
Furthermore, ‘women’s farms were suffering from the depredation of cattle and nothing seemed 
to be done about it; warnings to cattle-owners went unheeded’ (Chilver 1988: 8).There were 
violent confrontations between farmers and herders which led to the destruction of property and 
eighteen people sustained injuries (Kah 2009: 188; Sone 2012a: 84). The security forces 
intervened and eight people were shot.  
The latest protest occurred in 2003 when six thousand women besieged the chief's palace in 
Aghem, boycotting all social and ritual activity. "The immediate cause of the protest was an 
attempt by the Divisional Officer to enforce an order expelling about 600 women from a piece of 
land where they have cultivated food crops"(Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 134). Instead, the women 
wanted the eviction of the Fulani that they have constantly been referring to as strangers from 
Aghem.3 In these protests, women considered their access to land as being threatened which 
seems to have put them in a precarious situation. Consequently, the women have not been 
indifferent to these challenges but have resorted to fight back and defend what they consider as an 
infringement in the domain of women. One of the ways that women have always expressed their 
frustrations and the invasion of what Diduk (1992) refers to as ‘women’s sphere’ is through 
                                                 
3  Previous disputes between farmers and herders were recorded in 1937,1943, 1951, 1958, and 1966 and in 1973, 
Aghem women organized a public protest boycotting all market activity in Wum and in two neighbouring villages. 
They demanded that Fulbe herders should keep their animals in three demarcated grazing zones or be expelled. They 
argued that herders continually disrespected farmers' efforts and endangered farmers' livelihood by appropriating 
more and more land. Also see Dafinger and Pelican2006:  133;Kah 2009;Pelican 2006,Sone (2012b) 
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public protests. This is particularly important when such actions threaten land which is considered 
as a source of their livelihoods.  
Female protest movements4 have occurred in widely separated areas of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Diduk 1989:  338). Although they are found in varied societies, at great geographical distance, 
and during different moments of history, they exhibit structural similarities. In each case women 
join together in public contexts to protest against what they feel are infringements of their 
economic or political prerogatives (ibid). Similar protests by Kom Women known as Anlu have 
been documented by Chilver (1988: 7; Nkwi, 1985) and also on the Fombeun in Kedjom Keku 
(Diduk1992; Nkwi, 2011). For example, the circumstances which triggered off the Anlu women 
uprising originated from a false rumour that land was to be sold to the Igbo, (a stranger) provoked 
by the arrival of surveyors (Chilver 1988: 7). Women were the farmers in both the Kom and 
Kedjom societies and this fear that their lands were being sold out to strangers was of serious 
importance (Diduk 1992: 339). 
7.3 Why Women? 
The Bamenda Grassfields economy of which Aghem and Bu form part has been recognised as 
marked by an unobtrusive division of labour in which women are engaged in so-called 
subsistence agriculture and food preparation and men in wealth producing activities, trade and 
crafts, as well as building, bush clearance and help in harvesting and the provision of meat, 
medicine, oil and salt (Chilver 1988: 4).5 This distinction has been analysed by Goheen (1988 
1996) among the Nso’ of the northwest region of Cameroon, and she concludes that ‘men own the 
fields, women own the crops’.6Except for a few pioneers, the response of men to food farming 
was slow. A man with a hoe in a grain farm was then an anomalous, even ridiculous, figure in the 
eyes of men and women alike in most districts (Chilver 1988: 4) and in some cases was 
considered a taboo except for crops that were cultivated without using the women’s hoe (Henn 
                                                 
4 See Falola and Paddock (2011) on ‘the women’s War of 1929 and Fiona and Mackenzie (2000: 709) on the 
Kikuyu ‘women’s revolts of 1948, and Fonchingong and Tanga (2007) on Takumbeng of Mankon women protests 
5 RAB, No. NW/AC.1960/1/BK 
6  ‘Women own the crops, Men own the fields’, as used in this work is culled from the title of the book published by 
Goheen (1988, 1996) and I wish to duly acknowledge this.   
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1979: 207). Thus, there is a sharp division of roles and crops owned and cultivated by women and 
those belonging to men. 
In Cameroon, women constitute 52 percent of the population and their contribution to the 
country’s agricultural and economic development is unavoidable (Fon 2011: 65).In the chiefdoms 
of Aghem and Bu, women perform the main tasks of food production. Their predominantly 
female farmers tend to cultivate such crops like maize, groundnuts, beans and vegetables on 
valleys, plains and the hill sides of land that belongs to their male folks. Other crops cultivated are 
roots and tubers such as cassava, sweet potatoes, yams and cocoyam. The same scenario that 
Goheen (1996: 84) has described in Nso’ exist in Wum where women  perform other tasks such 
as tilling, planting, weeding and harvesting which in combination are ongoing tasks for much of 
the year and require almost daily attention. Aghem women often work in cooperative labour 
groups during peak labour seasons requiring maximum labour input (Kaberry 2004: 55). This 
predominantly female population is engaged in subsistence agriculture and sometimes food 
surplus is sold to generate revenue for the sustenance of the household. The importance of land is 
therefore very crucial for rural women in Cameroon and Wum Central Sub-division in particular. 
Considering the important role that they play in food cultivation, it is therefore not a surprise that 
the protest movements against crop damages are usually championed by women. 
In practice, women, as cultivators, have considerable informal rights over plots they are actually 
cultivating, may loan them to other women, and transmit them to close female kin.7 These are in 
effect, managerial rights, and a sharp distinction is made between a farm and heritable family 
land. Women usually farm on the plots of their husband’s lineage but they may exercise rights of 
usufruct in lands belonging to their mother’s lineage and, provided they have maintained 
cultivation continuously, may even retain the use of plots they farm in adolescence in their 
father’s lineage land (Kaberry 2004: 41;Teboh 2002: 170).8 Women’s access to land is therefore 
dependent on their relationships with men. In such a system (Kah 2009: 190),’since the land is 
managed by men, women cannot arbitrarily choose a plot of land for exploitation’ or for food 
                                                 
7 Also see Funk, U (1988:  42) on a similar situation among the Brassa of  Guinea-Bissau where women’s access to 
land is indirect and is only through their relationship with  men. 
8 Also see RAB, No. NW/Ac.1960/1/BK. 
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production on their own. Women’s land rights have been acknowledged by Henn (1979:  160) 
and she puts it this way:  
A wife’s right to her food plots cannot be taken from her even if the marriage flounders. A  
woman with children will remain in the husbands village even though separated or widowed in 
order to have land to farm in order to feed herself and her children, to earn a little cash on her 
own, and to protect her sons’ future land rights from encroachment by the husband’s relatives. 
Women’s usufruct rights are of course reversed in Aghem and Bu where there is matrilineal 
descent. Here the inheritance of plantain groves and houses is matrilineal but these revert to the 
Batum if the legal person to whom these things were handed fails to take possession (NAB 
No.Ad/22). 
7.4 Women’s Resistance to the Infringement of their Sphere 
Within the Aghem federation, there are women societies –especially Kefap, which plays leading 
roles as the custodian of Aghem tradition and culture (Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 95; Kaberry 
1952: 100). Furthermore, women are very important in the agrarian economy (Fonjong 2012; 
Goheen 1988, 1996; Kaberry 1952; Chilver and Kaberry 1967). In Aghem, apart from recreation 
and initiation of new members, Kefap whose membership is restricted to women is very important 
in society and performs several functions. The Kefap society is charged with the responsibility to 
ensure order in the community. In Aghem, Nantum is a title assigned to the mother of the king. 
Each reigning chief or king therefore has his own Natum. Under the leadership of the Natum, 
women undergo a fattening process and are invigorated with a medicine brewed by the Natum. 
This medicine is also closely associated with agriculture: just prior to planting it is rubbed on the 
bodies of members and it is believed to bring success in farming (Kaberry 1952: 100). In the old, 
a Natum could also invoke the blessing of the ancestors and of God on the harvest (ibid). The 
women’s’ associations under the leadership of their Natums also combine to protest against 
flouting of custom by men, not excluding the Batum. They did this by strewing a man’s 
compound with knotted elephant grass, which could not be removed until penitence had been 
signified by the payment of a fine (Diduk 1992; Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 95). They might even 
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expel a Batum who refused to reform or kept to tradition. This was particularly so in situations 
where there was an abuse of women, their rights and person (Nkwi 1985: 181).  
Kefap was therefore not just a social group, but an agency through which social harmony and any 
interference in farming practices considered as their sphere were regulated. Furthermore, among 
other functions, Kefap was charged with the organisation of work parties among women and also 
settled disputes among members of their own sex and acted as their spokesmen. Till today, Kefap, 
like Anlu, serves as a militant group and the voice of the women through which any infringement 
is resisted (Nkwi 1985). In the case cited above, the idea of strangeness was not only directed by 
the women towards the Fulani but in everything that was considered contrary to traditional 
practices and which in some cases included the introduction of new farming methods. The 
existence of women societies seems to be a general characteristic of the Bamenda Grassfield 
chiefdoms and although they may differ in magnitude, they display a semblance in terms of their 
attributions.9  
De Bruijn and van Dijk (2005: 61) however contend that although the conflicts may result from 
crops that have been damaged by unsupervised cattle, ‘the situation is much more complicated 
than it appears, and current conflicts result from a complex interaction between government 
policies, internal contradictions between farmers and grazers’. Boye and Kaarhus (2011: 100) 
drag the argument further and document that in most cases they are conflicts over land and may 
sometimes have their roots in complex and hostile-relations over land ownership. The protests by 
the women were not just against crops that have been destroyed but they believed that their 
authority was being challenged. Drawing from the example of Anlu (Fisiy 1996: 223) the protests 
were often against changes in the farming techniques initiated by the colonial office to fight 
against soil erosion and environmental degradation.10The women also objected to a government 
edict prescribing contour farming to replace the building of ridges vertically along hillsides. 
                                                 
9 See Nkwi,1985.pp 181, Fonchingong et al 2007 and Diduk 1989: 338 on Anlu,Takumbeng and Fumbeun women 
associations respectively in some chiefdoms of the Bamenda Grassfields. 
10 For full account on  Anlu, see Diduk 1989;Chilver 1988;Nkwi1985,Anlu emerged as a very powerful women’s 
social movement which was quickly transformed from its cultural trajectory to become an effective and frightening 
political action group during the transition to independence. Fonchingong and Tanga (2007) have also written 
extensively on Takumbeng, a similar women’s movement that played a leading role in 1990 when multiparty politics 
was reintroduced in Cameroon. 
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Meant to prevent soil erosion, the directive was extremely unpopular amongst women because it 
is much more difficult and labour-intensive to ridge horizontally on a steep slope (Nkwi, 1976: 
179). What angered the women were the fact that government-imposed agricultural innovations 
were introduced with minimal consultation locally and were perceived as strange and an 
intrusion.11 Such farming techniques were already being implemented by the colonialists as far 
back as 1940s as a means of integrating the Fulani stranger populations. The various techniques 
and innovations (for example the barb wire scheme, night paddock, and grazing lands) introduced 
by the British have been discussed extensively in chapter Five. Such actions did not only change 
the land use patterns but also the idea that their land rights were being threatened by intruders. 
7.5 Chiefs Facing the Women 
Within the present land law, chiefs are the main signatories in all land arrangements and 
transactions, alongside government administrators. As custodians of the land, they are charged 
with the responsibilities to distribute land to women for cultivation. At the centre of the 
accusations by the Kefap women’s movement was the Paramount ruler of Aghem, Fon Mbambi 
III who was arraigned and kept under the rain for hours by the women for always supporting and 
giving out farm lands to the Fulani. ‘It was the grazers’ “financial power” (Kah 2009: 191) that 
caused the disappearance of farmers’ documents in the court as part of the dirty trick occasioned 
by the bribes given to the chief and the Wum Area Development Authority (WADA) personnel so 
that free access to farm plots by cattle grazers would not be a problem’. Aghem is not an isolated 
case where accusations have been made against chiefs and notables for corrupt practices and the 
transfer of land to grazers for financial gains by women. Such accusations were recorded as far 
back as 1958 when Kedjom Ketinguh women sang, against their Fon and Quarter heads (Diduk 
1989: 243) for the same reasons. Led by Kedjom women, Fon Vugah Simon was finally murdered 
and burnt into ashes for ‘giving land to strangers for cattle rearing and the cultivation of cash 
crops in January 2006.12 This precarious situation has brought traditional rulers under serious 
                                                 
11 See Fiona and Mackenzie (2000: 706)The introduction of agricultural policies such as crop rotation, composting 
and grass leys were favoured and proved to be popular among the Kikuyu but they also resisted other innovations 
and soil conservation techniques such as terracing  
12 In 1985, Kedjom Keku women also marched to the sub-divisional headquarters to register outrage that lands have 
been sold by the Fon to herders in the mountain of Kedjom Keku, see Diduk 1992: 193 & Tegomoh 2013,pp223 
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criticisms, scrutiny and challenges from the public. It is as part of this transfer of land use from 
subsistence cultivation to herding and cash crop farming that women's protests must be 
understood.  
The Aghem women were opposed to the enormous powers that the different Batums wield over 
land matters. In the past, it was the Batum who controlled unused arable land and gave it out to 
members of his own section; the demarcation of boundaries was left to the women cultivators, 
usually under the supervision of his Natum or titular mother.13 As Kaberry emphasises, no men, 
but women only went out and distributed land to other women. The Chief went out to the fields 
only when there was a quarrel or a dispute between women on the land (NAB No.Ad/22).Today, 
the Batums have usurped the powers of their Natums and are increasingly making things difficult 
for the women because instead of allotting land for collective farming as required by tradition, 
they prefer to sell the land out rightly to the Fulani (Kah 2009: 187). ‘If you tell the Fulani to get 
out of the land they are willing to do so but remember that the chief will prefer him to stay since 
he can easily buy the conscience of the chief with money or cow’.14As Kah (2009: 188) notes, the 
Batums of Naikom, Waindo, Afuh Nkouh and Chuoembi villages are known to have received 
money from grazers to allow them graze on land meant for farming without the respect for 
demarcated areas. 
The 1974 Land Ordinances provides that land can be expropriated by the state for ‘public 
purposes’ and the chief in each village is expected to facilitate the process of expropriation by 
demarcating and ‘officially’ handing over the piece of land to the state. The same ordinances also 
allow a chief to sign the individual title deed for property rights. As ‘gate keepers’ of communal 
land, chiefs are usually accused by women and the elite for exchanging  land with the state or 
selling it to individuals for money. In the light of these accusations, Fon Mbambi argues that ‘a 
Batum does not sell land, but “gives” land and for doing so, he receives money which is rather 
known as “zinc”, “grass” or “firewood’ to the Palace. The  Fon of Aghem also acknowledged that 
he is usually given 200.000Frs by an indigene who is in need of a piece of land but when he gives 
land to the state, nothing at all is given to him. ‘That is what happened when I gave land for the 
                                                 
13 See Ndifor, Cletus (1960: 44),RAB No NW/Ac.1960/1/BK, Historical notes Bamenda Grassfields, Delegation of 
Culture, Bamenda 
14 Cheng Emerson, Secretary Wum Council interviewed,20/10/2013. 
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Wum Cattle Market’.15 In Bu, the nomenclature is different and before land is allotted to a 
member of the community, ’something’ is given to the Chief but it is kept secret by the giver and 
only known by the receiver-the Fon. They refer to it as “the Fon’s bag.” This has therefore placed 
traditional leaders at daggers drown with the local communities who do not see their leaders as 
protecting their interest anymore. In some situations, the authority of the Batum or chiefs is 
contested either by his own villagers or by inhabitants from another village (Andersson 1999: 
557).  
7.6 A Panorama of Conflicts over Crop damages 
This is usually a result of herders leaving cattle unattended and thus allowing them to wander 
into cultivated fields. Cattle may also go on a rampage and destroy seed crops or consume food 
items stored in barns. Cattle often destroy food crops during the planting season and the 
immediate post-harvest period (Tonah2006: 161).  
Drawing from the above citation and from a study they carried out on Fulbe herders and Senoufo 
farmers in Northern Cote d’Ivoire, De Bruijn and van Dijk (2005: 63) demonstrate that conflicts 
are sometimes caused by the poor treatment of clients by their patrons. As they note, ‘the rich 
Fulbe employ “salaried, young and impoverished Fulbe” who have no means of employment in 
their home [...] to look after their herds’. They go further to state that hardly do the patrons pay 
the meagre salaries thereby pushing them to resort to selling or stealing cattle belonging to the 
patrons or that of non Fulani cattle farmers.16 Consequently, some of the hired herdsmen allow 
the cattle to graze unsupervised; thus wandering into farms and damaging crops (Tonah 2006). On 
the other hand, Baye (2008: 154) demonstrates, that some Fulani with a view to frighten farmers 
intentionally allow their cattle to destroy crops as they believe their relationships with 
administrators and judges are cordial. From the above analysis, it is thought that there are 
different factors at play when it comes to farmer grazer conflicts. 
 In the following section, I present empirical evidences on some of the conflicts that I got from the 
field to show the trend and the different ways that they manifest. Three distinct ways that conflicts 
                                                 
15See Diduk (1992: 213) for a similar situation among the Kedjom Keku of the Grassfields of Cameroon where such 
exchanges are referred to as meulo mufo, “wine for the Fon.” 
16 For more on such stealing practices,see Manu et al (2014) ‘socio-economic effect of cattle theft on the pastoralists 
of the northwest region of Cameroon’, Scholarly Journal of Agricultural Science Volume 4(6) PP 299. 
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manifest have been identified and they include; disputes over crop damages by cattle, 
encroachments/trespass by farmers into grazing land and evictions. In discussing the different 
cases, I have also explored the part played by the Farmer/Grazer Commission which is in charge 
of handling farmer grazer conflicts. In the case cited above, the decision to evict Aghem women 
from their farm lands by the Senior Divisional Officer and the notion that their chief received 
bribes sparked up protests which the SDO was unable to handle. Consequently, it attracted the 
attention of the Regional Governor (Koumpa Isa) who paid a visit to the site. During his field 
visit, a mixed commission (Koumpa Isa Commission) was put in place, made up of Fulani and 
farmers, administrators and chiefs with their notables to look into the matter and also to 
subsequently handle specifically farmer/grazer disputes in the area. The commission is made up 
of nine members17 and meets periodically to examine reported cases; they also have the duty to 
undertake site visits on disputed areas and to appraise a situation before taking a decision. 
Consequently, since 2004, disputes involving farmers and grazers are being handled by this 
commission.  
Selected cases involving crops that were destroyed by cattle and how the disputes were settled by 
the Commission18 are presented below. The first is the case between Josephine Kum (farmer) and 
Saidu Aliyu/Daouji Gero (Grazers). The former had accused the latter for crop damages caused 
by their cattle. After field inspection and evaluation by the commission, it was noticed that cattle 
had destroyed the crops and the commission ordered the grazers to pay the sum of 131,250 Frs to 
the farmer. The commission also deliberated in another case involving crop destruction caused by 
cattle belonging to Alhadji Baba Danpollo and Abdul Karimu at the farm of Ebua Clement in 
Aghem. This case is special in the sense that it involves Alhaji Baba Danpollo considered by 
Cameroonians to be the richest Fulani in the country.19 ‘When he was invited by the commission, 
Danpollo failed to show up’. The commission however decided that he and Abdul Karimu should 
pay for the damages. It should be noted that Karimu is a hired herdsman working in the Elba 
                                                 
17 They are, the Sub-divisional Officer for Wum Central as the Chairperson, the Divisional Chief of Land tenure as 
its secretary, the Sub-divisional Delegate of Agriculture, the Divisional chief of Surveys, the Fon of the concern 
village and two of his notables and then the parties involved. 
18 In compliance with letter No 474/l/E28.01/6Vol28/342 of 20/08/2010 convening the Wum Farmer/ grazer 
commission to deliberate on farmer/grazer disputes. 
19 Danpollo has over 100 ha of land in Esu near Aghem, several cattle ranches in the country and the main tea 
producer in the country. Also see Teghemo, E (2013),pp226-7  
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Ranch belonging to Danpollo. In another matter, the cattle of Danpollo had also destroyed crops 
belonging to Akwo Cletus Chuo and through his herdsman he was also fined to pay 80.000Frs. 
The last but not the least of the cases was the one in which Alhaji Ibi Sale was also charged to pay 
the huge sum of 700.000Frs for destruction done by his cattle on the farm of Ni John Fru20 at 
Mbinjam. These are few of the so many cases that I came across and was reported to the 
farmer/grazer commission to resolve. It is likely that not all cases involving damages caused by 
cattle are reported to the commission.  
 However, evidence from the SDO’s office shows that the highest incidences of crop damages 
usually occur between March which is the peak of the farming season when food crops have been 
planted and in October when there is just little grass for grazing. Within this period in 2013, 87 
cases of varying magnitudes were recorded by the Sub-divisional office and grazers were charged 
to compensate farmers with different amounts estimated at 1.6million Frs.21 ‘The tendency has 
always been for the Fulani to negotiate with the individual farmers on the amounts to be paid as 
compensation for the crops that have been damaged and we also try as much as possible for 
reconciliation and this has paid off’ (Ndeh Theodore interviewed 8/10/2013). In any case, not all 
the amount of money mentioned above were paid as in some instances the Resolutions of the 
Commission and various administrative Orders concerning farmer/grazer conflict were not 
implemented by both the traditional leaders and administrators. As Baye (2008) has argued, the 
administration tends to complicate the possibility of negotiating lasting solutions to the farmer –
grazer problem because by so doing avenues of rent-seeking will be narrowed. There are 
situations where some Fulani have out rightly refused to ‘compensate’ farmers for such damages 
and instead violate Prefectural Orders.22 In the case of Idrissou mentioned below, Ndeh 
Theodore23 admitted that Idrissou is notorious and has many cases involving crop damages 
                                                 
20 ‘The evaluation was estimated at One million but the commission accepted that the grazer pay 700.000FRS 
although Fru Ndi insisted that all the money be paid (Guemdjom Jean -Divisional chief of lands). Apart from 
owning over 250 cattle and farms located in Mbinjam Fru Ndi is also the leader of the main opposition political 
party in Cameroon. The land that he has is estimated to be over 50ha of land in the study area. 
21 Interview with the Secretary to the DO Ndeh Theodore on 7/10/2013 Also see Farmer-grazer registrar at the 
D.O’s office Wum Central. 
22 See Prefectural Order No 036/2004 and Municipal Decision No.07/2004 and DO’s Notification,7 May 2004 
23 Theodore is the Private Secretary the D.O Wum Central interviewed 7/10/2013. 
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caused by his cattle. ‘He is always here to defend himself against charges levied by farmers and 
he is always hesitant to pay the money, others do pay actually’. 
Idrissou owes Regina so much money for similar acts of atrocities. For over a year she did not 
carry out any farming activity because Idrissou threatened to kill her.  
This farm that we are talking about belongs to Ma Regina; it is not even Idrissous’s farm. He 
had a serious case with Regina and the matter was taken to the Appeal Court in Bamenda. 
Finally Idrissou was asked to pay Ma Regina the sum of 550.000 Frs. Idrissou did not complete 
the payment. He was also charged to pay 150, 000 Frs for disturbance of peace and quiet 
enjoyment. That he did not till today. When I took the matter to the Divisional Officer, he went 
there and swore to the staff of the Divisional Officer that he will do all to eliminate me just as 
he told Ma Regina and she died. All what I want is for him  to sign here and  now that he will 
never abuse me again and will never threaten my life too. This guy also has another case with 
my husband. He is so heartless that he can still send cattle into your farm even in your 
presence. My husband has a large farm with pineapples, plantains, coffee and he does not want 
cows to trespass into that farm. Unfortunately cows always invade the farm. On my way to this 
office I saw cows in that farm. Idrissou is a very wicked man.24 
7.7 Encroachments into Farmlands/grazing Fields 
The main reason for the protests staged by the Aghem women was the encroachment of cattle into 
their farm lands. I however observed that both farmers and grazers encroach into each other’s 
sphere of influence. Several cases of encroachment by cattle into farm lands and farmers 
cultivating into reserves meant for grazing have been recorded. I highlight the case of Ardo Mama 
Umaru who refused to evacuate his cattle which had invaded the farm land of Buo Peter at 
Zonghefu and the cattle of Alhaji Ndere Shefu grazing in the farm land of Tino Jain at Naikom. 
The same situation was recorded in Waindo and Wanangwen villages.25  
On the other hand, complaints from Fulani about encroachments into grazing lands by farmers 
were also rampant. Women encroach and cultivate in grazing areas because cattle provides dung 
which enriches the soil. Even in situations where there is available land for farming, the women 
                                                 
24 Emmerencia interviewed 7/10/2013. 
25 See  ‘Report of Wum farmer-grazer commission of 12/12/2005’ 
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are still attracted by the dung to farm in grazing lands where they can have manure at little or no 
cost. Increasingly, most Fulani have lost their cattle and are now engaged in food cultivation and 
so they compete with farmers over fertile arable land (Dze-Ngwa 2013: 13). Competition over 
fertile land [...] leads to collision between the practice of extensive grazing and seasonal 
transhumance by Fulani herders and the shifting system of cultivation practiced by farmers 
(Nyamnjoh 2013a: 116).Worthy to note is the matter between Dion Shadaru who ‘constructed his 
fence very near the house of Adamu Hassan and blocking the way of passage used by cattle for 
grazing and the route to the spring site. By the stipulations of the land law, it is illegal to cultivate 
in a grazing area that has been carefully demarcated’.26 There are several reasons why the limits 
to the grazing lands are constantly being violated. Firstly, the degree of complementarity between 
farming and herding has decreased and they have become direct competitors to land and this has 
been described succinctly by de Bruijn and van Dijk (2005: 60) using the example of the Fulbe 
and Mossi as follows: 
In the past, the strategies of farmers and herders were complementary in the sense that the 
farmers made use of the arable land and the herders made use of the bush, with sufficient space 
for both. After the cereal harvest, the Fulbe herders’ livestock grazed on the harvest residues, 
were penned on Mossi agricultural land, and supplied them with manure to maintain soil 
fertility. This relationship altered when the Fulbe also took up cereal cultivation. 
This assertion is supported by the fact that the demarcation of farming and grazing lands that took 
place over 20 years ago is now highly contested because of the growing population in need of 
more farmland (Baye 2008: 153). Since pasture for grazing is decreasing, the cattle easily 
encroach into farms eventually damaging crops. Secondly, the Fulani seem to have the conception 
that gestation is better when cattle eat residues from maize and so herders invade farms in search 
of maize that would improve on the gestation of cattle,27 while farmers encroach into grazing 
lands in search of parcels of land that have been enriched by cow dung, In an effort to curb or 
                                                 
26 Also see the prefectural Order evicting Hamidu Tashi from the plot of Chi Stephen in the report of the Fungom 
Agro-Pastoral commission following letter of the Divisional Officer No 69/L/E28.04/PS/45/2012 of 19th January 
2012 and the case between the Lord Mayor of Wum Njukwe Charles at Mbinjam where the Mayor has invaded the 
grazing land of Musa Mukawo. The Mayor was ordered to evacuate the grazing land. See report of the commission 
of 11/03/2010 holden at Kesu following letter invitation No 358/L/E28.01/6vol28/324. 
27  Kuwo Beatrice, interviewed 23/11/2013, in Aghem. 
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reduce encroachment into grazing areas and /or farms, the government introduced the night 
paddock system. 
Night paddock is basically a system where cattle/animals are allowed to graze in fields in the day 
and locked up in the paddock for the night. It can take different forms. That is, it could be 
enclosed paddocks or allowing them in a farm where crops have been harvested. In the latter, 
there must be agreement between farmers and grazers in which case, farmers risk their land being 
hardened by cattle trampling on it while eating residues from harvest but gain faertility. It is 
usually a complimentary (win-win) relationship in which farmers gets fertility and grazers gain 
the feed. Unfortunately, this system has never worked because both parties have never respected 
the terms of engagements. 
 7.8 Ritual and Burial Sites as Strategy for Land Claims 
One of the strong arguments put forward by the Aghem people about their land claims is their 
ownership of burial sites and the performance of rites on what Luning (2007) refers to as ‘ritual 
territories’. Ritual sites are ancestral graves or shrines and as James (2009: 246), opines on the 
Mpumalanga contesting land claims, knowledge of the existence and where about of such graves 
has become a means to prove informal rights. More importantly, each year, the Aghem carry out 
traditional libations at the shrines. The shrines therefore have become significant sites for the 
concentration of social memory of the Aghem. The earth priest (in the case of Aghem) 
Denghezem or his first son carries out the ndukenye rituals at the shrines for good harvest, 
fertility, the birth of children, and protection of the Aghem people as Chilver and Kaberry 1967: 
95) explain below. 
In Aghem the main lodge for crop protection is ndukenye, presided over by the Batum’s son. Its 
function is to protect and promote the growth of corn by the preparation and distribution of 
medicines on farms and road junctions during the period of growth, from April to August and 
sacrificing in the lodge and on the graves of the batum’s ancestors for a good harvest […] the 
first rite in September involves a sacrifice and preparation in the central medicine-house by the 
Denkeghem and a test of good will and legitimacy of his four assistants, the four senior Batums.  
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Aghem hegemony and land claims are also reflected in the history of migration, settlement and 
conquest over the Aghem land. The Aghem insist that they do not have any collective memory 
with the Fulani and because of this; they have continued to see the Fulani as strangers and 
intruders. Going by this, the Aghem customary law considers the Fulani as illegal squatters and 
make their presence unlawful, thus effectively denying their land rights (James 2009: 239). The 
essence here is to bring out the important role that ritual and burial sites play in land claims. I link 
this up with the scenario that I observed in the field as explained below. 
A more serious case I came across was the one between Alhaji Ngouni and the Regent of Kesu 
where the regent allocated part of grazing land supposedly belonging to Ngouni to Kesu women 
without the knowledge of the Farmer-Grazer commission. When the Regent was ordered to 
select a different site for Kesu women by the administration, he resisted saying that the portion 
of the land was a ritual site and instead requested that Alhaji Ngouni should move. To him, if he 
evicts the Kesu women over that piece of land and hand it to Ngouni, calamity will befall him as 
it is the ancestral site which harbours the shrine of the Kesu deity. He insisted that ‘the ancestors 
will be angry with me and it will even be difficult to convince the women to move to another 
site’.28 Luning (2007: 95), articulates in a similar study among the Maane in Burkina Faso that 
‘these places are not considered to be empty but populated by ‘bush beings’ (the ancestors) and 
seen as the source of life on condition that they remain free of ordinary human and social 
activities’. The ancestors are therefore always there to watch over the people who must not let 
them get angry. The administration however insisted that Kesu women must be evicted from that 
area because according to the D.O-Kandem Ngounou Maurice, ‘the law of Cameroon is superior 
to tradition’. The administrator then decided that the women must leave that parcel of land that 
the commission had allotted to Alhaji Ngouni and that ‘a solid cattle proof fence be constructed 
by the farmers under the supervision and responsibility of the chief of Kesu’. The commission 
also ordered that Alhaji Ngouni should construct a strong paddock to keep his cattle save at 
night. Till today, the issue has remained unsettled and frequent disputes occur on this ritual site. 
In this narrative, there is a clash between the statutory legislation and customary tenure which 
does not only ridicule and put the village chief of Kesu in a dilemma but also make him to lose 
                                                 
28 See Minutes of dispute between Alhaji Ngouni and the Chief of Kesu at Mbinjam of 20th January 1997 following 
invitation Order from the DO No598/L/E28.01/6vol23/714 of 17/1/97. 
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trust from the Kesu women who see their leader as violating the tradition and the DO as an 
intruder. To prevent the Aghem from visiting or performing rituals on these shrines or lose 
claims over them is a serious source of grievance. Aghem women have attributed the rampant 
death of chiefs in Aghem as a result of the curse from their ancestors as they (women) even pray 
for their demise. ‘Aghem women have deserted their chiefs and have even vowed not to take part 
at their funerals.  Whatever we do the dead are seeing and we are really in agony for what our 
chiefs are doing’29  
Another area of conflict is the management of natural resources such as forest reserves. With the 
enactment of the 1994 forestry laws, exploitation of the forest and the hunting of wild animals 
have been regulated if not forbidden and the killing of wild life is punishable by law. According 
to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), wild life has been classified into 
three distinct classes.30The restrictions imposed on the exploitation of these forests without 
providing alternative sources of livelihoods have become ineffective as the adjacent communities 
to the forests have continued to depend on them for survival although they are aware of 
government regulations. With land ownership drifting away from the communities into the hands 
of the state, the customary claim on the land by traditional rulers over the forests has become 
meaningless (Postel 2013: 242). Like it is with all unoccupied lands, traditional rules governing 
forest use have been diluted by formal legal land titles, by indigenes and outsiders seeking land 
for farming, grazing and cash crop plantations.  
7.9 The First Comer/Late Comer Thesis 
The migration and settlement of the peoples of Cameroon brought together different conflicting 
cultures in search for peace and welfare (Dze-Ngwa 2013: 3).While most ethnic entities settled in 
specific locations, others found no separate geographical space, but settled amicably among the 
autochthons (ibid).This was the case with the Aghem/Bu communities who migrated and settled 
                                                 
29 Kum Beatrice interviewed 7/11/2013, in Aghem. 
30 Class ‘A’ include animals such as Elephants, tigers, leopard, lion, crocodile, chimpanzee, Baboons, Monkeys, 
Gorillas etc and hunting is strictly forbidden and punishable by law. Fines range from 2-10 years imprisonment or 
cash payment from 500.000FRS to 10million FRS Class ‘B’, includes animals such as cane rats ,rat moles that need 
permission before hunting can be done and class ‘C’ includes ruminants that are hunted without permission. 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/  Accessed 2/5/2014. 
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at their present sites at an earlier date. Generally, these ‘first comers’ are referred to as the ‘early 
settlers’ and the Fulani who came in later are often called ‘late comers or simply ‘strangers’.  The 
history of the Fulani is beyond the scope of this chapter but it has been discussed extensively in 
chapter six. Unfortunately, with the changing fortunes and diminishing wealth in cattle, 
urbanisation (Nyamnjoh 2013a: 118), increasing population, new land policies and decreasing 
pastures, and innovations in cattle herding practices; the Fulani have been compelled to adopt a 
sedentary life style.31 The Aghem /Bu land claims have always been based on grounds that they 
were the ‘first comers’ or ‘founders’and or rightful owners of the land. As far back as 1940, the 
Fulani started clamouring for citizenship rights, instead, they were granted grazing permits and 
refused the status of politically independent minority and classified as ‘strangers’ rather than 
‘natives.’32It is within the ambit of the colonial land policies and the Cameroon land law that this 
idea of perceiving the Fulani as strangers has been engrained into the minds of the Aghem and Bu 
people.  
I argue that this ‘first comer’ thesis, is used by the dominant group  to tap scarce resources from 
the state and also to  keep away competing groups from these resources and from occupying  
geopolitical space on grounds that those who came later are not the ‘rightful owners’ of the land 
(Konings 2008; James 2009 Nyamnjoh 2013a). It is important to note that the situation of farmers 
and Fulani herders in Wum is not an isolated case because; the politics of belonging has been 
instrumentalised as a system of governance in Cameroon.33 That is why in the Cameroonian 
context dominated by the politics of belonging and ethnic identity, highly migrant groups such the 
Bamilike and Fulani have come to embody the image of what Ndjio (2009: 77) refers to as 
‘eternal strangers’ who threaten the existnence of autochthonous populations in their ancestral 
lands.Yet, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in the past, both farmers and grazers 
developed complimentary strategies where one benefitted from the other and vice versa.  
                                                 
31 The practice of intensive cattle rearing and pasture improvement through the planting of fodder such as 
Bracaria,Accasia, 
32 See NAB No. Ab17 (6) ‘Application for lease of grazing grounds in the Cameroons Province’. 
33 For more on ‘cam-no-go’, see Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Nkwi 2006. 
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7.10 Why are these Conflicts Persistent? 
First, Wum has a huge population of Fulani and cattle and the population density has increased 
from 12.5pers/Km2 to 88 inhabitants /Km2. The available grazing land in Menchum is 41.533 ha 
and the grazing land per animal in a year has reduced from 3.6ha in 1990 to 2.8 in 2000 
(Ndenecho 2010: 61). Following this trend, it is estimated that there has been a further decrease in 
2014.34 Secondly, Jangali tax has become a veritable source of income for the Wum Municipal 
Council. The more cattle there are in a council area, the more revenue that accrues to the council. 
Consequently, because Jangali is a source of revenue for the municipal council, they prefer to deal 
with the Fulani than with the local population who contribute nothing into the council coffers.  
Furthermore, conflicts and rivalries, what Sone (2012a:  91) refers to as ‘class animosity’ have 
continued to exist between chiefs and the administration over allodia rights. This is because 
according to the 1974 Land Ordinances, the control of land is now vested in the DO who is the 
chairman of the Land Consultative Board. Landowners (chiefs) argue that the Administration has 
no right to allocate land and determine the purpose for which it may be used. ‘Landowners and 
villagers increasingly resist attempts by the District Administration to usurp their power to control 
and distribute land in their traditional areas’. In addition, the majority of the rural people still has 
the strong belief in their customs and out of sheer ignorance of the functioning of State law, has 
continued to rely on their local land tenure mechanisms for land management (Fisiy 1992: 148; 
Logo and Bikie 1998). As Fisiy notes further, ‘the state claim to unregistered land has not reduced 
the amount of ethnic and village disputes over ancestral lands. The practice is such that local 
landlords and chiefs still exercise a firm grip on land grants within their areas of jurisdiction and 
they behave as if no such law exist. In fact, in all cattle grazing areas, the chiefs have never 
accepted the fact that the grazers are now answerable to the Senior Prefects rather than to them. 
This switch in loyalty from the chiefs to the Senior Prefect is said to be one the causes of 
mounting farmer-grazer tensions. The chiefs and their subjects have persistently accused the 
administration of colluding with or favouring the richer grazers because they receive bribes in 
cattle from them (Fisiy 1992:  229). On the other hand, chiefs who are guardians of customary 
                                                 
34 For details, see Ndenecho 2010pp 61. Each ruminant is entitled to about 4 square metres of grazing land per day on 
the average and with demographic pressure and competition over resources, conflicts are bound to continue. 
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land are being lured and co-opted in an alliance with the governing state elites as members of the 
Land Consultative Board (Fisiy 1992: 148) where they have also been accused of protecting the 
interest of the rich Fulani. This has made the Fulani and the women to be vulnerable to corrupt 
practices that work to the advantage of the chiefs and the administration without seeking a final 
solution to the disputes. In addition, the administration and chiefs use the farmer/grazer conflict as 
a means of enriching themselves and as such constituting part of rather than a solution to the 
problem (Kah 2009: 188).This assertion is supported by Moritz (2006: 103) and Dafinger and 
Pelican (2006: 133) who note that ’traditional and regional administrative authorities purposefully 
and masterfully avoid conflict resolution as they gain more by perpetuation of the conflict than by 
its resolution’. It has been argued that chiefs have indulged in selling land because royalties that 
came in the past and enabled chiefs to run the palaces are not coming again.35 Now traditional 
rulers run the palaces with no means and the only option open to them is to sell land. The Fulani 
have also accused the women of using the damages caused by cattle as a means  to maximize their 
gains or minimize their losses by seeking compensation and punitive damages based on the 
premise that herders "can afford more" and thus should pay more (Moritz 2006: 21). The conflicts 
are further complicated and compounded by this cycle of accusations and lack of trust amongst 
the contending groups that instead struggle to make maximum gains out of the situation.  
Another reason why the conflicts have persisted is the fact that the committees set up to handle 
the persistent farmer/grazers conflicts are overwhelmingly dominated by men to the detriment of 
women. Women who constitute the bulk of the farming population are not included in the Land 
Consultative Boards and the law does not take into account women’s concerns (Logo and Bikie 
1998). It is the same scenario as it concerns the farmer/ grazer commissions where women and 
Fulani are not represented. It is however important to note that a Fulani could be called up by the 
Commission to justify, only when his cattle are involved in crop damages or trespass. Apart from 
that, they are not represented in the commission. More importantly, the members are made up of 
state bureaucrats who very often are ‘strangers’ and do not know the customs and traditions of the 
people they are dealing with.  
                                                 
35 Fon Fobuzee interviewed 8/11/2013 
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It should be noted that right from the colonial era, cattle played an important role in the local 
economy of the area and till today, it has continued to be the major source of revenue for the 
Wum Municipal Council.36 The Fulani have constantly argued that they make enormous 
contributions to the economy of the country especially in the beef diet of towns and villages in 
Cameroon which comes largely from cattle raised by Fulani people but unfortunately they have 
always been regarded as second class citizens and have never had a voice.37 By implication, it 
would be of strategic interest for the government and society to protect Fulani cattle-grazers. 
Besides, the Fulani people argue that they pay huge taxes to the various local councils including 
the exorbitant taxes known as Jangali. As Nana observes: 
The Fulani remain politically excluded from major decision making structures in Cameroon 
and are constantly reminded of the second class status (FIDH, 2013).38 ‘Locals tell us that 
we should go away from here and that this is not our land, where do we go to? This is 
where I was born; this is where my father was born. When people say we should go away, 
where do they really expect us to go to? 
Despite the enormous fiscal contributions that the Fulani bring into the area through cattle tax, 
they are still marginalised and are not considered as full members of the community. The Fulani 
also argue that they are not only marginalised economically, but politically too. ‘They claim 
under-representation or no representation at all in local councils and top government positions 
even though they contribute enormously to the economy of the region’s economic prowess.’39 
Some of this marginalisation is as a result of internal contradictions within the Fulani society 
itself (De Bruijn and van Dijk 2005) and the way they also relate with their neighbours. ‘They 
understand their neighbours but their neighbours do not understand them’.40 Influenced by the 
Pulaaku code, they claim superiority over the indigenous people and this has promoted and 
reinforced the dichotomy with the indigenous populations thus creating permanent social 
                                                 
36 Cheng Secretary Wum Council interviewed 12/10/2013, Wum Council Office 
37 Nana, S. Pioneer Secretary General, now lives in Hull, Uk 
38In the northwest region, there are only 46 Fulani Municipal Councillors out of 1035 and none is a Mayor. It is the 
same scenario in Aghem where they are not in any of the structures; the best they have had is a Deputy Mayor-
Adamou. Within the traditional Council structures, they are co-opted as members but their membership is only 
restricted to issues that involve grazers/farmer disputes. 
39 Also see Dze-Ngwa 2013,pp18 
40 Achuo Michael interviewed 7/11/2013 
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boundaries.41  ‘There is more cooperation among the Fulani and they have often manifested more 
solidarity with other Fulani (Mbororo) out of Aghem and Bu than with the indigenous peoples.42 
By distancing themselves from the indigenous people in so many ways, there is prejudice between 
farmers and the Fulani as they have been objectified in victimhood. In the same line of thought, 
Nyamnjoh (2013a: 111) has argued that contrary to the perception that the Fulani are bush people 
and uncivilised, the Fulani rather look down with silent disdain on farmers whom they even 
consider as poor. Furthermore, they are largely endogamous, marrying often within their own clan 
or close affine to prevent division of their wealth and to protect bloodlines.  Paradoxically, some 
Fulani have become more socially integrated and have become ‘insiders’ even if they are still 
seen as outsiders by the ‘others’. They are now buying and owning large tracts of land, in Wum. 
A case in point is the Fulani Ardo of Wum who now owns extensive lands and would not accept 
that the land be reduced.43  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to identify the main causes of land conflicts and the key actors that 
perpetuate such conflicts. The analyses reveal that although the disputes centre on crop damages 
by cattle or trespass, they are not automatically based on economic considerations but usually 
have multiple meanings. These conflicts also reflect local power hierarchies and the role that 
government agents play in them. In addition, the Fulani in the area have distanced themselves 
from the Aghem/Bu people in so many ways and because they are not fully integrated, there are 
often considered as the ‘others’ and conflicts are bound. Again, this chapter has shown that 
women play a leading role not only as the main food cultivators but as custodians of the culture 
and land conflicts in this area can not be fully explained without examining social and gender 
relations in the area. Furthermore, the farmer-grazer disputes in Aghem are embedded in cultural 
practices where two tenure regimes operate. Till today, neither farmers and herders, nor the 
colonial and post colonial administration have been successful in negotiating a satisfactory way of 
combining the two extensive economic systems (Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 132).  
                                                 
41 For more Pulaaku, see Dze-Ngwa 2013;and Nyamnjoh, Stenning 1959 
42 Ndeh Theodore, interviewed 8/10/2013 at DO’s Office Wum 
43 He has two title deeds and he owns land that is estimated at over 50 hectares .  
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The metaphor of the elephants and the grass simply relates to the chiefs and administration 
(elephants) on one hand and the Fulani and women (grass) on the other hand.  It describes the 
clash and contradictions in the customary law and the statutory legislations that have permanently 
prevented the Fulani and women from having land rights and have constantly brought them into 
confrontations. Implicitly, the two tenure systems considered here as the elephants and the Fulani 
and women seen as the grass that suffers. The discrepancies in both tenure regimes and the role of 
chiefs and administrators have led to chaos of some sort. 
Finally, identity politics plays an important role in these conflicts and this is a situation where 
particular groups claim territories and natural resources as their own, to the exclusion of others. 
This is generally marked by a growing desire to exclude people considered as strangers from 
economically resource rich areas as we have seen in Wum.  
 
 Chapter Eight: ‘Land is now Money’: Understanding the Role of 
Domestic Elites in land Deals 
8.1 Introduction: 
The 1974 and 1994 land tenure and the forestry legislations abolished traditional land tenure 
systems and proscribed formal land and resource use procedures, which progressively tilted to 
individual ownership under some sort of freehold (Baye 2008: 143). In Wum and in other regions  
of Cameroon, domestic elites, bureaucrats, and rich cattle grazers exploit these laws and use their 
positions and wealth to amass large tracts of land, on which they establish cattle ranches and 
plantations and some are actually involved in land hoarding. The paper argues that the 
phenomenon of land grabbing is essentially a product of imbalance power relations orchestrated 
by the political elite because of their position in the public sphere, and enforced by economic 
considerations and a weak institutional legal frame work.  
In this chapter, I seek to answer the question; why attempts to mitigate these conflicts have 
always failed. In doing so, I focus on the role of domestic elites and huge land acquisitions (Sone 
2012b: 86). In many cases, their activities have deprived the rural population of parcels of land on 
which their subsistence hinges (ibid). I also demonstrate how these domestic elites exploit the 
weaknesses of both customary tenure and statutory land law to fan conflicts than providing 
solutions. I present the biographies of two domestic elites to demonstrate how land 
commoditisation has not only contributed to these conflicts but have been used to accumulate 
wealth and have become an arena to mobilise political support through political patronage. I start 
by examining the phenomenon of land grabbing or huge land acquisitions and the reasons why 
people engage in land grabbing.  
8.2 Understanding the Phenomenon of Land Grabbing 
Within the past two decades, land grabbing has attracted the interest of scholars and researchers 
(White 2013: 38) and there is growing evidence that much academic literature is being published 
on this. However, the phenomenon of land grabbing does not only involve states or transnational 
organizations within the international sphere but local actors who are also acquiring huge tracts of 
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land.1 Unfortunately, a lot has been written about global land deals and very little attention has 
been paid to domestic land grabbing. This chapter shifts from global land deals involving 
transnational organisations and states and examines domestic land grabbing. This is crucial for 
several reasons; firstly, concentrating on large-scale transnational land deals, precludes our 
understanding of the land dynamics that are taking place at the local levels (Liversage 2010: 5). 
Secondly, domestic land grabbers constitute a market chain and are linked to the global markets 
where they serve as the main conduits through which semi-finished and finished agricultural 
produce are transmitted from the local markets to the international markets. This is usually done 
in collusion or alliance with external interests. Thirdly, domestic land grabbing and  
commoditisation of land has become the foundation for the formation of capitalist mode of 
production and wealth accumulation and loosing this land for local food production has 
disproportionate impacts on food security and livelihoods (Zoomers 2013: 59). Finally most of 
the communal/local conflicts are masterminded by these domestic elites as I have demonstrated 
below. 
8.3 The Drivers Behind Land Grab 
A lot of theoretical assumptions have been posited by scholars as to why organisations, states and 
individuals engage in land grabbing and the reasons are as varied as there are needs. I shall 
proceed by examining the different trajectories that explain why land grabbing has become an 
issue and taking a particular dimension now.  Matondi et al (2011) define land grabbing to include 
exploration, negotiations, acquisitions or leasing, settlement and exploitation of the land resource, 
specifically to attain energy and food security through export to investors’ countries and other 
markets. This definition suggests that multiple actions take place in the process of land grabbing. 
It also indicates that several actors are involved. At the international level, it involves bi-lateral 
                                                 
1 According to the International Land Coalition, 80million hectares have been acquired worldwide while Oxfam puts 
the figures at 227million hectares and over 60% of such land deals are in Sub-Saharan Africa (White 2013: 38). As 
Evers, Seagle and Krijtenburg (2013: 2) indicate, the estimates differ but point to a growing trend. Since 2006, 46 
million hectares were leased out to foreign investors and 20 million hectares officially transferred to investors 
worldwide and 20 million leased to private companies, states and businesses in Africa alone.  Following Zoomers 
(2013:  58), a report by the Global Land Project demonstrates that a minimum of around 10 million hectares in each 
of Mozambique, DR Congo and Congo and in 27 African countries (Olanya 2012: 10) where 177 deals covering 
between 51 and 63 million hectares of land have been leased out.  
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cooperation between states while at the local levels it involves local elites in connivance with 
state bureaucrats and sometimes community leaders. Several reasons have been advanced by 
different scholars for the intensification of land acquisition but these reasons are varied and 
sometimes full of contradictions (white 2013: 38).  
According to White (2013: 38) one of the main drivers for land grabbing is the idea that there is 
availability of huge tracts of ‘empty or ‘unused’, ’idle’ land in most of the developing countries. 
Frequently, national states consider underused land as being available for disposal to outside 
investors (Liversage 2010: 3). This supports the claim by the colonialists who saw  land as 
abundant, ’underutilised’ or ‘unoccupied’ and therefore considered as something to be 
appropriated and owned by individuals for capitalist accumulation (Ndege 2012: 20) and for the 
production of cash crops for the metropolitan markets. At the domestic level, the scenario is the 
same, as the Cameroon Land Ordinance is not only perverse but also considers some categories of 
land as ‘unoccupied’ or ‘state land’. This is further accentuated by the idea that ownership to land 
rights is only through a title deed and so all unregistered land is considered ‘unoccupied.2 This in 
most cases has provided the opportunity for the financially viable and politically influential elites 
to grab most of the ‘unoccupied’ land. White (2013: 38) however argues that what is being called 
idle land and leased by governments to foreign investors in reality often belongs to the 
community and is governed by customary rights. Still in line with his argument, Liversage (2010: 
3) contends that it is increasingly recognised that, while some land may be underutilised, very 
little is not owned, vacant or unused. According to Olanya (2012:  34), the perception that land is 
abundant is misleading because he sees ‘idle land’ as an important source of livelihood for the 
rural poor, which provides them with resources for subsistence farming, such as access to edible 
wild plants, grazing, water and firewood. 
Another school of thought holds that the search for land in African countries has been triggered 
by growing concerns over food, population growth and energy security in developed countries 
following the global food crisis of 2008 (Olanya 2012: 4;Evers et al 2013: 1).3 Rich countries or 
                                                 
2  See Cameroon Land Ordinances of 6th July 1974. 
3 The food security of food-insecure nations was threatened by skyrocketing food prices in 2008 resulting from 
increased import bills and inflation, harsh weather conditions, poor soils and scarce land and water in many areas, 
combined with economic and demographic growth Also see Olanya 2012,pp 9. 
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foreign investors are therefore driven by food, fuel and livestock shortages at home and so 
embark on investing in food production, what White ( 2013: 39) refers to as  ‘off shore farming’. 
This is to ensure food and fuel security at home in an era of recurrent shortages and rising 
commodity prices (ibid). In fact, ‘food-insecure’ governments that used to rely on imports to feed 
their populations, like the Gulf States, are now seeking to outsource domestic production by 
buying and/or leasing vast areas of farm land abroad for food production (Olanya 2012: 5). The 
same assumption holds at the domestic levels. In 2008, Cameroon was hit by food crisis and 
rising prices of staple foods (Awung and Atanga 2011: 95) which forced a lot of people to invest 
in agriculture; thereby acquiring most of the land from the rural communities. Increasingly, land 
also has become a veritable source of income for the rich both at national and local levels where 
people can make a lot of profit. Price rises in basic food stuffs such as rice and wheat in 2007–08 
encouraged financial speculators to invest in land to generate profit, not to feed people (Olanya 
2012: 17). 
Other Scholars see land grabbing as an opportunity to reverse longstanding underinvestment in 
agriculture that could allow land-abundant countries to gain access to better technology and more 
jobs for poor farmers and other rural citizens (Olanya 2012: 5). They consider poor developing 
countries as the recipients of these investments and that are actively trying to attract investors 
because they value land deals as an opportunity to gain funds for the development of agriculture 
or infrastructure (Friss and Reenberg (2010: 7). In fact, proponents of this school see land 
grabbing as a means to stimulate agricultural development (Zoomers 2013:  56) in developing 
countries.4Small scale farmers could significantly increase yields and incomes, both of which are 
necessary for poverty reduction. Consequently, investments in agriculture have been seen as the 
opportunity to provide employment and encourage skills development and secondary industry.  
Another argument is that the global ‘land grab’ is to a large extent the result of the liberalisation 
of land markets, a policy adopted in the early 1990s that has contributed to the commoditisation 
of land and other natural resources (Olanya 2012:  6).They argue that land is just another factor of 
production and should be placed at the disposal of those who can afford it and only through land 
                                                 
4 There are various competing interests in these deals. International institutions such as the World Bank and FAO 
support foreign investment in farmlands in Africa, along with African governments, which believe that land deals 
offer a golden opportunity to develop the African agrarian economy. See Olanya 2012pp,22 . 
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deals can there be an agricultural boom. This has also been influenced by the notion that free 
market economy  encourages free mobility of capital that in turn, opens land markets to cross-
border transactions and buyers (White 2013:  40).  As White (2013: 39) concludes, food shortages 
and rising prices notwithstanding, global scarcity provides an opportunity for capital 
accumulation and so land grabbing is an effective, safest and attractive means of investment in 
today’s turbulent global economy. This is how Liversage (2010: 6) has summarized the drivers 
for land grabbing and it goes thus: 
Rapid population growth, changing consumer patterns, climate change, a shrinking natural 
resource base, and continued extreme poverty and vulnerability in rural societies, especially 
in the developing world, require a major shift in the approach to development. There is a 
need for increased investment in agriculture in the developing world focusing on promoting 
and supporting smallholder farmers, pastoralists and artisanal fishers. The main assets that 
they have are land, labour and their creativity. Often what they need is secure land, water 
and other natural resource rights, capital investment, expertise, appropriate technology and 
access to markets. 
8.4 The State and Domestic Elites as Vectors for Land Commercialisation 
Within the past several decades, land has increasingly become a commodity of everyday trade in 
most urban and peri-urban areas in Africa and Cameroon through leases to indigenes and non-
indigenes for housing and commercial developments (Pul 2003:  62). Specifically, domestic elites 
in Cameroon and in the Grassfield have indulged in the process of acquiring huge tracts of land 
for the establishment of agro-businesses to serve local and international markets.5 This has 
brought unnecessary pressure on land and its resources and also competition over access to land 
which in most cases have resulted into conflicts. This is important because land is perceived by 
rural users as a source of security and relative stability (Boye and Kaarhus 2011: 118). That 
notwithstanding, increasingly, a lot of financially rich domestic elites are now engaged in large 
scale mono-cropping and cattle herding both requiring huge tracts of land. The conflicts in Wum 
should therefore not be seen as resulting only from competition between Fulani herders and 
                                                 
5 Examples cited include Ahadj Baba Danpullo owns the largest tea estates in Cameroon-one at Ndu in the 
northwest and the other at Tole in the Southwest region of Cameroon. Also see Fisiy 1992 on Chief Mukete who is 
the Paramount chief of the Bafaw and the Oldest Senator in Cameroon with Huge oil palm plantation in Kumba 
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farmers but also competition among domestic elites. Again, the competition over access to land 
and landed resources can also be considered as competition between two different land use or 
production systems: agriculture and cattle rearing (Moritz 2006: 7). ‘As competition for these 
resources increases, people have become more and more aware of its monetary value and the need 
to exclude potential competitors’ (Dafinger and Pelican 2006: 139). In most instances, the elites 
use their vantage power positions and commercial interests to appropriate and transform 
communal land into private property aided by an ambiguous and confused land law (Simo 2011: 
8).6 Apart from generating situations of food insecurity, this also exacerbates conflicts over 
diminishing land holdings. Protests against land seizure by the local communities have always led 
to confrontations, brutality, arrests, deaths, detentions and in some cases legal action.7  
Domestic elites operate within the state where there are administrators (bureaucrats) and a legal 
institutional framework which they sometimes manipulate to achieve certain desires. For instance, 
they have always been accused of colluding and collaborating with state bureaucrats to dispose 
communities and families from their land. The central role played by the state towards the 
acquisition of land by domestic elites is incumbent because ‘all lands has been placed in the 
public domain’ and this makes it difficult for various groups and communities to indulge in legal 
claims and counter claims over the land (Pul 2003: 58). The state has been described variously by 
scholars, and some see it as being at a distance ‘out there’, irrelevant and indifferent but only 
having the capacity to extract (Nyamnjoh 2013b: 2) or exploit resources. Other social scientists 
have simply conceptualized the state in the abstract (Fisiy 1992: 150), in which individuals and 
communities bypass national borders and undermine the role of the state to tap from these 
resources in a discrete and disjunctive manner (Ferguson 2005: 379; Nyamnjoh 2013b: 2) As 
Moritz (2006: 19) puts it, ‘bureaucrats and elites instrumentalize the apparent disorder to use the 
state and its public resources for personal enrichment and support for their clients’.  
                                                 
6 See Cameroon land law of 1974 which gives right for individual land entitlement, yet there are lots of 
complications and it is really cumbersome for one to have a land title because of the huge cost involved and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies. 
7 Mbororo appeal acquittal torture case  http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/lisa-matthews/mbororo-appeal-
acquittal-torture-case    accessed 02/01/2013       
 
141 
 
Since the state in most cases has never met up with its responsibilities and perform its duties, the 
result of this unrealistic expectations8 of the ‘state’ has given room for ambiguity, complexity and 
uncertainty in the governing of natural resources (Moritz 2006: 107). Where the state does not 
have the capacity or will to exercise its sovereignty, there has always been a break down in law 
and order (Hansen 2006: 306). Sovereignty therefore evokes the idea of maintaining public order 
at all cost and the state has the monopoly of power that is often exercised through the courts and 
the police. Within the state, local strongmen (political elite) occupy strategic positions between 
state institutions and the population and very often become very powerful especially in situations 
where proper land titling has never been undertaken and where access to entitlements is 
contingent on having a well-connected patron who can channel claims and applications. It is 
within this background that we should see farmer-herder conflicts not only as a result of crops 
destroyed by cattle and access to land but also about local power relations and the role 
governmental agents play in them (Definger and Pelican 2006: 134). Generally, elite claims to 
land right have often been enforced by state institutions (Galaty, 2013: 20).  
There are three principal ways through which the elites can have access to land. The appropriate 
means is through one’s membership into a community. Most of the domestic elite maintain close 
contacts with their communities and by virtue of their birth; they enjoy certain rights and owe 
certain obligations to these communities. Access to land is one of such rights, and this is the most 
common pattern of having access to landed property (Fisiy 1992: 166). Another method of 
acquiring land is through purchase or lease and here one does not necessarily need to be a 
member of the community and today such transactions are protected by the Cameroon Land 
Ordinances. Finally, access to land can also be through state expropriation where domestic elites 
and bureaucrats who organise themselves as elites from certain specific areas try to direct state 
development projects to their areas of origin (Fisiy 1992: 152) and very often, this gives them the 
opportunity to manipulate state power for personal advantages. In matters relating to land, it has 
become a very common practice to acquire land in the name of the state and, in turn, convert the 
same into private estates for members of the state elites (ibid). As Elhadary and Obeng-odoom 
                                                 
8 As Ferguson (2005: 380) holds, the state has the responsibility to protect, provide services, products, accounts, 
statistics to and about its citizens but very often, the state has failed to do this and this makes it possible for leakages 
and weaknesses within the state which individuals and groups exploit for their advantage. 
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(2012: 59) put it ‘the state grabs land and sells it to amass wealth and power under the guise of 
compulsorily acquiring land in the public interest and for title registration’. In some situations, 
they use force and their positions to acquire land from indigenous populations. In other areas, they 
seize the best land tracts from local farmers and assert their family claims on the lands, thereby 
further marginalising the farmers who are also family members by pushing them to the outskirts 
to look for farmland (Sone 2012a:  89).  
8.5 Elites and the ‘Sons and Daughters of the Soil’ Syndrome 
There is enough evidence to show that ethnic elites constitute important triggers of violence and 
conflicts in most of Africa and Cameroon (Pul 2003: 42).The causes of farmer/grazer conflicts in 
the northwest region of Cameroon (Pelican 2008; Sone 2012b; Baye 2008; Nyamnoh2013b) have 
been closely associated with the actions of the rich elites in their various communities on grounds 
that they are the rightful owners or ‘sons and daughters’ of the soil (Nkwi 2011; Geschiere1993; 
Nyamnjoh 2013c; Ndjio 2009). As sons and or daughters of the soil, they consider themselves as 
the rightful owners of the soil thereby categorising those whom they consider not to be part of the 
‘soil’ as the ‘others’ or ‘strangers’. Since most of the domestic elite generally have the means to 
mobilise the population to protect the land that they consider to be theirs, they can also determine 
the course of conflict (Swain et al 2011). Most of the elite therefore appeal to ethnic sentiments or 
use public offices and /or state power and resources for ethnic interests (Pul 2003: 64), to claim 
their land rights (Geschiere 2005a).  
As Swain et al (2011: 27) have documented in the Southern African Region, most conflicts be 
them riots, insurgencies or less organized forms of conflicts usually necessitates the active 
involvement of elites. In fact, most scholars argue that ‘without the presence of resourceful and 
willing politicians, businessmen, communal or military leaders, a desire amongst individuals to 
engage in violence is unlikely to transform itself into collective action’ (ibid). Apart from the fact 
that they occupy positions of leadership in the community, they also have the financial leverage 
that would enable them to mobilise the local populations to engage in conflicts. The lower 
echelons of society seldom have the resources and skills needed to finance and co-ordinate violent 
acts of a collective nature. Ethnic –led conflicts occur when ethnic symbolism goes to extremes-
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what Pul (2003: 58) refers to as the ‘ethnic myths’. That is why the Fulani grazers who migrated 
from Nigeria have persistently been considered as strangers, irrespective of whether they were 
born in the region or not (Fisiy 1992: 224). Following Ndege (2102: 51), domestic elites use land 
as a factor of political and ideological contestation, which in itself, is about power and the 
legitimacy of competing claims to authority, as about control of property per se. 
By utilizing ethnic, political, economic or military networks, they can generate the necessary 
feelings of affinity, trust and even fear to convince men and women to fight for them… Such acts 
of violence can at times be an extension of national disputes, whereby chiefs and communal 
leaders align themselves with national patrons, or, be purely localized affairs concerning the 
control of local resources (Swain et al 2011: 28).  
The  mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the political elite organise their 
activities arises from an imbalance power relations  that do not permit ordinary citizens and 
groups to articulate their interests, exercise their rights, meet their obligations, let alone to mediate 
their differences (Simo 2011: 5). 
8.6 Why Sell the Land? 
Driven by economic hardship and persistent poverty caused by the economic crisis of the 1980s 
and mid 1990s, people see land as the quickest means to get money. Secondly, land is seen as 
something they have simply inherited or acquired freely and so could easily give it out without 
any constraints. Thirdly, land has become a commodity just like any other article fit for the 
market through which money can be generated. ‘Land is now money and people sell land to pay 
school fees, medical expenses, and to carry out investments.’ Also there is the belief in some 
communities that land is in abundance and has no use. ‘There is no use keeping large tracts of 
land when you really need money to solve your problems. It is better you give out parcels of the 
land to someone who can develop it and put it into use’.9 Fon Fobuzee has attributed the 
unorthodox practices of selling land by traditional rulers to poverty and he puts it this way: 
We should be very honest that while we condemn the practice by traditional rulers to sell land 
we should also condemn the practice of the population who has abandoned traditional rulers 
                                                 
9 Chu Joseph,interviewed 30/11/2013,Naikom, Aghem 
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to their own fate. I know some traditional rulers who used to have 77 wives with more than 
400 children, in fact a village. That is not the ideal that is not what we want. The future is very 
bright particularly as they are putting young Fons and a good number of them are not idle 
sitting there waiting for Royalties, many are employed. Take a young Fon, the moment he is 
put on the throne as the tradition dictates, he soon have four,five and six wives and children 
come in as fast and he has to educate them ,feed them, then he has to give them medical care 
and all these responsibilities, and he sits there with nothing.  
Today, the new chiefs are selling the land out rightly. ‘It is only here in Kesu that I hear that land 
is being sold. There are people from Bafmen that have bought land here. Since I grew up in 
Waindo, Chief Banja never sold land. The chiefs are very lazy today and do not want to work as 
their predecessors did. They have farms but do not want to work’ (Emmerencia 7/10/2013). For 
fear that the community land will be taken away by state bureaucrats, chiefs prefer to sell or lease 
out the land in order not to lose everything to the state (Fisiy 1995: 55). 
8.7 The ‘Silent Group’ and the Fulanisation of the Farmer-grazer Conflicts 
For the past four decades, land has become a commodity and the domestic elites are seriously 
engaged in huge land acquisitions in Wum and in Cameroon. Like it is in most other areas in 
Cameroon, the commoditisation of land is one of the major factors that have exacerbated the land 
conflicts in Wum. Unfortunately, this group of people whom I would like to refer to as the ‘Silent 
group’ are usually ’forgotten’ and most discourses simply gloss over the role they play in land 
deals and only focus on  Fulani. But I emphasise that there has been the over politicization of the 
Fulaniness in the grazer/farmer relations in Aghem. This Fulanization has contributed towards a 
negative stereotype and stigmatisation of the Fulani that have further alienated them from being 
socially integrated into the indigenous communities. The statistics I got from Aghem indicate that 
there is a growing trend for the acquisition of land certificates by the economic and political elites 
in the area. Because the 1974 Land Ordinances does not limit how much land someone can 
acquire, this has made it possible for the rich to have as many land titles as there is money. I 
identified about 20 persons mostly politicians and businessmen who have more than five land 
certificates in Wum alone with over 277ha of land (see table below). Most of those who have 
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acquired land in the area do not live there and are considered absentee land lords or migrant land 
grabbers. Those of them who own cattle have entrusted the herding of their stock in the hands of 
Fulani herdsmen, while others have given out parcels of the land on lease basis or on tenancy 
arrangements to farmers. I cite a few examples to elucidate the point very well. 
A rich Fulani rancher who has appropriated huge tracts of land in Wum and other parts of the 
Northwest region is Alhadji Baba Danpollo who, apart from the huge tea estates in Ndawara 
Boyo, Ndu-Donga Mantung, Djottisa, and Tole in - Buea (Nyamnjoh 2013a: 124-5), he has also 
acquired 100ha of land in Esu and another 200ha in Bafmen.10 Danpollo’s Elba Ranch in Esu is 
about 100ha but he is claiming over 2000ha from the villagers and this has resulted into a conflict 
between him and the villagers. Several attempts have been made by the Divisional officer for 
Menchum to bring him in person to Esu for the problem to be resolved but he has never showed 
up.11 In Bafmen, one grazer by name Ndong Thomas applied for a land certificate and the Fon 
(Aneng Francis) together with his population opposed that the land is too big. In an effort to 
occupy the land ‘Ndong is quoted as putting up structures at every corner on the large piece of 
land. As a means to restrict his expansionist policy, the Divisional delegation of lands together 
with the chief decided to plant boundary pillars on the 17 hectares of land that he has already 
occupied’ (Jean Guemdjom interviewed 7/10/2013). To understand the land dynamics in Wum, it 
would be important to pay special attention to the silent group and more research should be 
conducted on this group. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Interview, 7/10/2013 with Guemdjom Jean: Divisional Chief of lands Menchum. Ndong Thomas comes second to 
Ahaj Danpollu in terms of livestock size in the entire Northwest Region. 
11 Instead he prefers to send but other people. This behaviour has angered the Chief of Esu and his subjects to the 
extent that they have vowed never to allow Danpollo expand the ranch by an inch. They have however accepted that 
he can exploit the land but cannot be issued a land certificate on grounds that they too have children and cannot allow 
a stranger to take all of their land (Guemdjom Jean Interviewed 7/10/2013).  
146 
 
Table 1: Statistics of Some people who have Acquired Land Titles on at least 10ha of land 
Name Size of Land ( in hectares) Location of land No. of Land certificates 
Cho Cyprian 50 Wum No data 
Hon Wallang Richard 52 Bu road No data 
Chia Patrick 15 Wum No data 
Ni John Fru Ndi Just applied 
Acquired land before 1998 
Binjam-Wum 
Bafmen road 
No data 
Chief Mbambi of Wum No data Wum 6 
Prince Bilingual Academy No data Weh No data 
Akwa Patrick 14 Weh No data 
Acheng Chia Thomas 28 Wum 2 
Christian Gospel Radio 
Bafmen 
14 Bafmen No data 
Tatoh Emmanuel-(Menchum 
Bilingual Academy (MBA) 
No data Bu Road No data 
Catholic Mission Bawuru No data Menchum Valley 1 
Bala Saidou 19* Wum Over six 
Malah Thomas of Bafmen 19* Wum No data 
Njukwe Charles No data Wum 6 
John Paul II Com Col 33 Wum No data 
Muslim Community Weh 400m* Weh No data 
Total 277 Ha  No data 
Source: Divisional Delegation of Land Tenure Menchum 3/10/2013 
Land with * belongs to the Fulani in Wum.  
 
8.8 Two Case Studies of Land Acquisitions 
I.  Honourable Wallang Richard Ebua 
Honourable Wallang Richard Ebua is a ‘son of the soil’ from Aghem-Menchum Division of the 
northwest region. After his elementary education in Wum, he attended post secondary school and 
after completion, he decided to go into business and also specialised as a government Contractor. 
In 2007, Honourable Wallang was elected into parliament as the youngest Parliamentarian from 
the northwest under the CPDM party for the Menchum South Constituency. In the 2013, he was 
re-elected during the Municipal and Parliamentary elections by his party as a member of 
parliament. Aside from politics, Honourable Wallang operates a 10 hectare palm plantation along 
Bu-road on land he acquired from the Regent of Kesu. As a son of the soil, Honourable Wallang 
has constructed a community hall and donated to his people as a sign of gratitude for the support 
that his people have been giving him. Honourable Wallang uses resources from the state through 
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contracts that he executes not only to support his party, but also to maintain his clientele. He does 
this by giving- gifts, assisting the needy in his community.12 
II. Ni John Fru Ndi 
Ni John Fru Ndi hails from Baba II, a tiny village in Santa Sub-Division in the northwest region 
of Cameroon. After completing the Santa Native Authority School, he travelled to Nigeria to 
study and work.13 Upon completion of his studies, he worked briefly with the Nigerian railway in 
Lagos before returning to Cameroon in 1966 when the Nigerian-Bafria War started. In Bamenda, 
he ran a bookshop known as Ebibi Book Centre. Apart from social affiliations, Ni John was not 
known beyond his confines. He rise to prominence was as a result of politics. 
In his political career, Fru Ndi was a militant of the lone political party (CPDM) that existed in 
the country before 1990. He was a candidate of the party in the Mezam Central Constituency in 
the single party list system (Khaki list) in the 1988 parliamentary elections, losing to the ‘White’ 
list headed by Achidi Achu.14 The economic liberalisation and the political democratisation 
reforms of the 1990s (Geschiere 2005b; Konings and Nyamnjo 2003; Nkwi 2011) provided an 
opportunity for him to launch a political party- the Social Democratic Front, hence (SDF) under 
very difficult circumstances.15 He became the founding Chairman of the SDF that has survived 
till today and the leading opposition party in Cameroon. He was a Presidential candidate in the 
elections of 1992, which were thought to have been rigged by the CPDM (Nkwi 2011b). Since 
then, he has continued to be the Chair of the party and has participated in all elections as the 
Presidential candidate for his party.16 In the first ever Senatorial elections organised in Cameroon 
in April 2013, he was the list leader for his party in the northwest region and was again defeated 
                                                 
12  Fon Mbambi ‘he has constructed schools for our children, donated benches, organized sporting events for our 
children during holidays. He sponsored the electricity project in Bu and above all, he has given us a community 
hall.’ 
13  John Fru Ndi  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Fru_Ndi accessed 23/7/2014 
14 In Cameroon, there was only one political party but there was inter-party competiton as militants of the same 
party participated at elections by aligning themselves in different list. In this system, there were two lits and people 
voted for a list that presented the best candidates. 
15 The launching of the SDF was considered ‘unauthorised’ by the government and so employed massive security. 
The party went ahead with the launching and six young adults were shot to death as the crowd dispersed. For details 
on this see Krieger (2008: 15) 
16 He was Presidential Candidate in 1997, 2004 and 2011 elections and the best he could get was the second position 
only coming after Paul Biya the CPDM incumbent chairman. 
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by his arch rival now Senator Achidi Achu. He alleged that the ruling party had bribed some of 
the SDF local councillors to vote against him.17 
Besides being a politician, Ni John Fru Ndi is also a farmer and owns over 200 hectares of farm 
land in the northwest region, which is believed to be the bastion of the SDF party that he has been 
leading since 1990.18 His largest farm is located at Ngoh, some 23Km from Wum town and 
another at Mbinjam about 8Km from Wum town, along the main highway to Bafmen. He has 
smaller farms in his home town of Baba II and in Bambui-Tabah Sub-division (Tegomoh 2011: 
230). Ni John is a cattle Rancher and has over 250 herds of cattle in his farms at Ngoh and 
Mbinjam. They are mixed breeds-some imported and others selected locally.19He also rear goats. 
Pasture is improved through the planting of Braccaria which enhances the nutrition intake of the 
cattle and hence, good quality and quantity of milk. Milk production is sold in the local Markets. 
He is also involved in the cultivation of plantains, sunflower, beans and maize and most of the 
finished product is transported to the regional market in Bamenda. 
Fru Ndi does not live in Wum. He lives in Bamenda which is about 79Km from his farms in 
Wum. Consequently, the estates are controlled by Sule and he only pays periodic visits to the 
farms during weekends.20 In the case of Ni John, he can be considered as an absentee land lord. 
The farms are all fenced with barbed wire and entry is only allowed through a permit. Fru Ndi’s 
rise to prominence as one of the founding fathers of the SDF, has offered him the political 
leverage to acquire huge tracts of land and also to carry out huge economic investments. He now 
owns one of the largest and lucrative business buildings along the Mankon Commercial Avenue 
in Bamenda.21 His Ntarinkon residence has been refurbished and expanded to accommodate his 
                                                 
17 Since 1990, the SDF has been controlling a majority of the municipal councils and Parliamentary seats in the 
northwest region. By the provisions of the law, Senators are elected by Municipal councilors, and since the majority 
of the councils were controlled by the SDF, it was thought that the SDF Senatorial list would win but it turned out to 
be the reverse. It is for this reason that Ni John accused his own councilors for voting the other way round.  
18 For example see the number of parliamentary seats won by the SDF in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 legislative 
elections and the municipal elections of 1996, 2002 and 2007. Detail analysis have been provided by Krugier 2008: 
18-19. 
19 Sule interviewed 15/12/2013. 
20Kum Grace Interviewed 14/12/2013 at Mbinjam Usually, he comes to inspect the farms, sometimes he works in 
the farms. It is also during weekends that he pays his workers. 
21 Since the inception of the SDF, Fru Ndi has been very vocal about France, whom he thinks are supporting Paul 
Biya. But he came under scrutiny and highly criticised for giving out the building to a French based company 
PMUC. 
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political entourage and clients. He runs in one of the most expensive Land Cruiser Toyota 
vehicles. 
The two case studies presented are prominent political elites belonging to different political 
parties but with the same economic interests. It is even thought that they use their political 
positions, connections and finances to acquire huge tracts of land (Tegomoh 2011: 230) and also 
to mobilise labourer, who in turn have become their political clients. Fru Ndi has over 150 hired 
labourers who are paid on man days.22 Most of the community land now belongs to these private 
individuals and the majority of the people have been alienated from their land. It can also be 
argued that apart from the fact that they enjoy political support from their workers, they also 
provide a source of livelihood to the local communities where these establishments are situated.  
So many families have been employed as labourers in these farms which have ensured a steady 
source of income. This is crucial for the Fulani herdsmen who have lost their cattle and can now 
work on these farms as hired-herdsmen.  
Conclusion 
For the past several decades, there has been the proliferation and rush for the acquisition of huge 
tracts of land in the northwest region of Cameroon by individuals. In Wum, there are a growing 
number of domestic elites who buy land or seize land using their political connections and 
financial powers. Most of them have established cattle ranches and have also developed huge 
plantations where monocropping take place and the produce are destined for local and 
international markets.This has not only led to the dispossession of people, but has also created 
new forms of power relations within communities. Although it may be argued that they provide 
employment in these communities, what they gain from the exploitation of the land far supercedes 
the wages that labourers receive from them. From field observations and the present trend of land 
commoditisation, farmer-grazer conflicts may instead be on the increase as more and more land is 
taken over by the rich.  
                                                 
22  Each ridge is constructed for the sum of 1000frs a day ( interview with Kum Grace 14/12/2013) 

 Chapter Nine: Concluding Reflections 
The main research question was to know why the conflicts between women cultivators and Fulani 
cattle herders in Wum Central Subdivision have been persistent. The study focused on two 
villages-Aghem and Bu. The objective was therefore to investigate into the causes of these 
conflicts and also to know who are the key actors /players. Furthermore, the research aimed at 
examining why different measures and strategies adopted to curb these conflicts have always 
failed. In order to address the research question and research objectives, several theoretical 
approaches on conflicts were reviewed. Following the review, the most suitable of the causes for 
this study were those of the politics of belonging, inherited colonial laws coupled with weak 
institutional frame work and resource scarcity. There is a strong positive relationship between the 
theoretical approaches that I have reviewed and research findings. For instance the politics of 
belonging takes into consideration competition over resources by the various groups and 
competing identities. Therefore a holistic approach needs to be employed in order to better 
explain the presence of conflicts in the area. 
The major outcome of this research reveals that though the conflicts in Aghem and Bu are usually 
presented as crop damages caused by cattle belonging to the Fulani, the conflicts are more 
complicated and multilayered than they are portrayed. Embedded in these conflicts are cultural 
practices that have been internalised and where respect for tradition is still optimal. From the 
research findings, there are several key actors that contribute in different ways towards these 
conflicts. They include, women, Fulani, local chiefs, state bureaucrats and rich domestic elites. It 
is the involvement of these actors that constitute the power hierarchies in the area and who use 
their financial, economic and political positions to perpetuate the conflicts and also to accumulate 
wealth and prestige. 
Another domain is that of gender relations which are highly reflected in the system of matrilineal 
succession.In such a system where women play the leading role as food producers and which 
guarantees their access to land, any action or attempt that affects land automatically touches on 
their source of livelihood. As it is in Cameroon, statistics reveal that women continue to 
experience unequal access to land as compared with men despite the fact that women form 52% 
of the total population of the country. Since the land is owned by men and women only have 
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usufructs rights, they are easily dispossessed from the land if men want to do so. In Aghem and 
Bu, matrilineal succession is increasingly being challenged within the present context of land 
formalisation since the law lence credence to patriarchy. Some successors actually dispose of the 
land that they have inherited and this has generated a lot of conflicts between nephews who 
succeed their uncles and the children of the deceased which is contrary to the roles of matrilineal 
system of succession.  
Secondly, the recurrent conflicts involving farmers and herders over land ownership have their 
roots in scarcity of key resources. With rapid population increase and resource scarcity, two 
modes of production (farming and livestock) are competing for land and resources. It is this 
competition and scarcity and /or diminishing resources that have led to the intensification of these 
conflicts and the emergence of identity politics. When the Fulani arrived in the early 1920s, land 
was in abundance and their relationship with farmers was cordial and there was complimentarity 
in terms of social exchanges as each benefitted from one another.Their presence did not raise 
ethnic concerns but as they started competing over resources, ethnic sentiments were evoked 
particularly by the women who felt that their access to land was being threatened. The Fulani that 
were initially accepted later on became ‘strangers’, ‘late comers’ and /or ‘outsiders’. Just like 
migration, ethnicity is not a given and it is not geographically determined. The stigmatisation of 
the Fulani as strangers therefore raises a lot of questions since they are not the only group that 
came later. Implicitly, it should be born in mind that ethnic relations and identity politics between 
farmers and Fulani seem to be hostile only when it concerns land and resources and are constantly 
being (re) negotiated, redefined and contested depending on the interest at stake. As Vubo and 
Neba (2001: 163) conclude, ‘identity fluctuates as people assert both similarity and difference 
from each other with differing political processes’. 
Since the colonial era, several factors or agents have brought about changes in the land use 
patterns.  The introduction of land laws since the colonial period encouraged private real property 
rights which were contrary to the principle of communal land ownership.Within the 
neopatrimonial state of Cameroon, all hitherto existing colonial land laws and edicts were 
harmonised and all land became the property of the state. With regards to the law, in some cases, 
the laws continue to be disregarded in favour of wealthy cattle grazers against farmers’ right to 
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own land. First, the ambiguous and wavering state policies on land ownership and chieftaincy 
rights are conflicting and overlapping. Since the 1974 Land Ordinances does not take into account 
the land rights of vulnerable groups such as women and Fulani pastoralists, both farmers and 
Fulani instigate and use it to contest and put forward their claims to land even if such claims are 
imagined or constructed ethnic identities. 
In the present situation, chiefs have lost control over land and consequently the exclusion of 
customary tenure in the Cameroon land law has constituted a contentious issue as chiefs continue 
to claim ownership of the land. It is this transfer of rights over the control of land that has 
generated conflicts between chiefs and state bureaucrats for long. As a result, two tenure regimes 
operate in Cameroon-the one statutary and the other customary tenure system. The existence of 
these two regimes have paved the leeway for chiefs who have continued to insist that they are the 
rightful owners of the land to exploit the weaknesses of the state statutory land laws for their 
personal interests. Unfortunately, even though chiefs know that under the current law they do not 
own the land, they have increasingly asserted ownership of all lands within their purview. 
Because of the financial gains that they make from land, chiefs have ceased to be the custodians 
of the land and have instead become competitors with their own subjects.  
Another major outcome of this research is the idea that land has become a commodity and given 
the weaknesses of the statutary provisions, state bureaucrats collude with rich domestic elites to 
expropriate or appropriate communal land at the detriment of women who depend on land for 
their sustenance and subsistence. Titling only favours a tiny segment of the population and rather 
inevitably disinherits a substantial portion of the population who are usually women, migrants and 
youths and has tended to increase instead of decreasing over all insecurity of tenure. This has 
made the Fulani and the women to be vulnerable to corrupt practices that work to the advantage 
of the chiefs and the administration without seeking a final solution to the disputes.  
The mediatisation of Fulani marginalisation has led to the emergence of opposing camps which 
have only reinforced these conflicts and have  not been able to solve the so many challenges that 
herders are facing in the area. I therefore conclude that MBOSCUDA just as SEDELCO is, are 
merely different strategies through which Fulani’s search for geopolitical space is articulated, 
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navigated and negotiated, redefined and the legitimate means through which they seek 
representation and recognition.  
By way of recommendation, here is an urgent need for a new land reform in Cameroon. The aim 
of land reform therefore should be to improve social justice, and equity, and to raise the standard 
of living of the poor. Presently, while a majority of the people is disposed of their land, there is an 
emerging capitalistic tendency which gives room for the rich to accumulate wealth through land 
titling.  Since 2012, Cameroon’s Ministry of Lands and State Property is leading a land policy 
reform process which is expected to improve on the land governance framework of the country 
and render it more adapted to the present global and national contexts. If nothing is done, many of 
the gaps in the current land legislation could be carried into the new legislation. If this happens, 
the land rights of vulnerable groups (smallholder farmers, women and indigenous people) will 
still be at stake. To do this, all stakeholders in the land sector should be involved in the review 
process at all levels.1 Such an inclusive approach will take into consideration, cultural tenure 
system, women rights and Fulani access to land.  
 
                                                 
1 For example, women, youth, Fulani, other vulnerable groups should be implicated in the land reform process. They 
must not be looked upon only as end users but as those who have contributed in the process. In that way it will be 
very inclusive and take into account the interests of all the stakeholders. 
 Bibliography 
Adebayo, A.G (1991), ’Of man and cattle: a reconsideration of the traditions of origin of 
 pastoral Fulani of Nigeria’, History in Africa Volume 18 pp1 
Albert, I.O, (2005),’Explaining ’Godfatherism’ in Nigerian politics, African Sociological 
 Review Volume 9 Number 2 pp79&81 
Aliber, M.  and Hart, T.G.B (2009), ‘Should subsistence agriculture be supported as a 
 strategy to address rural food insecurity?’ Agrekom Volume 48, Number 4 pp 436 
Amanor, S.(2007),’Conflicts and the reinterpretation of customary tenure in Ghana’ in 
 Derman, B, Odgaard, R and Sjaastad , E [Eds]conflict over land and water in Africa, 
 James Curry, Oxford  
Andersson, J.A, (1999), ’The politics of land scarcity: land disputes in Save Communal 
 Area,  Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 25, number 4 
 pp553-557 
Anjah, G.M and Oyun, M.B (2009) ‘Autoecological study of Ricinodendron heudelotii (Bail) 
 Pierre  et Pax in Agulli forest’, International Journal of Biochemistry Sciences 
 Volume 3 Number 5 pp1059 
Angwafo, P.T. (2014),Cameroon’s  predicaments, Langaa, Mankon 
Atanga, L.L (2010), Gender, discourse and power in the Cameroonian Parliament, Langaa, 
 Mankon 
Atangana, M.R. (1997),’French capitalism and nationalism in Cameroon, African Studies 
 Review Volume 40 Number 1pp 87 
Awung, W and Atanga, M (2011), Economic crisis and multiparty politics in Cameroon, 
 CJDHR, Volume 5 Number 1 pp 95 
Ayee, R.A. Frempong, K,D. Asante, R and Boafo-Arthur.(2011),local power struggles, 
 conflicts and conflict resolution in Ghana, CODESRIA, Dakar pp,xii,6,9 and 28 
Balogun, M. J. (2007),’enduring clientelism, governance reform and leadership capacity:  a 
 review of the democratization process in Nigeria’, Journal of Contemporary African 
 Studies Volume 15 Number 2 pp243&248 
Bavick, M.Pellegrini, and Master (2014), Conflicts over natural resources in the glopbal 
 South- conceptual approaches, CRC Press, London New York & Leiden.  
Bayart, J.F (2009), The state in Africa: the politics of the belly, Polity, Cambridge pp 228 
Baye, F.M (2008), Changing land tenure arrangements and access to primary assets 
 under  globalization: a case study of two villages in Anglophone Cameroon 
 Blackwell Publishing Oxford pp 142 
Beekers, D. and van Gool (2012), From patronage to neo patrimonialism, postcolonial 
 governance in Sub Saharan Africa and beyond, ASC-Leiden pp 6&7 
156 
 
Bellagamba (2004),’Entrustment and its changing political meanings in Fuladu, the 
 Gambia (1880-1994)’, Journal of the International African Institute Volume 74 
 Number 3 pp384-391 
Bejeng, P.S. (1984), (1984) ‘The signification and Role of Royal Symbols on Grassfields 
 Politics’, Senri Ethnological Studies Volume 15 PP267-27 
Bernard, R.(2006),Research methods in anthropology:qualitative and quantitative 
 approaches, ALTAMIRA Press Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford 
Boas, M and Dunn, K.(2013), Politics of origin in Africa: autochthony, citizenship and 
 conflict, Zed Books, London and New York pp,57 
Boesen, E. (2008),’Gleaming like the sun: Aesthetic values in Wodaabe material culture,The 
 Journal of the International African Institute Volume 78 Number 4 
Boni, S. (2006), ‘Indigenous blood and foreign labor: the ‘ancestralization’ of land rights in 
 Sefwi Ghana’ in Kuba and Lenz [Eds] land and the politics of belonging in West 
 Africa, Brill, Leiden-Boston  
Boye, S.R and Kaarhus (2011),’Competing claims and contested boundaries: legitimating 
 land rights in Isiolo District, Northern Kenya’, African Spectrum 2pp 100 &102 
Breusers, M.Nederlof, S and van Rheenen, T (1998), ‘Conflict of symbiosis? Disentangling 
 farmer-herder relations: the Mossi and Fulbe of the Central Plateau, Burkina Faso’, 
 The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 36 Number 3 
Buchalik, L (2013), ’Shifting patterns of land use and ownership in Burkina Faso in Sandra, 
 Evers, Seagle and Krijtenburg [Eds] Africa for sale? Positioning the state, land, and 
 society in foreign large scale land acquisitions in Africa, Brill Leiden-London 
Camara, B. (2013), ’The dynamics of land tenure systems in the Niger Basin, Mali’, Africa 
 Volume 83 Number 1 pp 78-99 
Chem-Langee, B. (1995), Slavery and slave trade marketing in Nso’ in the nineteenth 
 century, Paideuma, 41 pp180  
Chilver E.M (1988), ‘The political economy of Cameroon: historical perspectives in women 
 cultivators’ cows and cash crops’ Phillis Kaberry’s women of the Grassfields 
 revisited, African Studies Center, Leiden 
Chilver, E.M and Kaberry, P.M (1967), Traditional Bamenda: the pre-colonial history and 
 ethnography of the Bamenda grassfields, Ministry of Primary Education and Social 
 Welfare and west Cameroon Antiquities Commission 
Chilver .E.M and Kaberry P.M, (1970), Chronology of the Bamenda Grassfields, The Journal 
 of African History Volume 11 Number 2pp 255&256 
Clarence-Smith, W.G (1988), ‘From plantation to peasant cocoa production in German 
 Cameroun’ in the political economy of Cameroon: historical perspectives African 
 Studies Centre Leiden 
157 
 
Dafinger, A and Pelican, M (2006) ‘Sharing or dividing the land? Land rights and farmer-
 herder  relations in Burkina Faso and North West Cameroon’ CJAS/RCEA Volume 40 
 Number 1 pp133-139 
Daley and Englert (2008), [Eds] Women’s land rights and privatization in Eastern Africa, 
 Fountain Publishers, Woodbridge pp.93-94 
Davidheiser, M and Luna, A.M (2008),’From complementarity to conflict: a historical 
 analysis of farmer-Fulbe relations in West Africa’, African Journal on Conflict 
 Resolution, Volume 8, Number 1 pp 78-98 &132-134 
Davidson, J (1988), eds, ‘Land and women’s agricultural production: the context’ in 
 agriculture, women and land: the African experience, Westview Press, Boulder & 
 London 
Davis, L. (1995)’Opening political space in Cameroon: the ambiguous response of the 
 Mbororo,’ Review of African Political Economy, Number 64 pp213-228 
De Bruijn, M (1995), Arid ways: cultural understandings of insecurity in Fulbe society 
 central Mali. Thela 
De Bruijn and van Dijk, (2005), ‘Natural resources, scarcity, and conflict: a perspective from 
 below’ in Chabal .P, Engel .U and Gentili A-M [eds] is violence inevitable in Africa?: 
 theories and approaches to conflict prevention, Brill, Leiden-Boston 
DeBruijn M.Nyamnjoh.F.B and Angwafo, P. T (2010) Mobile interconnections: 
 reinterpreting  distance, relating and difference in the Cameroonian Grassfields , 
 Journal of African Media Studies Volume 2 Number 3 
DeLancey, M.W (1988), ‘The expansion of coffee production in Bamenda and Bananas in the 
 Southwest’ in Geschiere P. and Konings, P The political economy of Cameroon: 
 historical perspectives, African Studies Centre, Leiden 
Diduk, S. (1989), ‘Women’s agricultural production and political action in the Cameroon 
 Grassfields’, Journal of the International African Institute Volume 59, Number 3 
 pp243&338 
______ (1992), ‘The paradoxes of changing land tenure in Kedjom chiefdoms in Cameroon’, 
 Volume 32 Paideuma pp 202 &210 
Duncan, B.A. (2010), Cocoa, marriage, labour and land in Ghana: some matrilineal and 
 patrilineal perspectives, The Journal of the International African Institute Volume 80 
 Number 2 pp 302 
Dze-Ngwa, W(2013), ‘Boundary dynamics and the search for geopolitical space: the case of 
 the Mbororo in the Northwest Region of Cameroon’, in Abwa, D. Temgoua, A-
 P,Fomin,E.S.D and Dze-Ngwa [eds] Boundaries and history in Africa: issues in 
 conventional boundaries and ideological frontiers, Langaa CIG Mankon-Bamenda 
Eckert, A. (1996), ‘Missions, land politics and real estate in colonial Douala’ in Debusmann 
 and Arnold, S [eds] land law and land ownership in Africa, Bayreuth African Studies 
 41 
158 
 
Egbo, O.et al (2010), Legitimizing corruption in government: security votes in Nigeria,  ASC 
 Working paper 91, Leiden 
Ejobowah (2000),’Who owns the oil?: the politics of ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
 Africa  Today, Volume 47 Number 1 
Ekpo, M.U (1979), ‘Gift giving and bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria’ in Ekpo M.U, [eds] 
 bureaucratic corruption in Sub Saharan Africa: Towards a search for causes and 
 consequences, University Press of America pp174 
Elhadary, Y.A and Obeng-odoom (2012) ‘Conventions, changes, and contradictions in land 
 governance in Africa: the story of land grabbing in North Sudan and Ghana’, Africa 
 Today Volume 59, Number 2 pp 60 
Evans, M.(2010) ‘Primary patriotism,shifting identity:home associations in Manyu 
 Division,South-west Cameroon’,The Journal of the International African Institute, 
 Volume 80 Number 3pp 
Evers, S. J. T. M, Seagle, C and Krijtenburg (2013) ‘Introduction: contested landscapes-
 analysing the role of the state, land reforms and privatization in foreign land deals in 
 Africa’ [eds]   Africa for sale? : positioning the state, land and society in foreign 
 large- scale land acquisitions in Africa, Brill, Leiden-Boston  
Falola, T and Paddock, A (2011),’The women’s war of 1929: a history of anti-colonial 
 resistence in Eastern Nigeria, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 
Feldman-Savelsberg, P and Ndonko, T. (2010), ‘Urbanites and urban villagers: comparing 
 ‘home’among elite and non elite Bamileke women’s hometown associations’,The 
 Journal of the International African Institute Volume 80 Number 3pp 
FIDH (2013), ‘Cameroon: Acts of harassment faced by members of the MBOSCUDA’, 
 Worldwide human rights movement 
Firmin-Sellers, K and Sellers, P. (1999),’Expected failures and unexpected successes of land 
 titling  in Africa’ World Development Volume 27 Number 7 pp1116-1118 
Fisiy, F.C. (1992), Power and privilege in the administration of law: land law reforms and 
 social  differentiation in Cameroon, African Studies Centre, Leiden  
______(1995), ‘Chieftaincy in the Modern state: an institution at the crossroads of 
 democratic change: perspectives on the state from political history to ethnography 
 in Cameroon’ Paideuma 41 pp 52-56 
_______(1996), ‘Techniques of land acquisition: the concept of ‘crown lands’ in colonial 
 and post-colonial Cameroon’ in Debusmann and Arnold, S [eds] land law and land 
 ownership in Africa, Bayreuth African Studies 41  
Fon, D.E (2011), ‘Access to arable land by rural women in Cameroon’, Tropicultura, Volume 
 29, No 2 pp 66-68 
 
159 
 
Fonchingong, C.C and Tanga, P.T (2007), ‘Crossing rural urban spaces: the Takumbeng and 
 activism in Cameroon’s Democratic crusade’, Cahiere d’etudes Africaines 185  
Fonjong , L.N. (2004), ‘Changing fortunes of government policies and its implications on the 
 application of agricultural innovations in Cameroon’, Nordic Journal of African 
 Studies Volume 13 number 1pp 17-24  
______ (2012), [Eds] Issues in women’s land rights in Cameroon, Langaa, Mankon, pp 24-29 
Frerks, G. (2007),’Promoting human security to securitise or to de-securitise’ Presented at the 
 57th Pugwash Annual Conference, 21-26 October, Bari Italy 
Frerks,G.Dietz ,T and Vander Zaag,P(2014),’Conflict and cooperation on natural resurces; 
 justifying the CoCooN Programme’ in [eds] Bavick,M.Pellegrini, and Master (2014), 
 conflicts over natural resources in the glopbal South-conceptual approaches,CRC 
 Press, London New York & Leiden. 
Funk, U (1988),’Land tenure, agriculture, and gender in Guinea-Bissau’ in Davidson, J [Eds] 
 agriculture, women, and land: the African Experience, Westview Press Boulder & 
 London 
Gabriel, J.M. (2007), Cameroon’s neopatrimonial dilemma, Journal of Contemporary African 
 Studies Volume 17 Number 2  
Galaty, J.G. (2013), ‘The collapsing platform for pastoralism: land sales and land loss in 
 Kajiado’, Nomadic Peoples, Volume 17 Issue 2pp20-21  
Gbetnkom (2008), ‘Forest depletion and food security of poor populations in Africa: 
 evidence from Cameroon’, Journal of African economies Volume 18 Number 2 PP 
 262-280 
Geschiere, P (1988), ‘Accumulation and non-accumulation in agriculture, regional 
 comparisons  in’ Geschiere, P and Konings, P [eds] in the political economy of 
 Cameroon: historical perspectives, African Studies Center, Leiden 
______ (1993) ‘Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing Chieftaincy, French and 
 British Style, Journal of the International African Institute, Volume. 63, Number  2, 
 pp 151-175 
______ (2004) ‘ecology, belonging and xenophobia: the 1994 forest law in Cameroon and 
 the issue of ‘community’ in Harri Englund and Francis Nyamnjoh  [Eds] Rights and 
 the politics of recognition in Africa. London: Zed Books pp 237-59 
______ (2005a), ‘Autochthony and citizenship: new modes in the struggle over belonging 
 and exclusion in Africa’, Quest, African Journal of Philosophy xviii,9-24pp 10-20 
______ (2005b), ‘Funerals and belonging: different patterns in South Cameroon’  African 
 Studies Review Volume 48 Number 2pp 35-50 
-Geschiere, Peter and Stephen Jackson (2006) ‘autochthony and the crisis of citizenship, 
 democratization, decentralization, and the politics of belonging’: African Studies 
 Review, vol.49 no2.pp1-7 
160 
 
Goheen, M. (1988a),’Land accumulation and local control: the manipulation of symbols and 
 power  in Nso, Cameroon’ in the political economy of Cameroon: historical 
 perspectives,  Leiden 
______ (1988b),’Land and the household economy: women farmers of the Grassfields 
 today’  in Davison, J [Eds] agriculture, women, and land: the African experience 
 Westview Press, Boulder &London 
______ (1995), ‘Gender and accumulation in Nso’ Paideuma 41  
______ (1996), Men own the fields, women own the crops: gender and power in the 
 Cameroon Grassfields, the University of Wisconsin Press 
Habib, A.G and Jumare, J (2008), ‘Migration, pastoralists, HIV infection and access to care: 
 the nomadic Fulbe of Northern Nigeria’, African Journal of AIDS Research Volume 7 
 Number 2pp180 
Hobbs, M (1996), ‘Cameroon country profile’ in Bruce [Eds] country profiles of land tenure: 
 Africa, Land Tenure Center, and University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Hussein, K. Sumberg, J and Seddon, D (1999),’ Increasing violence, conflict between herders 
 and farmers in Africa: claims and evidence, Development Policy Review Volume 17 
 PP 398&400 
Ingram, V.J. (2014), Win-wins in forest product value chains?: how governance impacts the 
 sustainability of livelihoods based on non-timber forest products from Cameroon, 
 African Studies Centre, Leiden 
James, D. (2009),’Burial sites, informal rights and lost kingdoms: contesting land claims  in 
 Mpumalanga, South Africa, The Journal of the International African Institute, 
 Volume 79 No 2 pp239-246 
Jankowicz, A.D (1995) Business research projects, International Thomson Business Press, 
 London 
Joseph, R,A (1974),’Settlers, strikers and san-travail: the Douala riots of September 1945’, 
 The Journal of African History Volume 15, Number 4 pp.671 
______, R. A. (1983), ‘Class, state, and prebendal politics in Nigeria’, The Journal of 
 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Volume XXI pp 27-29 
Jua, N. and Konings, P (2004), ‘Occupation of public space: Anglophone nationalism in 
 Cameroon, Cahieres d’etudes Africaines 175 PP 4 
Kaberry, P.M (1952) Women of the Grassfields: a study of the economic position of women in 
 Bamenda, British Cameroons, Colonial Office, London  
_____ (2004), Women of the Grassfields: a study of the economic position of women in 
 Bamenda, British Cameroons, Routledge, London& New York 
Kabiri, N. (2001), ‘The social context of environmental education: the case of the Amboseli 
 ecosystem, Kajiado, Kenya’ in Jeffrey, R and Vira, B [eds] conflict and cooperation 
161 
 
 in participatory natural resource management, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
 Hamshire 
Kah.H. (2009), ‘Governance and land conflict: the case of Aghem-Wum 1966-2005’ in 
 Fonchingong.T.S &Gemandze .J.B [eds] Cameroon: the stakes and challenges of 
 governance and development, Langaa, CIG Mankon-Bamenda 
Kah, H, K. (2013) Gender and livestock farming in Laimbweland, Cameroon, 1980s-2011, 
 Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa Volume 15 number 1 pp 57-59 
 Kea, P (2010), Land, labour and entrustment: West African farmers and the politics of 
 difference, Brill, Leiden-Boston 
Kofele-Kale (1980), ‘Reconciling the dual heritage: reflections on the “Kamerun idea” [eds] 
 An African experiment in nation building: the bilingual Cameroon Republic since 
 reunification, Westview Press/Boulder, Colorado 
Konings, P. (1996),’Chieftaincy and labor control, Journal of Legal Pluralism Number 37-38 
 pp335 
______ (2001) ‘Mobility and exclusion: conflicts between autochthons and allochthons 
 during political liberalization in Cameroon’ in De Bruijn, M.van  Dijk and Foeken, 
 D [Eds] mobile Africa: the changing patterns of movement in Africa and Beyond, 
 Brill, Leiden 
______ (2008),’Autochthony and ethnic cleansing in the post-colony: the 1966 Tombel 
 disturbances in Cameroon’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
 Volume 41, Number 2  
______ (2012), Gender and plantation labour in Africa: the story of tea pluckers’ struggles 
 in Cameroon, Langaa and African Studies Centre, Mankon-Leiden  
Konings, P and Nyamnjoh, F.B. (2003), Negotiating an Anglophone identity: a study of the 
 politics of recognition and representation in Cameroon, Brill, leiden-Boston 
Kopytoff, I. (1981), ‘Aghem ethnogenesis and the Grassfields ecumene’ in the contribution 
 of ethnological research to the history of Cameroon cultures, CNRS, Editions du 
 CNRS, Paris  
Krieger, M. (2008), Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front: its history &prospects as an 
 opposition political party (1990-2011), Langaa Mankon-Bamenda 
Kuba, R and Lenz,C,(2006),[Eds) Land and the politics of belonging in Africa, Brill, Leiden-
 Boston 
Larsen, K,(2007),’Adaptability, identity and conflict mediation among the Hawawir in 
 Northern Sudan’ in Derman, Odgaard and Sjaastad [Eds] conflict over land and water 
 in Africa, James Curry, Oxford 
Lentz, C. (2006),’First-comers and late-comers: indigenous theories of landownership in 
 West  Africa’ in Kuba, R and Lentz, C [Eds] land and the politics of belonging  in 
 West Africa, Brill, Leiden-Boston 
162 
 
Liversage, H (2010), ‘Responding to “land grabbing” and promoting responsible investment 
 in agriculture’, IFAD Occasional paper 2 
Loftsdottir, K (2007), Bounded and multiple identities: ethnic identifications of WoDaaBe 
 and Fulbe, Cahier d’etudes Africains 185 
Logo, P.B and Bikie, E.H (1998) Women and land in Cameroon: questioning women’s land 
 status and claims for change, The Womenb and Land Studies 
Lund, C (2008), Local politics and the dynamics of property in Africa, Cambridge University 
 Press, Cambridge 
Lund, C and Boone, C. (2013)’Introduction: land politics in Africa-constituting authority 
 over territory, property and persons’, The Journal of the International African 
 Institute, Volume, 83 No1pp5  
Luning, S.  (2007), ’Ritual territories as local heritage? Discourse on disruptions in society 
 and nature in Maane, Burkina Faso’, The Journal of the International African 
 Institute, Volume 77 Number 1pp 95 
Manson (2013),’Mining and traditional communities in South Africa’s “Platinum Belt”: 
 contestations over land, leadership and assets in North-west Province C 1996-2012’, 
 Journal of Southern African Studies Number 39 Volume 2 
Manu, I.N, Andu, W.N, Tarla, D.N and Aghari,W. N(2014), ‘Socio-economic effect of cattle 
 theft on the pastoralists of the Northwest Region of Cameroon’,Scholarly Journal of 
 Agricultural Science Volume 4 Number 6pp299 
Masquelier, B.M. (1985),’Women’s constitutional role in politics: the Ide of West Cameroon’ 
 in Barbier [eds] Femmes du Cameroun: meres pacifiques, femmes rebelles, Orstom 
 Kathala Bondy- Paris  
Matondi, P. B, Havnevik, K and Beyene, A (2011),[Eds] Introduction: biofuels, food security 
 and land grabbing in Africa, Zed Books, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, London and New 
 York 
Mbah, E.M. (2008), Land/boundary conflict in Africa: the case of former British coloinial 
 Bamenda, Present-day Northwest Province of the Republic of Cameroon, 1916-1996, 
 The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston.Queenton. Lampeter 
Mbah, E.M.(2009) ‘Disruptive colonial boundaries and attempts to resolve land/boundary 
 disputes in the Grassfields of Bamenda, Cameroon, African Journal on Conflict 
 Resolution Volume 9 Number 3pp64 
Mbapndah,N.M,(1994), ‘French colonial agricultural policy,African chiefs and coffe growing 
 in the Cameroun Grassfields,1920-1960’,The  International Journal of African 
 Historical Studies Volume 27 Number 1pp 47& 48 
Mc Auslan (2010), ‘Personal reflections on drafting laws to improve women’s access to land: 
 is there a magic wand?’ Journal of Eastern African Studies Volume 4 number 1 pp 
 117 
163 
 
MDG (Millennium Development Goals) indicators 2012 UNDP  
http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo/DIWizard/DIWIndicator.aspx accessed 12/04/2014 
Médard, C & Golaz, V (2013), ‘Creating dependency: land and gift-giving practices in 
 Uganda’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:3, 551-552 
Merry, S.E (1991) ‘Law and colonialism’ (book review), law and society review 25, 4 pp 
 890-899 
Moritz, M (2006) ‘The politics of permanent conflict: farmers-herder conflicts in northern 
 Cameroon’, CJAS/RCEA Volume 40 Number 1 pp 113  
Mwangi, Oscar. (2008), ‘Political corruption, party financing and democracy in Kenya’ the 
 Journal of Modern African Studies 46 pp 269 & 272 
Nana, S .S (n.d),’Why we refuse to align ourselves to reactionary forces against our 
 Community’ (unpublished) 
Ndege, P. B. O (2012), From accumulation of women and children to ‘land grabbing: 
 agrarian kleptocracy and the land question in Kenya, Moi University Press 
Ndenecho, E.N.(2010), ‘Indigenous trees and shrubs in Silvopastoral systems of the Bamenda 
 Highlands of Cameroon’, Global Journal of Human Sciences Volume 10 Number 3 
 pp 61 
_____ (2011) Local livelihoods and protected areas management: biodiversity 
 conservation  problems in Cameroon, Langaa Research and Publishing, Mankon  
Ndjio, B. (2009), ‘Migration, Architecture, and the transformation of the landscape in the 
 Bamileke Grassfields of West Cameroon’, African Diaspora 2pp 77-79 
Ngoh, V. J. (2004), ‘Introduction’ [Eds] in Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary State 
 1961- 1972: A Critical Study, Design House, and Limbe 
 Niamir-Fuller, M (2001), ‘Conflict management and mobility among pastoralists in 
 Karamoja, Uganda’ in Jeffery and Vira, eds, conflict and cooperation in participatory 
 natural resource management Palgrave, Houndhills, Basingstoke Hampshire 
Njeuma, M.Z.(1978) Fulani hegemony in Yola (Old Adamawa),1802-1902, Yaounde 
 CEPER,pp3-4 
______ (1988), ‘The Fulani and the political economy of the Bamenda Grassfields, 1940-
 1960’ in Geschiere, P and Konings P [Eds] the Political Economy  of Cameroon: 
 Historical perspectives, Leiden 
Nkwi P.N (1974), the problem of the origin of Kom matrilineal institutions: symposium Leo 
 Frobenius, Perspectives of contemporary African Studies pp. 288 
______ (1985),’Traditional female militancy in a modern context’ in Barbier 
 (eds)Femmes  du Cameroun: meres pacifiques, femmes rebelles, Orstom Kathala 
 Bondy- Paris 
 
164 
 
Nkwi, W.G (2006),’Elites, ethno-regional competition in Cameroon, and the Southwest Elites 
 Association (SWELA), 1991-1997)’, African Study Monographs, Volume 27, 
 Number 3 pp 123-129  
______ (2011a), Sons and daughters of the soil: land and boundary conflicts in Northwest 
 Cameroon, 1955-2005, Langaa CIG, Mankon 
______ (2011b), ‘The counting of votes that have never counted: reading into the 2011 
 Presidential election in Cameroon, CJDHR Volume 5 Number 2 pp10-13 
______ (2014), National Engagement Strategy on Land Governance in Cameroon 
Nyamnjoh, F.B, (2011), ‘Cameroon bushfalling: negotiation of identity and belonging in 
 fiction  and ethnography’, American Ethnologist Volume 38 Number 4 pp709 
______ (2013a), ‘The nimbleness of being Fulani’, Africa Today Volume 59 Number 3pp 
 106,110,118,121 &124 
______ Nyamnjoh, F.B.(2013b) ’politics of back-scratching in Cameroon and beyond’ in 
 Drulak, Pand Moravcova, S ,eds, Non-Western relection on politics,Franfurt am 
 Main: Peter pp 1 
_______(2013c)‘Fiction and mobility in Africa’, Citizenship Studies Voulume 17  Number 6-
 7  
Olanya, D.R (2012),’From Global Land Grabbing for Biofuels to Acquisitions of African 
 Water  for Commercial Agriculture’ Current African Issues 50 pp 4,6,17 &34 
Omobowale, A and Olutayo (2010),’Political clientelism and rural development in South 
 western Nigeria’, the Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 80 
 Number 3pp 459-455 
Onoma, A, K. (2008),’The use of land to generate political support’, Africa Development 
 Volume XXXIII Number 3 pp 148 &153 
Orji, N. (2010)’governing‘Ethnicised’ public sphere: insights from Nigeria’,Africa 
 Development Vol. XXXV. No 4 pp 168 
O’Rourke, H.S (2012), ‘Native foreigners and the ambiguity of order and identity: the case of 
 African Diasporas and Islamic law in British Cameroon’, History in Africa, Volume 
 39pp 97-98 & 107 
Page, B. Evans, M and Mercer, C (2010),’Revisiting the politics of belonging in Cameroon’, 
 The Journal of the International African Institute Volume 80, Number 3pp.354 
Pelican, M. (2008), ‘Mbororo claims to regional citizenship and minority status in Northwest 
 Cameroon’, The Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 78 Number 
 4pp 550 
 Postel, G (2013), ‘Ancestors and title deeds: rural transformation in 20th century South 
 Africa  and the consolidation of ethnic based identities’ in Sandra, Evers, Seagle and 
 Krijtenburg [Eds] Africa for sale? Positioning the state, land, and society in foreign 
 large  scale  land  acquisitions in Africa, Brill Leiden-London pp247 
165 
 
Pul, H.A.S (2011) ‘Exclusion, association and violence: trends and triggers in Northern 
 Ghana’s Konkomba-Dagomba wars, The African Anthropologist Volume 10 Number 
 1 PP 42,58 & 62 
Rangers, T. (1994), ‘The invention of tradition revisited: the case of colonial Africa’ in 
 Kaarsholm et al [Eds] inventions and boundaries: historical and anthropological 
 approaches to the study of ethnicity, Roskilde University 
Schler, L. (2005), ‘History, the nation-state, and alternative narratives: an example from 
 colonial Douala’, African Studies Review, Volume 48, Number 1pp 93 
Scholte, P. Kari, S. Moritz, M and Prins, H(2006),pastoralists responses to flood plain 
 rehabilitation in North Cameroon, Human Ecology, Volume 34,No.1 
Scott, W.E and Miriam,G.M,(1980),Executive summary:agricultural marketing in the 
 northwest province of Cameroon, United Republic of Cameroon, USAID,Yaounde  
    Simo, M (2011) Land grabbing, governance and social peace-building issues in Cameroon: 
  Case study of  the roles of elites in land deals and commoditization in the northwest, 
  LDPI, University of Sussex PP 82&89 
    Socpa, A. (2010), ‘New kinds of land conflict in urban Cameroon: the case of the “landless” 
  indigenous peoples of Yaoundé’, The Journal of the International African Institute, 
  Volume 80, Number 4 pp 554-558 
Sone, P (2012a),’Conflict over landownership: the case of farmers and cattle graziers in the 
 northwest region of Cameroon’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution Volume 12, 
 number 1pp 84 &102 
Sone, P. (2012b), ‘Access to land in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon: challenges and 
 prospects’, Journal of Social Development in Africa Volume 27 Number 2 pp90-100 
Spierenburg, M. (2005),”We fought the war to return to the old ways.” Conflicts about land 
 reforms in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe’ in Evers, S Spierenburg, M and Wels, H 
 [Eds]  competing jurisdictions: settling land claims in Africa, Brill, Leiden &Boston 
Stenning, D.J.(1959),Savannah nomads: a study of the Wadaabe pastoral Fulani of Western 
 Bornu Province Northern Region, Nigeria, Oxford University Press London  
Swain,A.Swain,R.B,Themner,A and Krampe (2011) Climate change and the rsik of violent 
 conflicts in Southern Africa, Global Crisis Solutions, Pretoria 
Szeftel, M. (2000),’Clientelism, corruption and catastrophes’ Review of African Political 
 Economy Volume 27 Number 85 pp437 
Tegomoh, E.N. (2013),’being a foreigner in one’s country: mobility, land acquisitions and 
 investments in Cameroon’, in Sandra, Evers, Seagle and Krijtenburg [Eds] Africa for 
 sale?:  Positioning the state, land and society in foreign large-scale land acquisitions 
 in Africa Brill Leiden. Boston  
166 
 
Tonah, S. (2002), ‘Fulani pastoralists, indigenous farmers and the contest for land in 
 Northern Ghana’, Afrika Spectrum Volume 37 Number 1pp 
Tonah, S.(2006) ‘Migration and Fulbe conflicts in Ghana’, CJAS, Volume 40 Number 
 1pp155-172 
 Toulmin, C. (2007), ‘Negotiating access to land in West Africa’ in Derman, B, Odgaard, R 
 and Sjaastad, E [Eds] conflict over land and water in Africa, James Curry, Oxford 
Twaib, F. (1996) ‘The dilemma of the customary landholder: the conflict between customary 
 and statutory rights of occupancy in Tanzania’ in Debusmann Rand Arnold, S [Eds] 
 land law and land ownership in Africa, Bayreuth African Studies 41 
Umeh, J.N, (1973), Compulsory acquisition of land and compensation in Nigeria, Sweet and 
 Maxwell, London 
Vabi, M (n.d) Fulani settlement and modes of adjustment in the northwest province of 
 Cameroon (unpublished) 
Van Beek (2012), ‘Cultural models of power in Africa’, in Abbink,J and De Bruijn,M  eds, 
 land ,law and politics in Africa:mediating conflict and reshaping the state,Brill, 
 Leiden 
Vubo, E (2005), ‘Matriliny and patriliny: between cohabitation-equilibrium and modernity in 
 the Cameroon Grassfields’ African Study Monographs Volume 26 Number 
 3pp151, 157 &158 
Vubo, E.Y and Ngwa, G.A. (2001),’Changing intercommunity relations and the politics of 
 identity in the northern Mezam area, Cameroon’,Cahiers d’etudes Africaines 
 161pp163,166-8 &185 
Warnier, J.P. (2012), Cameroon Grassfields civilization, Langaa, Mankon 
Werner, W.(1993), ‘A brief history of land dispossession in Namibia’, Journal of African 
 Studies Volume 19 Number 1pp137-144 
White, B. (2013),’ Corporate land deals, dispossession and the future of farming’ in Evers, 
 Seagle  and Krijtenburg [Eds] Africa for sale? : positioning the state, land and society 
 in foreign large-scale land acquisitions in Africa, Brill, and Leiden-Boston 
Wouonepo (1992) the new agricultural policy, Douala-Cameroon 7-15 
Zoomers, A. (2013), ‘A critical review of the policy debate on large scale land acquisitions: 
 fighting symptoms or killing the heart?’ in Africa for sale? : positioning the state, 
 land and society in foreign large-scale land acquisitions in Africa, Brill, and Leiden-
 Boston 
Thesis and Dissertations 
De Wit , S (2011), Global warning: an ethnography of the encounter of global and local 
 climate change discourses in the Bamenda Grassfields, Cameroon, Research Master 
 Thesis in African Studies, African Studies Centre Leiden. 
167 
 
Henn, J.K (1979), Peasants, workers, and capital: the political economy of labor and 
 incomes in Cameroon, PhD Thesis, Harvard University, and Cambridge. 
 Massachusetts 
Kah, H.K (2012) Gender and matriliny in the Laimbwe history (Cameroon), C.1750-2001, 
 PhD Thesis, University of Buea 
Kirchner, K. (2013) Conflicts and Politics in the Tana Delta, Kenya: An Analysis of the 
 2012- 2013 Clashes and the General and Presidential Elections 2013, Thesis African 
 Studies Research Master 
Nkwi, W. G. (1998), Boundary conflicts in the Bamenda grassfields C.1950-1995: a case 
 study of the Bambili and Babanki-Tungoh boundary conflict, Master Thesis, 
 University of Buea 
Teboh, B. A (2002), Women and change in the Cameroon Grassfields: a social and economic 
 history of Moghamoland.C.1889-1960, PhD dissertation, University of California, 
 Los Angeles. 
Archival Sources 
NAB/No. Ab/17(1) ‘Fulani in Bamenda Division reorganisation of 1943’ 
______ No.Ab17/ (3) ‘Report on Education for Nomadic Bororos by AEF Murray, Resident 
 Cameroons Province’ 
______ No.Ab/17 (6) ‘Application for lease of grazing grounds in the Cameroons province’ 
______No. Ab/17(7)’Fulani intelligence report correspondence on the Cameroon Bush 
 Fulani, Bamenda Division 1937’ by Percival 
______No. Ab/17 (8) ‘Memorandum of Fulani Settlement Bamenda Division by E.A Carr 
 1956’Appendix ‘A’ 
______ No.Ab/17 (9) ‘Notes on the Fulani of British and French Cameroons, Cameroons 
 Province 1943’ 
_____ No.Ab/17(10) ‘Report on farmer-grazier relations and changing pattern of agriculture 
 in Nsaw (South Eastern Federation, Bamenda, Southern Cameroons’ 
_____ No.Ab/17 (11) ‘The farmer-grazier and related problems by MJA Browers, Land use 
 Office’ 
_____ No.Ad/22 ‘Intelligence report on Wum and Nsaw in the Bamenda Province by Phyllis 
 Kaberry, Lady Anthropologist 1948’ 
______ No.Ib/1949/2 ‘Bu Quarter head petition by and others of Bu village Bamenda 
 Division’ 
______ No.Ib/1938/3 ‘Fulani headman Ardo Sabga Bamenda Division Cameroons Province 
 1938 
168 
 
RAB N0/NW/AC.1960/1/BK; Historical notes Bamenda Grassfields by Ndifor Cletus 
 Delegation of Culture Bamenda 
_______ N0/ NW/Aa/1983/1: A collection of ethnography notes 
_______ No.NW/Qf/G.1933/1 ‘Petition by Fulani residing in Bamenda Province 1933’ 
_______ Aa 1 ethnological notes on the Cameroons 1916 
_______ Ad.10 assessment report on Fungom District Bamenda Division Cameroon Province 
 1929 
Official Texts, Minutes, Reports, Orders and Letters 
Annual Report of the Divisional Delegation of Livestock and Fisheries for Menchum 
 (MINEPIA) 2009 
Decree No.77/245 of July 1977 which provided the framework for the recognition of 
 Traditional Rulers in Cameroon 
Decree No. 2007/115 of April 2007 creating new administrative Units in Cameroon 
Decree No.2005/481 of December 2005 to complete and supplement the 1974 Ordinances 
 and 1976 decrees.  
Land Reform  Law 1974 Decree N0.76-165 of 27 April 1976 to establish the conditions for 
 obtaining land certificates, amended and supplemented by Decree N0.2005/481 of 16 
 December 2005 
Ordinance No. 74-1 to establish rules governing land tenure in Cameroon 
Ordinace No.74-2 to establish rules governing state land 
Ordinance No. 74-3 to establish expropriation procedures for ‘public purposes’ including the 
 terms of expropriation passed in 1974 
Forestry law No.94/0/ of 20th January 1994 
Decree No. 95/466-PM of 20th July 1995 on wild life 
Law No. 90/053 of December 19th 1992 and receipt of declaration of association No. 
RDA/061/BAPP of 21st October 1992 
Decree No. 66-307-COR of 25th November 1966 on the registration of Traditional land rights 
Decree No.90/1459 of 08 November 1990 creating the National Human Rights and Liberty 
 Commission 
Liberty laws No.90/052 OF December 1990 
Preamble of the 1996 Cameroon Constitution 
Report of Wum farmer-grazer commission of 12/12/2005 
Constitution and Internal Regulations of MBOSCUDA 
169 
 
Newspapers 
Doing Business in Cameroon 2012 Edition 
L’Action Newspaper 
Websites 
 Map of Cameroon within the Central African Sub region 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cameroon-political-map.htm  accessed 
26/07/2013 
Map of Wum showing Aghem and Bu sites of research http://www.focodev.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/wum-map-color.jpg accessed 4/8/2014. 
Presidential Decree allocating monthly allowances to traditional rulers in nCameroon 
http://journal.rdpcpdm.cm/content/monthly-allowance?page=1 accessed 26/7/2013 
Bakweri Youths accuse Traditional rulers of selling their ancestral land to strangers 
http://cameroonjournal.com/page565.html  accessed 22/4/2014 
See  Wache, F ‘on Mount Mary Anglophones stand 20years after the All Anglophone 
Conference (AAC) Buea http://www.franciswache.com/2013/04/on-mount-mary-
anglophones-stand.html#sthash.2LC4jAWA.dpuf   accessed 18/03/2014 
See ‘Eviction of The Fulani from their ancestral land at Banjah’. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47545&Cr=cameroon&Cr1#.U1fDsCjtA5g 
Accessed 15th /4/2014 
Cameroon: Institutional situation 
http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/institutionnel/cameroon.html  accessed 
10/01/2013. 
Mbororo appeal acquittal torture case  http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/lisa-
matthews/mbororo-appeal-acquittal-torture-case    accessed 02/01/2013       
John Fru Ndi  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Fru_Ndi accessed 23/7/2014 
 
Glossary 
Akon- Aghem name for a ward 
Aku- A clan of the Fulani pastoralists who rear small white black-nosed cattle 
Aghem- This is the name of the ethnic group and people occupying part of the research area. 
 This should not be confused with Wum which is the administrative name of the area 
 derived from colonial influences 
Anlu/Kefap/Funbweun- Female militant group in matrilineal societies, called differently in 
 Kom, Aghem and Funghom 
Ardo/Sarki –the Traditional leader of the Fulani in Wum Central Sub-division 
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Batum- the Traditional title for the chief of one of the Aghem sections 
Bororoji –A breed of cattle usually associated with the Jafen 
Denkeghem- Title reserve for the Paramount and spiritual ruler of the Aghem 
 Fon, Fuai- Hereditary title for village head in some ethnic groups of the Grassfields 
Ganako-Local name for cattle herdsman  
Goshi- the First Family of nomadic pastoralists to arrive Cameroon at the beginning of the 
 21st Century 
Jafen-(Jafun) Nomadic Fulani family that migrated from Kano into the Cameroons 
 between1880- 1897 and rear large dark-brown cattle 
Jangali-tax paid per herd of cattl 
Meulo mufo- Symbolic drink for the Fon but could also refer to other gifts including money 
Mbororo (Bororo) the term refers to all the sub groups of the Fulbe pastoralists derived from 
 a cattle breed Bororoji 
Natum/Nafoyn-Title for the mother of the chief in Wum and in Kom it is knwon as Nafoyn 
Ndukenye- It is the ritual performed by the Denkeghem or his first son at the shrines of late 
 Batums for good harvest, fertility, the birth of children and protection of the Aghem 
 people 
Takumbeng- Women militant group in Mezam Division, same with Kefap and Anlu 
Tshokon- Ward head appointed by a Batum 
Pulaaku- It is the Fulani moral code of conduct which also prescribes strict adherence to the 
 Islamic religion. It is also the agency through which young Fulani are socialised to 
 follow Fulani culture.       
Sallah/Ramadan- Moslem Feast 
Sous-Prefet- French title for a district head 
 
 
 
 
 
 
